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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this empirical research was to investigate 
whether there is a need for change in the accounting and audit 
requirements of small private companies in the UK, where there has 
been little empirical research or application of a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the SC audit problems. 
In order to achieve the research objective, a comprehensive 
literature review of small company financial reporting (SCFR) was 
carried out to ascertain whether there was a generally acceptable 
auditing framework to offer possible solutions to the SC audit 
problems. It also sought to identify the role played by the main 
parties in SCFR, and to examine the main SCFR issues and arguments in 
the SCFR debate. Furthermore, a survey of SC accounts was undertaken 
to check whether the disclosures seemed to be consistent with the 
various financial reporting requirements. In addition, postal 
questionnaires were used to ascertain the views of selected directors 
and auditors of SCs about SCFR issues. 
The main findings of this empirical research broadly indicate, within 
a SCFR context, that: 
There is a generally acceptable framework for company audit but due 
to the characteristics of SCs, there are a number of weaknesses in 
its application to SCs. The literature review identifies possible 
solutions to overcome some of these problems. 
The survey of accounts indicates that there is an apparent improvement in filing of accounts within the statutory time limit and that there is a fall in the number of qualified audit reports. The 
survey shows that the majority of SCs do not take advantage of filing 
abbreviated accounts, and the extent of non-compliance with various 
financial reporting requirements appears not to be wide-spread. 
With respect to the surveys of the directors and auditors, the study 
identifies a number of similar views concerning the ownership and 
control of SCs by their directors and their families, the limitation 
of liability as the main advantage of incorporation and the need for 
an audit as the main disadvantage. Other similarities were the need 
for replacing full and abbreviated accounts of SCs with one set of 
accounts including a shortened profit and loss account with possible 
disclosures of turnover and profit before tax figures. Differences 
of view emerged over directors' and auditors' perceptions of the 
value of an audit, with a higher proportion of directors claiming 
them to be valuable. Cross analysis of results provided some 
assurances about the consistency of the above results. 
Comparing the results of these surveys with those of Page (1981), 
they appear to suggest that there are changes in directors' and 
auditors' attitudes over the last decade regarding the need for an 
audit and the main uses of SC accounts. 
In conclusion, this empirical research calls for simplification of 
the form and content of SC accounts and the relaxation of audit 
requirement for certain categories of SCs. 
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
small company Financial Reporting (SCFR) 
The term SCFR refers to a Small Company's accounts and 
statutory audit. 
Small Company (SC) 
For the purpose of this research, a "small company" 
refers to a non-dormant private company which satisfies 
at least two of the following thresholds in a financial 
year (i. e. a definition based on the Companies Act 1985 
for filing abbreviated accounts, S 247 CA 1985): 
At time current 
of survey limits 
- 
turnover not exceeding £2.000m £2.8m 
- 
balance sheet total not 
exceeding £O. 975m £1.4m 
- average number of employees 
not exceeding 50 50 
(For other definitions of a SC see section 4.3). 
Very Small Company (Very SC) 
The term "Very Small Company" refers to a private company 
with annual turnover below the threshold for VAT 
registration and balance sheet total not exceeding £1.4m 
(see section 5.8.1 for more details). 
Proprietary Company 
The term "Proprietary Company" refers to a private owner- 
managed company with annual turnover in excess of VAT 
registration threshold but less than 25% of the turnover 
limit of a SC as defined by the CA 1985. 
Audit 
"An 'audit' is the independent examination of, and 
expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an 
enterprise" (para. 2 to the Explanatory Foreword, 
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Auditing Standards and Guidelines, ICAEW, 1993b). For 
other definitions of audit see section 2.2. Alternatives 
to SC audit (for example, review and a compilation 
report) are compared in, section 5.7. 
Review 
"A review could be described as a procedure whereby an 
accountant, relying upon the assumption that his client 
has made a full and fair disclosure of all the relevant 
information, satisfies himself (after completing work in 
accordance with an approved review standard) that on the 
basis of information and explanations so provided the 
financial statements give a true and fair view" (APC, 
1979: para. 43). For other definitions of a review and 
its comparisons with other alternatives to SC audit see 
section 5.7. 
Compilation Report 
Compilation report is a statement by a competent person 
that accounts have been properly prepared from 
information supplied by management and conformed as 
regards content and layout with the specification of the 
Companies Act (DTI, 1988). For other definitions of a 
compilation report and its comparisons with other 
alternatives to SC audit see section 5.7. 
VAT thresholds 
At time current 
of survey limits 
££ 
i) For VAT registration 36,600 45,000 
ii) For VAT cash accounting 300,000 350,000 
Note 
This thesis makes frequent reference to auditing and the 
auditor which are to external auditing and the external 
auditor respectively. 
Additionally, references to the auditor are made in the 
masculine only, but equally applies to the feminine form. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of problem 
All companies incorporated under the Companies Acts are required 
to have their accounts audited with the exception of: 
- 
dormant companies (which do not trade and have no accounting 
transactions during their financial periods); and 
- 
those small companies (with annual turnover up to the VAT cash 
accounting threshold) which were exempt by the November 1993 
Budget (for more details see section 5.8). 
However, the laws of almost all other EC countries do not 
require small private companies (SCs) to have their accounts 
audited. Similarly, SCs in the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada do not require an audit. 
The administrative and legislative burdens imposed on small 
businesses have been a controversial issue for many years. In 
particular, issues such as the retention of the SC audit and the 
application of accounting standards to SCs have been the subject 
of extensive debate in the UK (e. g. APC, 1979 and Carsberg et 
al, 1985). 
SCs as defined by the companies Act (CA) 1985 may file 
abbreviated (modified) accounts with the Registrar of companies 
but they must prepare and circulate full accounts to their 
members. The form and content of these full and abbreviated 
accounts are also subject to debate (e. g. LSCA, 1992; DTI, 
1995). 
The following section provides an outline of SCFR issues and 
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debate. Full details of these issues and debate are provided in 
subsequent Chapters. 
1.2 Outline of SCFR issues and debate 
Over the last twenty years, there have been much public debate 
and research about SCFR issues (e. g. DoT, 1979; APC, 1979; Page, 
1981; Abdel-khalik, 1983; Robertson, 1986a; Keasey and Watson, 
1987; Freedman and Godwin, 1993) and in particular on the 
application of accounting standards to SCs (Carsberg et al, 
1985), form and content of SC accounts (DTI, 1985b; DTI, 1995), 
whether SCs should be audited or not, and alternatives to SC 
audit (APC, 1979; DTI, 1985b; DTI, 1988; LSCA, 1992; ICAEW, 
1992b). 
Despite the economic importance of small businesses, for example 
in creating employment (Storey, 1994) and being innovative 
(Cross, 1983), there is no single, uniformly acceptable 
definition of a SC and most definitions of a SC overlap greatly 
(Storey, 1994) and generally speaking, they comprise the vast 
majority of all companies in the UK (see Freedman and Godwin, 
1993). SCs are claimed to have specific characteristics, such 
as owner/manager dominance and internal control deficiencies 
resulting from limited segregation of duties (Raiborn, 1982) 
which may make it rather difficult for the auditor of a SC to 
rely on its internal control (UEC, 1983), resulting in the audit 
of a SC to be different from that of a large company (Humphrey 
and Turley, 1986). 
With regard to ownership and control of SCs, a number of leading 
studies (e. g. Page, 1981 and Humphrey et al, 1986) indicate that 
SCs are generally owned and controlled by their directors, 
possibly bringing into question the appropriateness of the 
current reporting requirement (based on the stewardship 
principle) by directors to themselves as shareholders. 
As to the application of accounting standards to SCs, Carsberg 
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et al (1985) argues that compliance costs are relatively higher 
for SCs and their benefits are relatively lower. In this 
regard, the ASC (1988a) accepted that there was a case, in 
specific circumstances, for exempting small entities from 
certain provisions of accounting standards. It is worthy of 
note that the CCAB working party on "Big GAAP/Little GAAP" 
recently proposed radical exemptions relieving SCs from the 
requirements of the majority of accounting standards (for more 
details see section 4.11). 
In terms of the burden of financial reporting, the DTI (1985a) 
suggested that SCs should be subject to less rigorous disclosure 
requirements in their annual accounts. Carsberg et al (1985) 
also investigated the burden of financial reporting on SCs by 
examining the costs and benefits of accounting disclosure and 
statutory audit. They found that their sample directors 
considered the production of the annual accounts one of 
administrative difficulty rather than one of the main problems 
facing SCs (see section 4.12). 
According to Moizer (1991), auditor independence may be 
threatened, principally because of the nature of the economic 
relationship between auditor and client. However, Humphrey et 
al (1986) found that the reliance placed on the auditor by a SC 
client increased with multiple services (e. g. accounting, 
taxation, management advice) and this in fact might increase the 
auditors' power in dealing with SC clients without conflicting 
with the interests of management. 
With reference to the form and content of SC accounts, LSCA 
(1992) argues that the distinction between full and abbreviated 
accounts of SCs, and even the occasion when the latter may be 
used, is not well understood by SCs. On the other hand, 
Robertson (1986a) provides some evidence in support of the 
option for SCs to file abbreviated accounts. 
The debate in this area, which has been going on for the past 
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decade or so (see DTI, 1985b and DTI, 1995) is yet to be 
settled. This warrants a thorough investigation. 
As to whether SCs should be audited or not, the APC (1979) in 
its discussion paper sets out the arguments for and against SC 
statutory audit requirement. It stresses that the case for 
retaining SC audit rests on the value of the audit to those who 
have an interest in SC affairs (shareholders, banks, creditors, 
etc. ). For example, with reference to shareholders, on the one 
hand, it argues that an audit provides some assurance as to 
whether the accounts give a "true and fair" view and, in 
particular, it may protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, the discussion paper (APC, 
1979) argues that the independent audit is of little value to 
shareholders, who are all directors and actively involved in the 
management of the company. 
The paper also considers the effect of other issues, such as 
"limited liability". It argues that limited liability is an 
important benefit provided to shareholders of a limited company 
and statutory audit is a valid price for this perceived benefit. 
However, it argues that in many SCs, the benefits of limited 
liability have been eroded because directors have to give 
personal guarantees for their companies' borrowings (for full 
discussion of these arguments see section 5.6). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that problems invariably arise 
in the application of normal auditing principles and procedures 
to many SCs because of their characteristics (e. g. owner/manager 
dominance and internal control deficiencies) which may bring 
into question "whether such a company can and should be 
subjected to a normal audit" (Woolf, 1994: 319). In addition to 
the above, it has been claimed that statutory audit imposes real 
costs on SCs (DTI, 1993 and Freedman and Godwin, 1993), in 
particular, the opportunity cost of diverting management time to 
deal with the audit matters and the extra cost of the new audit 
regulation introduced by the CA 1989 (see for example, Fearnley 
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and Page, 1992 and 1993 and section 5.4). In this regard, 
Fearnley and Page (1993: 59) report that opinion against 
retaining the SC audit has been hardened. 
In anticipation of change, the DTI (1988) Is consultative note 
considered alternatives to an SC audit, in particular, a 
compilation report and a review (for full discussion see section 
5.7). In response, the ICAEW (1988) expressed some concern at 
how the various alternative forms of report would be interpreted 
by the reader of the accounts. In this regard, a study by 
Johnson et al (1983) found that the decision to grant a loan or 
determine the interest-rate premium was not "significantly" 
affected by involvement of the auditor. In another study 
carried out by Arnold and Diamond (1981), who investigated the 
reactions of CPAs and bankers to the introduction of new 
services (in July 1979) to nonpublic companies in the USA - 
namely compilation, review and audit 
- 
found that their 
respondents claimed that the introduction of review and 
compilation services was a positive development by the 
accounting profession. 
In addition, there are a number of recent discussion papers on 
this issue, for example, LSCA, 1992; ICAEW, 1992b and DTI, 1993 
highlighting the importance of the SC audit debate and the 
controversy surrounding it which warrants an empirical 
investigation. 
It is worth mentioning that published literature covers issues 
around the SCFR debate in a piecemeal fashion only and there is 
little research of an empirical nature on this topic (Robertson, 
1986a and 1986b). In fact, according to Robertson (1986a: 21): 
"... there has been a failure to obtain general consensus in 
the small company financial reporting and auditing debate. It 
was suggested that one factor which may have contributed 
towards this lack of achievement is that the various 
organisations and bodies involved in the debate and concerned 
with making submissions to the Department of Trade have not 
all been in possession of the same information 
- 
that is, in 
the form of published empirical research". 
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This research seeks to contribute to this field by obtaining 
general consensus in the SCFR and auditing debate. 
1.3 Lack of application of a theoretical framework to SCs 
The literature review identifies broadly two main types of 
approach adopted to establish a rationale for auditing within a 
coherent theoretical framework. The first approach (i. e. audit 
postulates), which was developed by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) and 
adopted by other audit theorists such as Sherer and Kent (1983) 
and Flint (1988), includes assumptions which are claimed to be 
"the fundamental theoretical truths of corporate auditing" (Lee, 
1993: 74) and are thought to provide the basis for the 
development of general auditing concepts. However, there are 
conflicting viewpoints about the usefulness of this approach. 
For example, Hamilton (see Gwilliam, 1987: 42) has argued that 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) Is conceptual model has failed to provide 
any empirical testable results. 
By contrast, the second approach explains the demand for and 
supply of audit services within the context of various theories 
of an economic framework for auditing. In particular, the 
agency theory, which generally speaking is concerned with the 
principal-agent problem in the separation of ownership and 
control of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), argues that 
shareholders (the principals) may be able to maximise their 
wealth by using incentive compensation contracts together with 
independent monitoring of the financial reporting, and that the 
need for monitoring may also come from the agent (Evans, 1980). 
Indeed, according to Ng and Stoeckenius (1979) the above 
situation encourages more accurate reporting and demand for 
external auditing. Other theories within the economic approach 
provide some explanation for the need for audit; for example, 
the information theory indicates that an audit can help 
investors to improve their decision making (Wallace, 1985) or, 
according to the insurance theory, an audit may be needed to 
provide protection against financial failure of companies 
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(Antle, 1982). 
The signalling theory predicts that an external audit may be 
required by some clients in order to set themselves apart from 
others in the market (Morris, 1987), whereas according to the 
behavioural theory, an audit may, generally speaking, influence 
the behaviour of staff in a company (Churchill et al, 1982). 
The two other main theories in this approach, namely the 
contracting theory and the political process theory, have the 
potential to explain auditing practice. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) argue that these explanations are generally intuitive and 
their predictions are not formally tested. However, one study 
(Chow, 1982) used contracting variables to predict which firms 
hired professional auditors in 1926 when such an audit was not 
required by law. With reference to the political process 
theory, there are a number of empirical studies which indicate 
that regulation has an effect on auditing (DeAngelo, 1982; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1981b; Simunic, 1980). 
From the above published literature and research on a 
theoretical framework for company auditing, there appear to be 
gaps in understanding their application to the SC audit debate. 
Indeed, the need for their application has been put forward by 
Robertson (1986b), who argues that one of the factors which may 
have contributed to lack of progress in the SC audit debate is 
that "there has been no application of a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of the small company audit problem". He goes 
on to add that "without reference to an underlying theory, it is 
difficult to put the various arguments in perspective. There 
is, therefore, no rational or consistent means of evaluating 
alternative solutions" (pp. 50-51). This piece of work is a 
contribution in this direction. 
1.4 Research objective and significance 
The main objective of this research was to investigate whether 
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there is a need for change in the accounting and audit 
requirements of small private companies, based on recent 
developments and the perceptions of selected groups affected by 
the debate, i. e. directors and auditors of SCs. To achieve this 
objective, a comprehensive literature review of the SCFR issues 
was undertaken together with a review of some SC accounts. 
Furthermore, postal surveys of SC directors and auditors were 
carried out. 
This study is significant insofar as it comprises empirical 
research which develops issues raised in various discussion 
papers, for example, the DTI, 1993; ICAEW, 1992b and LSCA, 1992 
and it responds to Robertson's (1986a and 1986b) identified need 
for research in this field. This research also responds to the 
need of the APC (1991) which considered the scope of SC audit. 
It was because of the significance of this study and the 
topicality of the SCFR debate that CUBS sponsored and LSCA 
supported this research. 
Preliminary reports on the research findings were presented to 
the DTI, ICAEW, LSCA and other interested parties in July 1993 
which demonstrated substantial support for SCFR reform. It is 
hoped that the research findings might provide a basis for APB 
and ASB pronouncements affecting the SCFR with a view to 
reducing the accounting and audit burdens on SCs. 
Finally, it is hoped that the research findings might help to 
provide a basis for a way forward in the apparent division 
between the accountancy profession and the DTI, and also among 
accountancy bodies on the SCFR issues. 
1.5 Outline of the study and summary of the major findings 
The rest of this work is structured as follows: 
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review on the 
theoretical framework for company auditing is provided. This 
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helps to establish a rationale for auditing and to examine its 
application to the SCFR debate. The review identifies apparent 
weaknesses in the assumptions which form the foundation of the 
framework as far as SCs are concerned. In the search for a 
possible solution, two broad options are identified, namely: 
change the "practice" or change the "aims and objectives" to 
make them compatible. However, in order to decide which option 
might be preferred, there is a need to obtain general consensus 
in the SCFR and auditing debate (see surveys in Chapters 7,8 
and 9). 
Chapter 3 examines the role played by the major parties (e. g. 
the regulatory bodies and professional institutions) in the SCFR 
debate, what they represent and how their decisions are 
influenced. For example, with regard to the professional 
institutions' role in the SCFR debate, the literature review 
indicates that "self-interest" has led to the lack of consensus 
among them. 
Chapter 4 reviews the published literature to identify some of 
the important issues in a SC environment which affect SCFR. In 
particular, the review examines the economic importance of small 
businesses; definitions of a SC; their characteristics, 
ownership and control; the form and content of SC accounts; and 
their main users. The review concludes that some of these 
issues need to be investigated further in order to establish a 
fair balance between the different needs of the diverse 
interests involved. 
Chapter 5 considers the SCFR debate by reviewing the history of 
the company audit; provisions of the main CAs; and the 
background to the SCFR debate since 1979. The effects of audit 
regulation on the SC audit debate, the main arguments in favour 
and against SC audit requirement, alternatives to an SC audit 
and their consequences are discussed in detail in this Chapter. 
The review concludes that the statutory audit requirement may 
impose a real cost on SCs and the government's drive to free SCs 
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from unnecessary burdens appears to be in the right direction. 
Chapter 6 considers the methods of data collection and analysis. 
The main findings of the survey of accounts are presented in 
Chapter 7, which broadly indicate that there is an apparent 
improvement in the filing of accounts within the statutory time 
limit and also a fall in the number of qualified audit reports 
on SC accounts. The review also indicates that the accounts of 
SCs generally comply with the requirements of the CA and the 
"basic" SSAPs requirements. 
Chapters 8 and 9 report respectively on the main findings of 
postal surveys of a sample of SC directors and auditors. The 
surveys were carried out in order to obtain a general consensus 
in the SCFR and auditing debate. With regard to the form and 
content of SC accounts in particular, the surveys provide some 
interesting empirical evidence in support of replacing both full 
and abbreviated accounts of SCs with only "one set of accounts", 
and also point to their possible benefits and contents. With 
reference to a possible change of audit requirement of SCs, the 
findings provide empirical evidence in support of SC audit 
relaxation and also examine its consequences. 
Chapter 10 is devoted to testing the research hypotheses and 
provides some assurances regarding the consistency- of the 
primary results reported in Chapters 8 and 9 it also identifies 
some diversity of opinion among respondents in respect of SCFR 
issues. 
Finally, Chapter 11 sets out the research summary, main findings 
and recommendations, and areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AUDIT: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, an attempt will be made to provide some 
definitions of an audit and an outline of the modern view 
of the audit function. It will also discuss the main 
types of approach that a number of researchers have 
adopted to establish a rationale for auditing within a 
coherent theoretical framework. The first approach 
considers some fundamental postulates which are assumed 
to provide the foundations for the development of a 
logical and integrated theory of auditing. In this 
respect, the company audit framework as put forward by 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) and Lee (1982) will be 
considered. The second approach looks at the economic 
considerations of the need for auditing (i. e. the demand 
for and supply of audit services). Within the economic 
framework, the application of agency theory, information 
theory, insurance theory, signalling theory and 
behavioural theory will be discussed. 
Furthermore, within the economic framework, the 
application of positive accounting theory to auditing 
will be explained. The application of a theoretical 
framework to the SC audit debate and possible solutions 
are presented in this Chapter. 
2.2 Audit 
This section briefly provides some of the definitions of 
an audit and an outline of the modern view of the audit 
function. Other special audit functions are considered 
in the remaining part of this Chapter. 
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Unaudited statements and data are claimed to have an 
information value (Flint, 1988) and the purpose of audit 
is: 
"... to add to that information value by expressing an 
opinion on the credibility, meaning, significance, 
reliability, legitimacy, legality or regularity of the 
statement or the data. The audit lends some 
authority, or alternatively explicitly denies 
authority, to the message which the originator of the 
statement or the data intended to convey... ". (Flint, 
1988: 38). 
According to Flint (1988), most definitions of audit are 
"oriented to a specific situation" as the following 
definitions by the two major international bodies bear 
out: 
The first International Auditing Practices Committee of 
the International Federation of Accountants Guideline 
(IFAC, 1980: 9) states that: 
"The objective of an audit of financial statements 
prepared within a framework of recognised accounting 
policies, is to enable an auditor to express an 
opinion on such financial statements. The auditor's 
opinion helps establish the credibility of the 
financial statements". 
Furthermore, the AICPA (1973: 1) states that: 
"The objective of the ordinary examination of 
financial statements by the independent auditor is the 
expression of an opinion on the fairness with which 
they present financial position, results of 
operations, and changes in financial position in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles". 
The main theme common to these definitions appears to be 
the process of an independent examination of financial 
statements and the expression of an opinion to certain 
users. Indeed, in the UK, the explanatory foreword to 
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Auditing Standards and Guidelines (see ICAEW, 1993b) 
states that: 
"An 'audit' is the independent examination of, and 
expression of an opinion on, the financial statements 
of an enterprise". 
This definition was adopted for the purpose of this 
research. 
With reference to the above definition, the Green Paper 
"The Future Development of Auditing" (ABP, 1993: 89) 
argues that "the present role of company audit is 
narrowly drawn" as the CA requires an "auditor to report 
to shareholders on a financial account of past activity" 
and it is "based on legislation formulated nearly fifty 
years ago" (the CA 1947). The APB (1993: 89) goes on to 
argue that this definition is not concerned with the 
future and it does not recognise a public interest beyond 
the needs of shareholders. 
The Green Paper offered for public debate a number of 
proposals for change in the current state of auditing and 
suggested that in the face of substantial change both in 
the commercial environment and in the expectations of 
users of financial statements, the auditing profession 
needs to accept change. 
In particular, the Green Paper proposed the need to 
redefine the role and scope of audit and the acceptance 
by auditors of wider responsibilities. These could 
extend beyond those currently required by statute or case 
law, such as warning shareholders or other stakeholders 
of substantial future risks, to encompass the detection 
of fraud or other illegal acts. 
The outcome of the debate on the Green Paper (APB, 1993) 
and other APB's initiatives were considered in the paper 
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"The Audit Agenda" (APB, 1995). The key proposals of 
this paper (APB, 1995) relate to the future role of 
auditors and the scope of audit which mainly apply to 
listed companies, and they are considered below. The 
paper proposes that the scope of audit for listed 
companies and major economic entities must be 
differentiated from that of unlisted. owner-managed 
businesses and in this regard it suggests that the APB 
will develop guidance on the application of auditing 
standards to the audit of owner-managed businesses. 
In the foreword to this paper, Professor Percy refers to 
the function of an audit; he states that it is about 
governance, and about upholding the integrity of 
financial reporting and business conduct. He stresses 
that audit is about "constructively adding value to 
confidence in those entities". 
In explaining why a need for audit exists, the APB 
(1995: para. 2.4) states that: 
"... legal or market requirements for audit arise from 
the existence of one or more groups with a valid 
interest in the entity which do not have direct access 
to information concerning its performance, whose 
members will often seek an account, from those who run 
the entity, of the matters with which they have 
concerns and will look to auditors to add value to 
that account". 
Furthermore, commenting on the nature of the interests 
which give rise to the need for audit, APB (1995) states 
that there is a public interest in ensuring proper 
accountability by those who manage entities. 
With reference to the purpose of audit, the APB (1993 and 
1995) argues that there are perceived gaps in the scope 
of audit, particularly regarding directors' stewardship, 
future prospects and detection of risk and fraud. To 
deal with these concerns, the APB (1993 and 1995: para. 
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4.3) proposes that the purpose of audit should be defined 
as being: 
"to provide an independent opinion to those with an 
interest in a company that they have received from 
those responsible for its direction and management an 
adequate account of: 
* the proper conduct of the company's affairs -a 
role which is now widely expected of auditors but 
is not part of the conventional definition of an 
audit; 
* the company's financial performance and position 
- 
the traditional role of reporting on financial 
stewardship; 
* future risks attaching to the company -a newly 
defined role, recognising that it is not the 
purpose of financial statements to predict the 
future". 
As regards the precise scope of the auditors' role, the 
APB (1995) suggests that it should encompass the above 
three elements of the definition of audit but it is 
concerned that those might be construed too widely, 
extending the expected role into areas in which auditors 
would be ill-placed to deliver any assurance. Taking 
these concerns into account, the APB (1995: para. 4.7) 
proposes the following general statement of the role of 
auditors: 
a) "to provide objective assurance on an entity's 
published financial reports, principally for the 
benefit of primary stakeholders to whom the auditors 
owe a duty of care, but also for the information of 
other stakeholders". 
b) "to provide advisory reports to directors or officers 
(including the audit committee) on governance matters, 
including risks and sensitivities relating to going 
concern and the appropriateness and adequacy of its 
systems of controls; in particular, arrangements for 
stewardship of assets, minimisation of risk of fraud 
and compliance with laws and regulations". 
c) "to provide to appointing agencies in the public 
sector or to regulators the information or assurance 
that they require through statute or by agreement". 
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It is worth mentioning that the existing statutory 
requirements cover some, but not all, elements of the 
role of auditors as defined above. 
The APB (1995) recognises that auditors will be reluctant 
to expand their statutory role until changes take place 
to the legal environment in which they operate, in 
particular in respect of Section 310 of the CA 1985 which 
prohibits persons appointed as auditors of a company from 
obtaining exemption from any liability attached to them 
in respect of breach of duty towards the company. 
However, in order to encourage auditors to expand their 
statutory role, the APB (1995) stresses that these 
proposals should allow for the scope of audit to be 
determined on a "market-led basis", to be agreed by 
contract, rather than the imposition of new legal 
requirements. 
It is worth pointing out that the various definitions and 
the scope of audit cited above relate to what is 
generally referred to as "corporate or company audit". 
This is different from an operational audit, a management 
audit and a social audit, which are briefly alluded to 
below. 
According to Flint (1988: 174-175) an operational audit is 
intended "to provide a measure of the achievement of an 
organisation towards its goals and objectives... ", 
whereas, a management audit is concerned with: 
"A comprehensive examination, analysis and evaluation 
by an independent external auditor of the performance 
of management in regard to the objectives, plans, 
procedures and strategies of the business 
enterprise... ". 
With regard to social audit, Flint (1988: 75) states that: 
"Social audit has to do with social responsibility and 
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monitoring the way in which an organisation conducts 
itself in its various relationships with society - as 
employer, manufacturer, supplier, member of the 
community, etc. ". 
It should be borne in mind that there are alternatives to 
company audit such as a review or a compilation report, 
which are considered in detail in section 5.7. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that an audit can 
commence after the necessary accounting work has been 
completed. However, in practice, especially in the case 
of SCs, the distinction between audit and accountancy 
work, as Woolf (1994) has observed, is not clearly 
appreciated. This lack of appreciation apparently is due 
to the limited book-keeping and accounting experiences of 
those involved in managing SCs. 
The preparation of the accounts is not part of the audit 
but it may provide the SC auditor, who has prepared the 
accounts, with extra assurance, thus allowing for reduced 
testing in other audit areas. 
2.3 Postulates framework for auditing 
2.3.1 Mautz and Sharaf's company audit framework 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) provide a skeleton framework 
within which auditing thought could be developed. They 
focus on the nature of the audit process for determining 
those criteria necessary for the adequate performance of 
the audit function. 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 42) offer the following 
"tentative" postulates which provide the foundations for 
developing a logical, integrated theory of auditing: 
- 
"financial statements and financial data are 
verifiable; 
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- 
there is no necessary conflict of interest between the 
auditor and the management of the enterprise under 
audit; 
- 
the financial statements and other information 
submitted for verification are free from collusive and 
other unusual irregularities; 
- 
the existence of a satisfactory system of internal 
control eliminates the probability of irregularities; 
- 
consistent application of generally accepted 
principles of accounting results in the fair 
presentation of financial position and the results of 
operations;. 
- 
in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, what 
has held true in the past for the enterprise under 
examination will hold true in the future; 
- 
when examining financial data for the purpose of 
expressing an independent opinion thereon, the auditor 
acts exclusively in the capacity of an auditor; and 
- 
the professional status of the independent auditor imposes commensurate professional obligations". 
According to Mautz and Sharaf, postulates are: 
"... assumptions that do not lend themselves to direct 
verification. The propositions deduced from the 
postulates of a given system, however, can be directly 
verified and such verification bears evidence of the truth of the postulates themselves" (Mautz and Sharaf, 
1961: 37). 
They emphasize (1961: 39) that "... the postulates, once 
accepted as useful and valid, may at a later date be 
challenged and even demonstrated to be invalid". 
Therefore, these postulates must be reviewed continually 
to see if they have become invalid because of new 
circumstances and if so, they should be discarded. 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 42) provide explanations for each 
postulate as justification for their selection. 
References to some of these explanations are made here. 
With reference to the postulate that "financial 
statements and financial data are verfiable", they argue 
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that "Unless financial data are verifiable, auditing has 
no reason for existence. If we release this assumption, 
we do away with the very subject of auditing" (p. 42). In 
this regard, they refer to various definitions of 
"verification" and in particular, they state that (p. 43): 
"Verification is the vehicle that carries one to a 
position of confidence about any given proposition. 
Such confidence may be positive or negative; that is, 
there may be assurance supplied by the verification 
procedure that the proposition is right or wrong, but 
the confidence cannot be blind. There must be 
evidence to support it, sufficient reason, sufficient 
" competent evidential matter". Otherwise the fancied 
assurance is nothing more than folly". 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961: 43) have cited Hospers noting that: 
"In order to know what a statement means, we must know 
how to verify it; we must know what operations we 
would have to go through in order to determine its truth or falsity". 
With regard to the proposition that financial statements 
are free from collusive and other unusual irregularities, 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 46) argue that: 
"If we assume that the data under examination do include irregularities resulting from extensive 
collusion and of the most unusual nature, we must design an audit program far beyond anything now 
considered necessary. In fact, there is some question 
whether any type of examination could be designed that 
would give even a reasonable assurance that all such irregularities would be discovered". 
Further discussion on the above has been provided in 
section 2.5, where the application of a theoretical 
framework to the SC audit debate has been considered (see 
"Major fraud and error"). 
Finally, with reference to the postulate that internal 
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control eliminates the probability of irregularities, it 
is worth noting that the term "probability" rather than 
"possibility" has been used. This is because, as Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961: 47) argue, "It is doubtful that the 
possibility of irregularities can ever be eliminated, 
although of course it can be reduced". Furthermore, in 
this regard they emphasize that (p. 47): 
"... it is the probability of irregularities that is 
eliminated, not irregularities themselves. 
Irregularities are still possible under good internal 
control, but they are no longer probable. On the 
other hand, if the internal control is not 
satisfactory, then errors and irregularities must be 
considered something more than merely possible". 
In their work, Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 245) offer a 
comprehensive view of auditing in a five level structure 
which shows the relationship between audit theory and 
audit practice. A simplified version of their original 
pie-shaped chart (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961: 247) showing the 
structure of auditing as a field of knowledge is 
presented below: 
Illustration 2.1: Structure of auditiv as a field of 
knowledge 
Central core of abstract thought 
(Mathematics, Logic and Metaphysics) 
Level 1: Philosophical Foundation (rests on 
fundamental disciplines) 
Level 2: Postulates (provide a groundwork for concept 
development) 
Level 3: Concepts 
Level 4: Precepts (provide directives for guidance 
of the practitioner) 
Level 5: Practical Applications (practice) 
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In the above illustration each level is derived from the 
level immediately above it (e. g. concepts are derived 
from postulates and so on). 
This illustration will be used later in conjunction with 
Lee (1982)'s and Robertson (1986b) Is illustrations to 
consider their application to the SC audit debate. 
2.3.2 Lee's company audit framework 
Lee (1982) develops three groups of auditing postulates 
from ideas contained in Mautz and SharafIs monograph "The 
Philosophy of Auditing" (1961). The first group of 
postulates (justifying postulates) is concerned with 
justifying assumptions relating to the existence of the 
company audit. The second group (behavioural postulates) 
is concerned with the behavioural aspects of company 
auditing and the third group (functional postulates) 
relates to actual work performed by the auditor. 
These postulates are briefly considered below. 
a) Justifying postulates 
There are five main postulates relating to the existence 
of the company audit (Lee 1982: 84), reproduced below with 
explanations where necessary. 
i) "Unaudited annual accounting information lacks 
sufficient credibility". 
The CA 1985 requires all companies (with the 
exception of those companies noted in Chapter 1) to 
have their accounts audited. The ultimate aim of 
verified information (audited accounts) is that it 
is credible and that it should have the capacity to 
give its users belief in the overall quality of its 
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accounting message content (see Lee, 1993: 48). 
The company directors are legally responsible for 
the preparation of the accounts. In this way, they 
make themselves accountable to the shareholders for 
their stewardship of the company's resources. It 
could be argued that due to economic incentives, 
management may not act impartially when producing 
the company's annual accounts. Therefore, there is 
sufficient doubt about the credibility of annual 
accounts to justify an audit. The need for audit 
becomes more evident in the large public companies 
where shareholders and other users of the accounts 
are firmly divorced from management. (For further 
discussion see "agency theory" in section 2.4.1). 
The above postulate, Lee (1993: 75) argued, is the 
most fundamental of all in corporate audit theory. 
If it is not acceptable, then no other is 
reasonable. 
ii) "Attestation of annual accounting information 
credibility is the most pressing audit need". 
iii) "Attestation of annual accounting information 
credibility is best achieved by a legally required 
audit". 
iv) "The credibility of annual accounting information 
can be verified and attested". 
The CA 1985 requires the auditor to give an opinion 
on the "truth and fairness" of annual accounts and 
in this regard Lee (1982: 76) argues that "it has to 
be assumed that the information can be 
satisfactorily verified and attested... ", because 
to believe otherwise, Lee argues, "would be asking 
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the auditor to attempt an impossible task". 
However, Lee (1982: 76) acknowledges that there are 
"certain circumstances which are a potential threat 
to the absolute validity of this notion... " as 
there may exist "certain items of information which 
are difficult, if not impossible, satisfactorily to 
verify and evidence" (Lee, 1982: 77). For example, 
in smaller companies, the auditor may find it 
difficult to verify all accounting information and 
records. Nevertheless, Lee (1982: 77) argues that 
"on the whole, it appears to be reasonable to 
assume that accounting information in general can 
be adequately audited". 
v) "Shareholders and other report users cannot 
normally attest annual accounting information 
credibility personally". 
b) Behavioural postulates 
The quality of an audit depends on the behavioural 
standards of the auditor. For this reason, the UK 
professional accountancy bodies set their own guidance 
statements on professional conduct and ethics and they 
expect their members to observe them in their audit 
assignments in order to lend further credibility to the 
accounting information they audit. 
There are five main behavioural postulates for auditing, 
reproduced from Lee (1982: 85) with relevant explanations. 
i) "There is no unnecessary conflict of interest 
between the auditor and management". 
The above postulate is based on the assumption that 
the company management will cooperate with the 
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auditor to enable him to proceed with his audit in 
order to meet audit objectives. 
The CA 1985 (S237(3)) gives adequate right to the 
auditor to access all such evidence necessary to 
report on the accounts. 
ii) "There is no unreasonable legal restriction on the 
auditor". 
The CA 1985 allows the auditor freedom of action to 
conduct his audit. These can be found in the 
following sections of the Act: 
* S388(3) and S387(2) CA 1985 
- 
giving the auditor 
the right to make personal representations to 
shareholders and to attend and be heard at the 
relevant meeting. 
* S237(3) CA 1985 
- 
giving the auditor the right of 
access at all times to the books, records, 
information and explanations necessary for his 
audit. 
* S387(1) CA 1985 
- 
giving the auditor the right to 
attend and be heard at any general meeting of the 
company. 
iii) "The auditor is suitably independent". 
As accounts lack sufficient credibility without 
audit, it is therefore essential that the auditor 
be free from any pressure and potential bias which 
might impair his judgement. 
In order to give credibility to the audited 
accounts, the auditor not only should be 
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independent but also be seen to be independent, as 
this visible evidence is vital for users of the 
accounts to determine the degree of the auditor's 
independence. 
iv) "The auditor is suitably skilled". 
The CA 1985 (S389(1)) requires the auditor of every 
company to be a suitably qualified accountant in 
order to carry out an audit and give an opinion on 
the audited accounts. 
Furthermore, the professional accountancy bodies 
require their members to have adequate training and 
skills for carrying out audit assignments. 
v) "The auditor can be held accountable for the nature 
and quality of his work". 
The auditor is accountable to the shareholders (and 
possibly to some specific users) for the quality of 
his work as is evident from auditing case law. 
The professional accountancy bodies have issued a 
series of Auditing Standards and Guidelines which 
are intended to provide the auditor with a 
framework of practice below which the quality of 
audit work must not fall and these are used by the 
court to judge the adequacy of the auditor's 
quality of performance. 
c) Functional postulates 
Functional postulates relate to the actual work performed 
by the auditor. Lee (1982: 85) provides three functional 
postulates which are reproduced below with explanations 
where necessary. 
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i) "There is sufficient competent audit evidence 
available to the auditor". 
ii) "The annual accounting information is free of major 
fraud and error". 
It is the company management's responsibility to 
detect or prevent fraud and errors by establishing 
a reliable system of accounting and internal 
controls. 
It is not the main objective of audit to detect or 
prevent fraud and errors. However, the auditor 
should plan his audit to reveal material fraud and 
errors. 
iii) "There are generally acceptable accounting concepts 
and bases to measure and disclose annual accounting 
information". 
In the UK, the 
-CA 1985 provides the auditor with an 
accounting framework of standards to use as a basis 
for arriving at his audit opinion on the accounts. 
The above postulate (iii) in its original form has been 
deleted from the list of functional postulates provided 
by Lee (1993). However, Lee (1993) gives the following 
additional functional postulates: 
iv) "The over-riding quality of reported financial 
statements for corporate audit purposes is interpreted mainly in terms of their relevance and 
reliability, and there are standards by which, the 
corporate auditor can determine the existence of 
such a quality". (Lee 1993: 83). 
v) "The relevance and reliability of reported 
financial statements to shareholders and other 
report users can be reported meaningfully to them 
by the corporate auditor". (Lee 1993: 87). 
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From the above postulates, Lee (1982) developed four 
concepts which are listed below (see Table 2.1) together 
with the equivalent comparative concepts suggested by 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961). 
2.3.3 
Table 2.1: Auditing concepts 
Lee (1982 
Independence 
Responsibility 
Evidence 
Truth and Fairness 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
Independence 
Ethical conduct 
Due Audit Care 
Evidence 
Fair Presentation 
It is worth mentioning that Flint (1988) also provides 
similar concepts. 
The importance 
of the concept of independence is 
considered in detail within the contracting theory 
explanations for auditing practice, because of the 
central role it plays in understanding the auditor's role (see 2.4.6(a)). 
Conflicting viewpoints 
The major feature of Lee (1982 and 1993)'s company audit 
framework is the existence of certain assumptions which 
are developed from or supported or used by the work of 
other audit theorists such as Mautz and Sharaf (1961); 
Schandl (1978), Sherer and Kent (1983) and Flint (1988). 
These assumptions (postulates) are "the fundamental 
theoretical truths of corporate auditing" (Lee, 1993: 74) 
and provide the basis for the development of general 
auditing concepts. 
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According to Robertson (1986b: 52): 
"A generally accepted framework for company auditing 
does, therefore, exist 
-a framework most familiar 
through Lee's text on company auditing, but one which 
has strong support from earlier auditing thought". 
Furthermore, Sherer and Kent (1983: 19), who used these 
postulates in their theory of company auditing argue that 
the categorisation of postulates "forms a rational and 
comprehensible basis upon which to base an examination of 
auditing theory". 
In contrast, Gwilliam (1987) does not support the above 
approach and prefers any development of audit theory to 
be within the context of agency theory (see 2.4.1 for a 
detailed discussion of agency theory). Gwilliam (1987) 
is against the uncritical acceptance of the postulates 
specified by Mautz and Sharaf, because he appears to be 
concerned that these postulates "seek not so much to 
uncover a rationale for the audit process as a whole as 
to identify those circumstances in which an audit may be 
successfully carried out". (Gwilliam 1987: 42). 
These criticisms were strongly opposed by Lee (1993: 74). 
It is also worth mentioning that Gwilliam (1987: 48) noted 
that Hamilton, Mautz and Robertson have given different 
viewpoints in respect of the audit postulates originally 
advanced by Mautz and Sharaf (1961). 
Hamilton, for example, has argued that the conceptual 
model put forward by Mautz and Sharaf has failed to 
provide any empirically testable results. He is of the 
opinion that any theory of auditing should be in a 
position to explain the demand for and supply of audit 
services and that such a theory should be developed 
within the context of the agency theory. 
63 
However, Mautz sees the agency theory as described by 
Hamilton as stating the obvious and suggests that, like 
other economic theories, it exists at a level remote from 
the problems of the day (see Gwilliam 1987: 48). 
Robertson is of the view that although the framework put 
forward by Mautz and Sharaf is imperfect, it can, in 
fact, serve practitioners and researchers in their work. 
A number of reasons could account for this contention. 
Chief among them is the fact that auditing is a control 
mechanism which has its roots in behavioural and economic 
theory and as suggested by some commentators (e. g. Bird, 
1970 and Flint, 1971) the audit role has changed and may 
need to change further to adapt to a changing society 
(see also APB, 1993 and APB, 1995). Therefore, it does 
not fit neatly into a fixed framework as suggested by 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961). 
This leads to a discussion of auditing in an economic 
framework which is considered below. 
2.4 Economic framework for auditing 
External audit serves many functions; for example, it 
can monitor the performance of management on behalf of 
shareholders 
- 
this function is referred to as 
"stewardship" 
- 
or as a demonstration by management to 
existing and potential shareholders of their effort and 
performance ("agency theory"). 
It can also help investors to improve their decision 
making by means of adding credibility to the accounts of 
companies ("information theory"). It may be viewed by 
investors as a protection against financial failures of 
companies ("insurance theory"). It may also be required 
by some companies in order to differentiate themselves 
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from others in the market ("signalling theory"). 
Furthermore, an audit may influence the behaviour and 
actions of staff at all levels in a company ("behavioural 
theory") 
An attempt will also be made to explain auditing practice 
using "contracting theory" and "political process theory" 
within "positive accounting theory". All these theories 
are discussed in turn. 
2.4.1 Agency theory 
In the nineteenth century, the role of the auditor was 
seen as directly linked to the stewardship function of 
company management (i. e. management integrity and 
honesty). As such, a monitoring role on behalf of 
shareholders who had entrusted their assets to the care 
of the company management was carried out by the auditor. 
(See for example Flint, 1971). 
However, following recent developments in the application 
of agency theory to auditing, the above monitoring role 
has been extended to include not only management 
integrity, but also managerial effort and performance. 
(See for example Ng, 1978; Evans, 1980; Antle, 1982). 
The shareholders, as principals, have limited means 
besides management reports of observing the success and 
actions of agents (i. e. management). Therefore, 
management may have economic incentives to bias 
management reporting to shareholders with little fear of 
detection if management remuneration is related to 
reported performance. Ng (1978) appears to support this 
line of argument. 
Even where management has no economic incentive to bias 
the reporting (for example, having a fixed remuneration) 
, 
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the reporting may be accurate, but the level of 
management effort may be low which will be to the 
disadvantage of the shareholders. 
A possible solution to the above problem is considered by 
the agency theory which, generally speaking, is concerned 
with the principal-agent problem in the separation of 
ownership and control of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Firms are described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
as sets of contracts among the factors of production and 
that different sets of contractual arrangements provide 
different incentives for opportunistic behaviour by the 
contracting parties, which reduce the value of the firm. 
They argued that in markets characterised by rational 
expectations, the cost of the opportunistic behaviour is 
borne by the offending party, who has an incentive to 
write contracts which restrict his opportunistic 
behaviour. For this reason, according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), corporate managers write contracts to 
restrict their own opportunistic behaviour. The 
enforcement of the contracts requires monitoring of 
management's activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
hypothesised that an audit is one type of monitoring 
activity that increases the value of the firm. An audit 
by someone independent of the manager reduces the 
incentive problems that arise when the firm's manager 
does not own all the residual claims on the firm. 
"An audit will be successful in changing expectations 
and hence reducing the opportunistic behavior costs (agency costs) borne by the manager only if it is 
expected that the auditor will report some discovered 
breaches of contract... " (See Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983: 615). 
According to the agency theory, the shareholders may be 
able to maximise their wealth by using incentive 
compensation contracts together with independent 
monitoring of the financial reporting. This argument 
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seems to support the "justifying postulates" (i. e. the 
reasons for company audit). 
Interestingly, Ng and Stoeckenius (1979) have 
demonstrated that in a similar situation, auditing will 
encourage more accurate reporting and that depending upon 
the price of audit services, there will be a demand for 
external auditing. 
Furthermore, according to the agency theory, the need for 
a monitoring service does not necessarily come from the 
shareholders. 
"It is argued that as the shareholders recognise the 
scope and incentives for adverse management action and 
reporting they will protect themselves by reducing 
managerial compensation. 'Good' management will then 
have an incentive to demonstrate its greater effort 
and efficiency by hiring auditors to verify the 
truthful nature of their reporting". (Gwilliam, 
1987: 50). 
In developing this point, Evans (1980) in his study 
demonstrated that the need for the audit will come from 
the agent. 
It is worth mentioning that the majority of research 
studies of the agency theory have generally been 
theoretical in nature, based on simplified models using 
mathematical arguments. Indeed, Jensen (1983) refers to 
two separate bodies of literature addressing the same set 
of problems in the agency theory. The first (the 
"principal-agent") is generally mathematical and non- 
empirically oriented, and Jensen (1983) argues that it 
may suffer from the inability to generate mathematical 
solutions without simplifying assumptions. 
The second (the "Positive theory of agency") is generally 
non-mathematical and empirically oriented. The concept 
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of the positive theory was, introduced into accounting 
literature relatively recently (1960). This will be 
discussed in detail in section 2.4.6 (see positive 
accounting theory). 
In conclusion, Gwilliam has asserted that (1987: 52): 
"Apart from the insight that management may 
voluntarily seek to be audited so as to demonstrate 
the greater credibility of its reporting, there 
appears to be little else in the models developed so 
far that adds fresh understanding of audit processes 
or of the market in which they are offered". 
Perhaps it is worth noting that there are problems 
inherent in attempting to measure (monitor) management 
performance "in an uncertain world of imperfect markets" 
and so like Mautz and Sharaf's postulates, one comes up 
against the inadequacy of GAAP (Gwilliam, 1987: 52). 
2.4.2 Information theory 
Information theory may also help to explain why there is 
a demand for external auditing. It explores the 
economics of the provision of data to financial markets 
and how this enables efficient allocation of capital 
flows. 
Audits add credibility to the financial information and 
improve their quality, which may help investors to 
improve their decision making. 
According to Wallace (1985: 26), the information theory: 
"... predicts a demand for audited information as a 
means of reducing the risk of investments, improving internal and external decision making, enhancing gains from trade, and improving the portfolio investment 
position of individuals. " 
This may explain the case for enforcing the external 
audit as a statutory requirement if the cost of the 
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external audit is lower than the benefits derived from 
more efficient capital market operations and if the 
market fails to provide the right amount of auditing. 
(See Gwilliam, 1987: 54). 
In examining the market for auditing services, Gwilliam 
(1987) argues that there is a considerable degree of 
overlap between the agency theory and the information 
theory. However, the information theory pays greater 
attention to the needs of investors generally and the 
information requirements of prospective investors who are 
unlikely to have a contractual relationship with 
management. Therefore, the information theory tends to 
support the need for the compulsory requirement for audit 
and disclosure of financial information. However, it is 
worth noting that the extent to which investors do rely 
upon audited financial accounts in decision making is not 
clear. Lee (1977) appears to suggest that non-audited 
data (for example, interim results or forecasts in the 
chairman's report) are perhaps of more importance to 
investors for their decision making. Furthermore, 
"... while people say the audit report is important, 
when it comes to making decisions a relatively minor 
role for the audit report is found in terms of both 
user perceptions and of market reactions to the 
presence of audit qualification". (Gwilliam, 
1987: 55). 
As Gwilliam (1987: 55) has noted, it is rather difficult: 
"... to reach any firm conclusions as to the force or 
otherwise of the information theory arguments 
concerning the value of audit or the significance of 
the audit report itself". 
2.4.3 Insurance theory 
Insurance theory is concerned with the auditor's role as 
an insurer. 
In Antle (1982)'s model, the audit fee is regarded as 
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compensation for risk sharing with the owner (i. e. apart 
from ensuring truthful reporting, the auditor acts as 
insurance for risk averse shareholders against the 
possibility of correctly reported adverse results). In 
such circumstances the value of the actual audit work is 
to determine efficiently the likely risks in various 
types of clients. 
Wallace (1985) identifies a number of different 
perspectives: for example, reporting managers look to the 
auditor as a form of insurance policy should something go 
wrong with the use of the information concerned; or the 
auditor assists in improving the quality of information 
disclosure for management; or the auditor represents a 
form of protection for an otherwise uninsured business 
risk. 
2.4.4 Signalling theory 
External audit may be required by some audit clients in 
order to differentiate themselves from others in the 
market. This is addressed by the signalling theory, 
which deals with the problems of information asymmetry in 
the market. The theory illustrates how this asymmetry 
can be reduced by the party with more information 
signalling it to others. 
According to Morris (1987: 48), the following steps occur 
in most signalling models: 
"Initially, sellers in a market are assumed to possess 
more information about their product than buyers. If 
buyers have no information about specific products but 
do have some general perceptions 
..., 
then buyers will 
value all products at the same price which is a 
weighted average of their general perceptions". 
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Morris (1987: 48) goes on to say that: 
"Sellers of above average quality products incur an 
opportunity loss because their products could sell at 
a higher price if buyers knew about the superior 
quality, while sellers of below average products make 
an opportunity gain. Sellers of high quality products 
have an incentive to leave the market... unless they 
can communicate their product's superior quality to 
buyers and thus increase its price". 
This communication is done by a signal in the form of a 
costly act taken by the seller of high quality goods to 
indicate the superiority of his product (for example, by 
providing a product warranty, which acts as a prediction 
of superior quality). This process continues as long as 
the increase in price obtained exceeds the signalling 
costs. 
The prediction of the signalling theory for the audit 
market is that: 
"... auditors will be appointed voluntarily by higher 
quality firms in order to discriminate themselves from 
other firms in the market... this incentive should be 
greatest in firms with large and widespread numbers of 
shareholders". (Morris, 1987: 53). 
The market for audit services in terms of incentive- 
signalling theory was examined by Bar-Yosef and Livnat 
(1984). They demonstrated that management with high 
expectations of future cash flows will in fact select a 
larger, more highly priced, auditing firm. 
Morris (1987: 53), in comparing the signalling theory with 
the agency theory concluded that both theories are 
consistent and that there is considerable overlap between 
them, for example: 
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"Rational behaviour is common to both theories; 
information asymmetry is implied by positive 
monitoring costs in agency theory; quality can be 
defined in terms of agency theory variables; and 
signalling costs are implicit in some bonding devices 
of agency theory". 
2.4.5 Behavioural theory 
External audit may influence the motivation, integrity 
and conformity with organisational rules of the employees 
of a firm at all levels. A study by Churchill, Cooper 
and Govindarajan (1982) suggested that an audit could 
exert behavioural effects in a number of ways through the 
audit report and the occurrence of the audit itself and 
even through anticipation of the audit. 
Churchill et al (1982) tested the behavioural effects of 
an audit not in the context of an external financial 
audit but in that of a medical audit, and found that the 
audit occurrence and anticipation "significantly" reduced 
the average length of stay at hospital and its variance. 
It is worth noting that they also found that the actual 
audit occurrence had a greater effect than the audit 
anticipation. 
2.4.6 Positive accounting theory 
Positive accounting researchers have developed theories 
of accounting practice by applying economic theories that 
assume nonzero contracting and information costs. The 
two main theories: contracting theory and political 
process theory have the potential to explain auditing 
practice. In discussing both theories, an attempt will 
be made to delve into the work of Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986). 
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a) Contracting theory explanations for auditing practice 
Accounting researchers have applied the contracting 
theory to auditing and have developed intuitive 
explanations for auditing practice. For example, 
explanations have been developed for the emphasis on 
auditor's competence, independence and reputation; the 
existence of professional societies; the audit firm's 
organisational form, size and industry specialisation. 
Furthermore, the contracting theory had been used to 
predict which firms hired professional auditors when such 
an audit was not required by law (see Chow, 1982). 
Auditor's competence and independence 
The concepts of an auditor's competence and independence 
are central to the explanations for auditing practice. 
The demand for accounting arises from its use in 
contracts that reduce the firm's agency costs. However, 
those contracts are of little use in reducing agency 
costs unless their provisions are monitored and enforced. 
Auditing is one of the ways in which the contracts are 
monitored. The auditor's monitoring is not valuable to 
other parties to the firm unless those parties consider 
the probability that the auditor will report a contract 
breach, should one occur, is nonzero. The very existence 
of a demand for the auditor's services, and the amount a 
firm will pay for those services, depends on the 
assessment of a nonzero probability of reporting a 
breach. The probability that an auditor will report a 
breach, if it occurs, depends on: 
i) "The probability that the auditor discovers a given 
breach". 
ii) "The probability that the auditor reports the 
discovered breach". (See Watts and Zimmerman, 1986: 
314). 
73 
These probabilities depend on the auditor's competence 
and independence from the client respectively. 
Therefore, in order to create a demand for audit 
services, auditors have to convince the market that they 
have some competence and independence from the client. 
However, managers may impose costs on auditors if 
auditors refuse to give in to their pressures not to 
report a discovered breach. It is suggested that one way 
in which managers impose costs is by changing auditors, 
which denies the existing auditor a stream of quasi-rents 
arising through the practice of low-balling (DeAngelo 
1981a and 1981b). However, as suggested by Moizer 
(1985: 36) both listed companies and their auditors have 
a strong economic interest to be independent because: 
"Auditors who are perceived to be more independent and 
hence more likely to report a breach by management, 
will be valued more highly by the capital market. The 
greater the reputation enjoyed by auditors, then the 
greater will be the increase in market value of the 
companies audited by them and hence the greater will 
be the fees that they can command for audit services". 
Furthermore, there are some institutions and contractual 
arrangements (such as the auditor's reputation, 
professional societies, the audit firm's organisational 
form, and large-scale audit firms) which provide the 
auditor with incentives to be independent and to resist 
the manager's pressures. These are considered below: 
Auditor's reputation 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 315) in citing Benston pointed 
out that reputation gives auditors incentives to be 
independent. Watts and Zimmerman argued that once this 
reputation is established, it increases the demand for 
the auditor's services. This view on auditors' 
independence is consistent with that of Moizer (1985). 
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The auditor's reputation is a valuable asset which serves 
as a collateral bond for independence. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) took this view when they 
provided a historically based explanation for the 
practice of auditing and when they offered an explanation 
for the prevalence and continuance of auditing even 
before it was required by statute (see 5.2). 
Professional societies 
By accrediting auditors, professional societies can help 
their members to establish a reputation for independence 
and competence. Professional societies such as the ICAS 
(formed in 1854) and the ICAEW (formed in 1870) appeared 
at the time of the replacement of the shareholders' audit 
committees by professional audit firms (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983: 631). The professional societies 
established brand names and gave their members 
designations, thereby providing information on their 
minimum level of audit competence and independence. By 
setting and monitoring standards of conduct, examinations 
for admission and a period of training with a member, the 
professional societies maintain their brand name. 
Like the auditor's reputation, membership of the 
professional society serves as a collateral bond. Loss 
of membership leads to loss of audit fees. 
Audit firm's organisational form 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 316) the 
organisational form of audit firms evolved as unlimited 
partnerships which contributes in at least two ways to 
the auditor's incentives to be competent and independent: 
i) unlimited partnerships (as compared with limited 
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liability corporations) provide a greater amount of 
assets available as a bond on the auditors' 
independence; and 
ii) unlimited partnerships provide mutual monitoring by 
the-partners (as each partner is liable for the 
other partners' actions), thereby, increasing 
competence and making it more difficult for the 
manager to bribe the auditor. It has been noted 
that a similar form existed before the development 
of the professional audit firms, when the audit was 
conducted by a committee of shareholders (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983). 
Furthermore, the above circumstances, according to Fama 
and Jensen (1983), will increase the market's assessment 
of the auditor's competence and independence. 
However, it is worth pointing out that KPMG Peat Marwick 
had recently incorporated part of their audit practice in 
order to limit their partners' exposure to liability and 
to enjoy the perceived "greater freedom" incorporation 
would bring. (See, for example, "KPMG consults clients" 
- 
Accountancy, November 1994: 13). 
Audit firm size and industry specialisation 
A large audit firm can provide a much larger bond for its 
services than can a single auditor. The bond consists of 
the assets of the partnership as well as the individual 
partners' assets, together with all the partners' human 
capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
"The value of that human capital", Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986: 317) point out, "is sensitive to the auditor's 
reputation, and the auditor's reputation is tied to the 
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partnership reputation". 
Therefore, because of the availability of larger bond, a 
large firm is more likely than a single accredited 
auditor to resist pressure from a client's manager not to 
report breaches. 
Furthermore, as a large firm has many clients, the value 
of quasi-rents lost if a manager of a client changes 
auditors is more likely to be less on the firm's brand 
name and its audit fees than the effect of the failure to 
report a breach. 
It is worthy of note that Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 318) 
have cited Dopuch and Simunic in observing that the 
initial audit start-up costs and economies of scale in 
information can help to explain the audit firm 
specialisation by industry. 
The above explanations indicate that contracting theory 
can provide a wide set of explanations for auditing. 
Nevertheless, these explanations are intuitive and their 
predications are not formally tested (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986: 318). 
However, one study which attempted to provide empirical 
evidence to support contracting theory was that of Chow 
(1982). Chow (1982) used contracting variables to 
predict and explain the firm's choice in 1926 between 
being audited and not being audited at the time such 
audits were not required by USA law. 
In that study, 1926 was chosen as the base year, a. year 
in which a large majority of the New York Stock Exchange 
firms voluntarily engaged external auditors but a 
substantial minority (18%) did not (see Gwilliam, 1987). 
77 
Chow (1982) hypothesises that external auditing is 
associated with firm size, capital structure and the 
number of debt covenants written in terms of accounting 
numbers. 
He argues that as managers of larger firms typically own 
a smaller fraction of the firm's shares then they have a 
greater incentive to transfer wealth from shareholders. 
Therefore, larger firms are expected to have greater 
demand for audits. Furthermore, he argues that because 
of economies of scale in auditing, larger firms are more 
likely to be audited than smaller ones. 
Chow (1982) also argues that firms with higher 
debt/equity ratios are more likely to be audited. This 
is because, without an audit, shareholders (equity- 
holders) have a greater incentive to transfer wealth from 
bondholders (for example by paying excessive dividends). 
Therefore, bondholders anticipate the likelihood of such 
actions and protect themselves by increasing the cost of 
their funds. To prevent this increase in the cost of 
debt, firms with substantial amounts of debt in their 
capital structure would voluntarily have their accounts 
audited. 
In addition, Chow (1982) argues that firms are also more 
likely to have audits if the audited results have a 
direct effect on the fulfilment of debt covenants. 
Chow (1982)'s study ignores the availability and cost of 
monitoring methods other than auditing. However, his 
results are generally consistent with the hypotheses. 
Indeed Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 321) observed that: 
"These results are generally consistent with contracting 
theory. They suggest that contracting theory has the 
potential to predict auditing practice". 
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It is worth noting that the absence of sufficient data 
relating to the level of managerial shareholdings 
prevented Chow (1982) from testing a hypothesis that a 
firm was more likely to engage in voluntary auditing if 
management were divorced from shareholders (see Gwilliam, 
1987: 53). 
b) The effect of political process on auditing 
Political process affects auditing through regulation and 
threatened regulation 
- 
for example, the Companies Acts 
requirements in the UK or the securities acts in the US; 
the role of the DTI (through appointed supervisory 
bodies) in the UK or the Congressional committees in the 
US 
- 
in monitoring auditing standards. 
Regulation and threatened regulation affect the nature of 
audit by providing auditors with the opportunity to offer 
new services to their clients and giving auditors chance 
to transfer wealth to themselves. These are considered 
below. 
Effect on audit 
The auditor's role and duties under statute are broader 
than the contract monitoring role. The auditor is 
required to determine if contracts have been breached 
under the contract monitoring role, within the scope and 
definitions written in the contract. 
However, under statute, the auditor's role depends on the 
investor's decision-making process. Numbers and 
definitions other than those used in contracts may be 
considered relevant. Therefore, the political process 
expands the scope of the audit and changes its emphasis. 
For example, the accounting standards may reduce the 
79 
effectiveness of accounting-based contracts in 
controlling agency costs and consequently may reduce the 
demand for auditing as a contract monitoring device. 
"Hence, while regulation is broadening the nature of 
the audit and increasing the demand for auditing to 
meet legal requirements, it decreases the contracting 
demand for auditing". (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986: 323). 
It is worth mentioning that the introduction of audit 
regulation in October 1991 in the UK has brought with it 
major changes to auditing firms. These changes warrant 
specific attention which will be dealt with in section 
5.4. 
Additional services 
Regulations provide auditors with the opportunity to 
offer additional services to their clients. As new 
regulations can impose costs on clients, they may value 
lobbying and regulation information services provided by 
their auditors. Indeed, these services are considered by 
potential clients when they choose an auditor and audit 
fees reflect these services, thereby increasing both the 
auditor's and the client's wealth. 
It is worth mentioning that lobbying is rather more 
common in the US than the UK. In this regard, in the UK, 
a Committee chaired by Lord Nolan has produced a report 
tightening lobbying practices, particularly by MPs, after 
a number of "sleaze" allegations which resulted in the 
resignation of Neil Hamilton, the then corporate affairs 
minister (see "Government rules out Nolan probe into 
party funds", Financial Times, 15th May 1995: 1). 
Wealth transfers 
Auditors have incentives to lobby for more complicated 
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accounting standards which could increase demand for 
their services. However, if the consequent drop in 
demand for the auditor's monitoring services (resulting 
from more complex accounting systems) exceeds the 
increase in demand because of the greater complexity, 
then auditors would oppose the more complex system. 
Furthermore, state licensing of auditors has the 
potential to restrict entry into the audit profession and 
increase existing auditors' wealth. 
Empirical studies 
Three types of empirical studies that test the hypotheses 
about the effect of regulation on auditing are reviewed 
below. 
1) A study of auditor turnover by DeAngelo (1982) 
Using data for the period 1973-80 relating to the US 
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
firms, DeAngelo (1982) found that oil firms, adversely 
affected by the proposed elimination of full cost 
accounting, increased the rate at which they changed 
their auditors during the period of controversy. This 
supported her hypothesis that firms most negatively 
affected by an accounting standard are more likely to 
change auditors than less severely affected firms. 
However, although clients appeared to change firms 
with whom they disagreed, the data did not support an 
overall shift to firms with whom they agreed as 
hypothesised by Watts and Zimmerman (1981b). 
2) A study of auditor lobbying by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1981b) 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 327) made reference to their 
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work (1981b) in which they hypothesised that the 
auditors' position on a proposed accounting standard 
was positively related to their clients' managers' 
positions. This is because their audit fees depend on 
their clients' market value, which provides them with 
an incentive to argue for accounting standards that 
increase their clients' market value. However, the 
auditors' position and interests differ from those of 
their clients, where for example, the auditor has an 
incentive to support accounting standards which create 
more work for them. Taking these diversities into 
account, Watts and Zimmerman (1981b) investigated the 
combined implication of contracting theory and the 
political process theory for auditors' lobbying on 
proposed accounting standards, by deriving and testing 
a complex relation between an audit firm's position on 
an accounting standard and its clients' managers' 
positions. Their evidence is generally consistent 
with that relation. 
3) A study of auditor competition by Simunic (1980) 
Simunic (1980) investigated the charge that the Big 
Eight audit firms have an effective cartel or monopoly 
on audits of listed companies and that they are able 
to charge higher fees than their small rivals. 
Simunic (1980)'s results suggest that there is 
competition in the auditing market, that auditors (at 
least Price Waterhouse) specialise in audits of 
different quality (as suggested by DeAngelo, 1981b), 
and that the complexity in client accounts increases 
audit fees. 
2.5 Application of a theoretical framework to SC audit debate 
Having discussed the postulates and economic framework 
for company auditing, this section considers whether the 
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SC audit debate can be placed within the context of such 
a framework. In fact, the need for this consideration 
has been put forward by Robertson (1986b: 50-51), who has 
argued that two factors may have contributed to the lack 
of progress in the SC audit debate: 
i) "there has been no application of a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the small company 
audit problem. Without reference to an 
underlying theory, it is difficult to put the 
various arguments in perspective. There is, 
therefore, no rational or consistent means of 
evaluating alternative solutions". 
ii) "little research has been published on the small 
company problem... ". 
It is considered necessary first and foremost to look at 
a number of SC audit issues that appear to give rise to 
some weaknesses in the assumptions on which a theoretical 
framework is built as far as SCs are concerned. 
Shareholders in owner-managed private companies 
It has been observed that the independent audit is of 
little value to shareholders who are all directors and 
actively involved in the management of the company or to 
shareholders who, although not involved in the management 
of the company, have complete confidence in the integrity 
of the directors (APC, 1979). This appears to weaken to 
some extent the application of justifying postulates in 
relation to SC audit. As Lee (1993: 76) has pointed out: 
"... in such cases, the absence of significant external 
interests may cause the postulate to be unreasonable. 
Indeed, there is a persistent implied concern about 
its legitimacy in the context of small companies [Page, 1991)". 
Internal control 
It has been noted that in SCs, internal controls are 
generally weak or absent because of owner/manager 
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dominance (Raiborn, 1982). As a result the quality of 
reported financial statements to shareholders and others 
may not be satisfactorily attested by the verifications 
process of an external audit, which makes the application 
of justifying postulates to SC audit rather weak. Lee 
(1993: 78) argues that "in certain smaller companies, 
inevitable weaknesses in control systems may be such that 
the postulate cannot be expressed in a strong form [Page, 
1991: 217]". 
Independence 
The infringement of the auditor's independence has always 
been viewed with serious concern. For example, Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961: 49) assert that "Independence is of the 
essence in auditing". 
Lee (1993: 81) in his own contribution to this issue 
points out that: 
it is vital to the credibility of the corporate 
audit opinion, and to the perceived quality of the 
reported accounting information, that the corporate 
auditor is assumed to be mentally independent and 
physically seen to be so independent". 
Furthermore, as already pointed out, there are some 
economic reasons for companies and their auditors to be 
independent (Moizer, 1985). 
However, in SCs where the auditor, generally speaking, 
prepares the accounts and audits them, and where he may 
also act as financial adviser, it is questionable whether 
the auditor is fully independent. 
- 
In fact, as Keasey and 
Watson (1991: 46) have noted: 
u 
... 
many important features of the small firm sector, 
such as lack of separation of ownership from control, the much less stringent financial reporting and other 
regulatory requirements and the very wide variety of 
audit firms that are able to audit their accounts, 
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reduce the applicability of this line of reasoning". 
Consequently, the behavioural postulate that "The auditor 
is suitably independent" may not be applicable in the SCs 
context vis-a-vis larger companies. 
Audit evidence 
In considering the audit evidence, the APC in its 
discussion paper (1979, para 35) argues that: 
"In some small companies because of the personal 
involvement of the proprietor, the level of 
independent audit evidence which the auditor of a 
larger organisation would reasonably expect cannot be 
provided. In other small companies this level of 
audit evidence may be available, but the cost of 
collecting and 
, 
evaluating it may well be 
disproportionate to the benefit arising either to the 
company or to user of its financial statements". 
It is therefore rather questionable whether the first 
functional postulate, that "There is sufficient competent 
audit evidence available to the auditor", is reasonable 
in the context of SCs. 
Major fraud and error 
Gwilliam (1987: 47) argues that the second functional 
postulate, that "The annual accounting information is 
free of major fraud and error", appears: 
"... to contradict the justifying postulate relating to 
the need for audit to enhance the credibility of the 
accounts. If 'due to the existence of internal 
controls' the accounts are 'free from major fraud and 
error' then they are in themselves credible and do not 
require audit. What purpose is there in adding 
credibility to numbers that are already credible? ". 
However, Lee (1993: 86) points out that to assume 
otherwise "would result in a fraud investigation of a 
type wholly incompatible with the corporate audit task 
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specified by present regulation". Indeed, as Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961: 47) have observed, such a situation would 
require: 
"... either complete disclaimer for the discovery of 
irregularities or an extremely detailed and tedious 
examination, and even with the latter some disclaimer 
of responsibility would still be required". 
In considering this assumption, Robertson (1986b: 52) 
argues that: 
"... attention to the matter of fraud often distracts 
attention from the equally serious matter of error. 
And it is about the presence of error that the auditor 
must perhaps be most concerned in the small company 
situation. Where internal control is weak, there 
comes a point where the auditor approaches his task 
with the expectation that his subject-matter contains 
major error. Some might argue that this is an 
unsatisfactory starting point for a conventional audit 
investigation". 
Auditing standards 
One of the vital points about having GAAP is "To judge 
the fairness of financial statement presentations" (Mautz 
and Sharaf, 1961: 47). In other words, Standards are 
needed for the accounts to give a true and fair view and 
also to promote comparability. However, Carsberg et al 
(1985) argue that compliance costs'are relatively higher 
for SCs and their benefits are relatively lower. 
Perhaps, it is worth bearing in mind that as Carsberg et 
al (1985) have argued, there is no need for accounts of 
SCs to be comparable with those of large companies 
because their users are different kinds of people and 
they have different needs. 
As a result, following Carsberg et al (1985)'s 
recommendations, the ASC (1988b) has accepted that there 
is a case, in specific circumstances, for exempting SCs 
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from certain provisions of accounting standards relating 
to disclosure requirements, rather than to recognition or 
measurement rules. (For detailed discussion see section 
4.11). 
It is worthy of note that similar conclusions were made 
by the Committee on GAAP for Smaller and/or Closely Held 
Businesses in the US (see section 4.17). 
Consequently, there is doubt as to whether GAAP should be 
applied equally to both small and large companies and 
this may well explain why the third functional postulate 
has been deleted from Lee (1993)'s current list of 
postulates. 
So far, in the above discussion, emphasis has been placed 
on the problems which may exist in the application of the 
various postulates to SC audit debate. It is worth 
mentioning that it is possible to observe similar 
problems in the economic framework, particularly when 
applying the agency theory to the SC audit debate. As 
already noted, the main focus of the agency theory has 
been concerned with the conflict between managers and 
shareholders. However, as asserted by Keasey and Watson 
(1991: 47) "this particular type of conflict will not 
normally be important for the majority of small firms 
because of their close company status". 
Generally speaking, a close company is a company under 
the control of five or fewer persons and their associates 
(see for example Burns and Dewhirst, 1983). Since 
directors/managers are usually the major shareholders in 
SCs, the agency problems between shareholders and 
management are generally considered to be of less 
importance. However, in respect of other contracting 
entities such as external lending institutions, the 
agency theory suggests that debtholders are concerned 
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with the possibility of wealth transfers to shareholders 
(see for example, Chow, 1982). For this reason, there is 
the possibility of conflict of interest arising between 
owner/managers and other contracting entities. 
Furthermore, the agency theory recognises the conflict 
between owner/managers and debtholders in the appointment 
of auditors when there is a high level of existing debt 
or when a new debt is required. For instance, as noted 
by Keasey and Watson (1991: 48), in the case of existing 
debt "the owner/managers may have both strong incentives 
and the ability to change to more 'accommodating' 
auditors" because this will allow value to be switched 
from debtholders to shareholders. However, when new debt 
is required, Keasey and Watson (1991: 48) argue that: 
"... the debtholders are likely to demand less 
'accommodating' auditors. Thus owner/managers will 
attempt to engage auditors that satisfy external 
lenders' requirements while being accommodating to 
their own needs". 
The above analysis indicates that there are a number of 
weaknesses in the assumptions on which company auditing 
theory is built as far as SCs are concerned. In 
attempting to provide possible solutions to the inherent 
weaknesses in the theoretical framework, Robertson 
(1986b) has suggested possible solutions which are 
considered below. 
2.6 Possible solutions 
Robertson (1986b: 52) summarises Lee's company audit 
framework by adding a "practice" element which was not 
explicit in Lee (1982: 84-85)'s original illustration. 
(See Illustration 2.2 below). 
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Illustration 2.2: Lee's summarised company audit 
framework 
Company Law ; 
................ 
Observable 
Aims & Objectives ; 
................ 
Implicit 
------------------------ 
-------------------------- 
Assumptions [&] Concepts I 
............... 
Derived 
-------------------------- 
i i 
Practice ; 
................ 
Observable 
In this regard, Robertson (1986b: 52) notes that: 
"By observing company law and audit practice, the aims 
and objectives of the existing audit function become 
apparent and are agreed. The assumptions (be they justifying, behavioural or functional in nature) are 
made in order to reconcile the apparent aims and 
objectives of the audit function with observed 
practice. Once practice has been observed, the aims 
and objectives clarified and the underlying 
assumptions derived, then general ideas about the 
audit (concepts) can be developed". 
However, in order to show how "practice" may follow 
"concepts", the idea of "precepts" as defined by Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) needs to be incorporated in'the above 
summarised framework. As Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 246) 
state: 
"... out of these concepts and deriving their strength 
from them appear certain more or less obvious 
directives for the guidance of the practitioner; we 
feel these may properly be described as precepts". 
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Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 246) further argue that if 
practice follows the precepts and if the precepts are 
properly developed from the basic philosophy, postulates 
and conceptual structure, then practice can rest on a 
strong foundation of theory. 
The revised framework is shown below: 
Illustration 2.3: Lee's adjusted company audit framework 
------------------------ 
Company Law 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Aims & Objectives 
------------------------ 
-------------------- 
Assumptions & Concepts 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Precepts 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Practice 
------------------------ 
As discussed earlier, many of the arguments raised in the 
SC debate show apparent weaknesses in the assumptions 
which form the foundation of the framework. 
Robertson (1986b: 53) argues that if these assumptions 
appear to be absurd in a SC context, then existing 
practice is in some way incompatible with existing aims 
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and objectives. Robertson (1986b: 53) suggests two 
options for reconciling practice with aims and objectives 
in a SC context: 
i) change practice in order to become consistent with 
the existing aims and objectives 
In order to maintain the existing aims and 
objectives of the audit function within a SC 
context (i. e. to keep the existing SC audit 
requirement), it has been suggested that a clear 
distinction be made between SC audit and large 
company audit, which may require separate audit 
guidance for auditors of SCs and those of large 
companies. This option is shown in the following 
illustration. 
Illustration 2.4: change practice 
---------------------- 
Company law 
---------------------- 
---------------------- 
1& objectives 1 
---------------------- 
------------------------ 
Assumptions & concepts 
------------------------ 
------------------------ ---------------------- 
Small company precepts; ; Large company precepts; 
------------------------ ---------------------- 
------------------------ ---------------------- 
Small company practice I ; Large company practice 
------------------------ ---------------------- 
It is not surprising to=note that already a number 
of specific guidelines for audit of SCs have been 
introduced. For example, "The total vouching audit 
system" (Kestrian, 1992a), "The really small 
company audit system" (Kestrian, 1992b) and "Small 
company audit system"(ICAEW,: 1991). 
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However, it would appear that the existing 
guidelines are inadequate. As Humphrey and Turley 
(1986) found, the most important influences on the 
procedures adopted in the audit of SCs are: 
* the lack of sufficient available reliable 
evidence; 
* the extent of the auditor's involvement in the 
preparation of accounts; 
* the absence of an internal control system; and 
* the degree of personal control exercised by the 
directors. 
They noted that all of these influences relate to 
areas in which the differences between large 
companies and SCs are likely to be great. Humphrey 
and Turley (1986) observed that the effect of the 
influences mentioned above is reflected in the 
extent to which auditors used particular types of 
audit procedures or techniques in SC audit. 
In their studies, Humphrey and Turley (1986: 31) 
observed that the majority of their responding 
auditors of SCs used substantive procedures and 
overall reviews, such as obtaining a bank 
certificate, analytical review, post balance sheet 
review and review of accounting policies. 
Nevertheless, they found that relatively little use 
was made of debtors circularisations and attendance 
at stocktaking despite the fact that they are 
recommended in professional statements as means of 
overcoming the inability to place reliance on 
internal controls in SCs. Therefore, it appears 
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that there is a need for additional guidance on 
these important audit procedures for use in SC 
audit. 
It is worth bearing in mind that, the introduction 
and application of these additional guidelines and 
procedures may create additional responsibility for 
SC auditors and additional audit costs which 
auditors might find unable to pass to SC clients. 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the SC auditor 
can reach the same high degree of assurance in the 
audit of a SC as he can in the audit of a large 
company. 
This option does not appear to have strong support. 
Nevertheless, if it were to be considered as a 
solution to the SC audit debate, it is important to 
identify the relative importance of the various SC 
accounts users and their accounting information 
needs, and whether their needs justify the 
existence of an audit. Once the need for an audit 
is justified, then appropriate guidance should be 
provided to SC auditors to carry out their audit 
assignments most efficiently and effectively. 
ii) Change the existing aims and objectives to achieve 
what is feasible and agreeable in practice in a SC 
environment 
This option can be shown by the following 
illustration: 
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Illustration 2.5: change the existing aims and 
objectives 
Company law 
------------------------ 
----------------------- ---------------------- 
1 Small company aims ; ; Large company aims 
and objectives I land objectives 
----------------------- ---------------------- 
11 11 
Small company 
assumptions & concepts; 
----------------------- 
; Large company 
; assumptions & concepts; 
---------------------- 
Small company precepts; 
----------------------- 
Small company practice; 
---------------------- 
; Large company precepts= 
---------------------- 
---------------------- 
Large company practice 
---------------------- 
Under this option, it is suggested that there 
should be a clear and different set of aims and 
objectives for both SCs and large companies. As 
far as SCs are concerned, this option implies that 
different sub-categories of SCs might have 
different, levels of attestation, such as review, 
compilation, audit or total exemption. 
At present, this option has very strong support 
from the Government (DTI, 
=1993), accountancy bodies 
(e. g. ICAEW, 1992b), accountancy firms and SCs 
(ICAEW, 1993a) and other interested bodies (e. g. 
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LSCA, 1992) for SCs with annual turnover up to the 
VAT cash accounting threshold. A detailed 
discussion of this option is provided in sections 
5.7 and 5.8. 
It is important to consider what is feasible and 
agreeable in practice in a SC environment before 
setting new aims and objectives. This may require 
an examination of the following issues: 
* the ownership and control in SCs; 
* the advantages and disadvantages of incorporation 
for SCs; 
* the relative importance of the various SC 
accounts users and their accounting information 
needs; 
* the usefulness of SC accounts for decision making 
* the form and content of SC accounts: 
- 
full accounts 
- 
abbreviated accounts 
- 
one set of accounts for both shareholders of 
SCs and public filing; 
* the accountant's role in SCs; 
* the difficulties in auditing SCs; 
* the audit benefits 
* the arguments for and against and the assessment 
of cost and benefits of SC audit and its 
alternatives (e. g. review or compilation report); 
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* the various SC accounts users' attitudes to 
change of SC audit requirement; 
* the effect of SC audit abolition; and 
* the effect of replacement of an audit with a 
statutory review (for SCs with annual turnover 
above the VAT cash accounting threshold). 
This research investigated the above by 
ascertaining the views of SCs1, 
directors/shareholders and auditors/accountants by 
postal questionnaires (see Chapter 6). The 
questionnaires were designed with the research 
objective and the hypotheses (see Chapter 10) in 
mind. 
2.7 Summary and conclusion 
A number of broad conclusions can be drawn from the 
various discussions in this Chapter. 
It is convenient to say that the various theoretical 
approaches discussed above have different purposes. The 
economic approach attempts to explain the existence of 
the audit through economic means, whereas the postulates 
approach is generally concerned with operationalising the 
audit process given its existence. 
The basis of the postulates approach is to help to 
construct a set of basic assumptions implicit in auditing 
about financial information. It is about relationships 
between management, the auditor and outside parties, and 
the possible contribution of, the audit. The contribution 
of this approach to audit is to deduce a set of concepts 
relevant to audit practice. 
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In contrast to the postulates approach, the economic 
framework has attempted to develop a theoretical 
understanding of auditing in terms of economic 
transactions between various parties connected with the 
firm. 
In particular, the agency theory is concerned with the 
problem of the separation of ownership and control of the 
firm by shareholders and managers, each with different 
vested interests. As a result of that, the agency theory 
argues that shareholders may be able to maximise their 
wealth by using incentive compensation contracts together 
with independent monitoring of the financial reporting. 
As noted, there is a considerable degree of overlap 
between the agency theory and the information theory. It 
is worth noting that the information theory however, is 
principally concerned with the needs of investors and the 
information requirements of prospective investors who are 
unlikely to have a contractual relationship with 
management. The above theories differ from the insurance 
theory, which is concerned with the auditor's role as an 
insurer. 
The signalling theory predicts that auditors "will be 
appointed voluntarily by higher quality firms in order to 
discriminate themselves from other firms in the market". 
Like the information theory, the signalling theory also 
has some considerable amount of overlap with the agency 
theory; for example, rational behaviour is common to both 
theories. 
In the discussion of behavioural theory it was observed 
that external audit may have some influence on the 
motivation, integrity and conformity with organisational 
rules of the staff of a firm at all levels. 
In the contracting theory, auditing and accounting are 
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related, and the use of accounting in contracts requires 
monitoring. The role of the political process too has 
been found useful in developing a theory of auditing. 
One important conclusion from the studies discussed is 
that contracting has been used to explain why the 
auditor is concerned with his independence and 
reputation; to explain the development of professional 
societies, large firms and the organisational form 
adopted by audit firms. 
Furthermore, some of the studies have attempted to show 
that contracting variables were used to predict which 
firms were likely to hire a professional audit firm when 
external professional audits were not a legal 
requirement. 
Some evidence shows that regulation has a bearing on the 
nature of the audit. On the one hand, the auditor is 
legally responsible for information beyond that used in 
contracts, a situation that affects auditing's 
contracting role, particularly its efficiency as a 
monitoring device. On the other hand, regulation 
provides the auditor with the opportunity to lobby on 
accounting standards on behalf of clients and to lobby 
for increasing accounting complexity because of its audit 
fee effect. This in turn determine the auditor's 
relationship with the clients. 
Despite all the findings, it is worth mentioning that 
further studies are needed to explain in detail the 
subject matter of auditing. 
The application of the above theories to the SC audit 
debate identified a number of weaknesses in the 
assumptions which form the foundation of the framework, 
indicating that the existing practice is in some way 
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incompatible with the existing aims and objectives in a 
SC context. In an attempt to reconcile practice with 
aims and objectives, a number of broad possible options 
were considered: either to change the practice or change 
the aims and objectives so that they become compatible. 
To achieve this, there is a need for a detailed 
consideration of the SC issues and the SC audit debate 
which are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
Furthermore, in order to obtain a general consensus in 
the SCFR, surveys of SC accounts, directors, and auditors 
were carried out. Their primary findings are reported in 
Chapters 7,8 and 9 respectively. The cross analysis of 
the results and testing of the research hypotheses are 
presented in Chapter 10. 
Before considering the SC issues and debate, it may be 
useful to provide an overview of the role of the major 
parties in the SCFR debate, which is presented in the 
next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
"". 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN PARTIES IN THE SCFR DEBATE 
3.1 Introduction 
The major active parties in the SCFR debate are: 
a) regulatory bodies 
- 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); and 
- 
Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Practices 
Board. 
b) professional institutions; 
c) accountancy firms; 
d) banks and other institutional creditors; 
e) tax authorities; and 
f) small companies (SCs) and organisations representing 
the interests of small firms. 
The role played by each of the above parties in the SCFR 
debate is considered below. It should be pointed out 
that this Chapter does not consider the SC issues and 
debate. These are considered in detail in Chapters 4 and 
5 respectively. However, suffice to state that brief 
references have been made where necessary. 
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3.2 Regulatory bodies 
3.2.1 Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) 
The DTI has always been concerned about the 
administrative burdens on SCs resulting from the 
requirements of company law. In March 1985, the DTI 
(1985a)'s "Burden on Business" report proposed the 
removal of audit for shareholder-managed companies and 
the simplification of SC accounts. 
Furthermore, in June 1985, the DTI (1985b) considered the 
arguments for and against audit for all SCs and in March 
1988, considered all possible alternatives to audit for 
SCs (DTI, 1988). 
However, the response to the DTI's proposals has always 
been mixed due to the fact that they came from parties 
(e. g. ICAEW, ACCA, small firms, large firms) with 
conflicting interests (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
The Government had been under pressure from the 
professional bodies and SCs to offer SCs some measure of 
relief from the statutory requirements. In April 1993, 
the DTI (1993) proposed the abolition of the audit for 
Very SCs or its replacement with a compilation report. 
In the November 1993 Budget, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer confirmed the abolition of the audit for Very 
SCs with turnover up to £90,000 per annum and also 
replacement of audit by a simple compilation report 
certified by an independent accountant for SCs with 
turnover up to £350,000 per annum. These measures came 
into effect in August 1994 which "reduced burdens on some 
500,000 smaller companies... (DTI, 1995: 9). For further 
detail see sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2. 
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It is worthy of note that in November 1994, the DTI 
(1994) published a consultative document to review the 
company law applicable to private companies. In this 
regard, the DTI states that "Our concern is that the law 
should meet the needs of small firms and impose minimum 
burdens, while maintaining protection for creditors and 
shareholders". (DTI, 1994: para. 2). 
As part of the deregulation initiative, in May 1995, the 
DTI (1995) also published a consultative document to 
examine statutory accounting requirements. According to 
that document, the Government's aim was expressed as: 
"... to minimise the burdens imposed on companies, 
while at the same time ensuring that the information 
provided meets the reasonable needs of users of 
accounts, such as shareholder, banks, the Inland 
Revenue, creditors and others dealing with the 
company" (DTI, 1995: 3). 
The document contains an invitation to contribute views 
on the level of ac&ounting disclosure required of SCs 
(DTI, 1995, Section 4: 9-18). In particular, whether 
form and content of SCs should be further simplified and 
whether there should be a "standard format" in which to 
give accounting information to Companies House and the 
Inland Revenue. 
3.2.2 Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Practices Board 
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) which replaced the 
Accounting Standards Committee-(ASC) in 1991 as the 
Standard-setting body, in the UK and Ireland develops and 
adopts Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) 
and Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) to narrow the 
areas of differences in the accounting treatments of the 
matters which they deal. 'Adoption by the ASB gives the 
SSAPs/FRSs the status, of "accounting standards" within 
Part VII of the CA 1985. " "' 
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In 1985, the ASC investigated whether or not accounting 
standards should apply equally to large and small 
companies (see Carsberg et al, 1985). However, it took 
more than 3 years for the ASC (1988a and 1988b) to define 
a "small company" (see section 4.3) which should be 
exempt from certain provisions of accounting standards. 
Even this exemption did not help SCs from the burden of 
compliance with accounting standards requirements. 
The other regulatory body, the Auditing Practices Board 
(APB) which replaced the Auditing Practices Committee 
(APC) in 1991 develops auditing standards and auditing 
guidelines which are approved by the Councils of the 
Accountancy Bodies (consisting of ICAEW, ACCA, ICAS, 
ICAI, LIMA, and CIPFA). 
The APC (1979)'s discussion paper contributed 
significantly to the SCFR debate by setting out the 
arguments for and against SC audit and invited the public 
for views and comments (for further details see section 
5.6). 
In March 1991, the APC (1991) also issued a draft 
guideline considering the main issues in respect of the 
audit of small businesses. It concluded that "to the 
owner-manager.... the cost of an audit is invariably 
considered to outweigh its benefits". 
In November 1992, the APB (1993) published a "green 
paper" on "The Future Development of Auditing", prepared 
on its behalf by a group chaired by John McFarlane, in 
order to review the role of auditing and the way 
auditors and other interested parties considered that it 
should develop so as to meet future needs. The quantity 
and quality of the, responses and research flowing from 
the above initiative have been impressive (see "The Audit 
Agenda", APB, 1995). Indeed as noted by the APB 
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(1995: 116): 
"... much has been achieved since by the APB in 
developing and issuing standards and bulletins on 
going concern, governance reporting flowing from the 
Cadbury initiative, fraud, laws and regulations and 
the revisions project due to be finalised in 1995". 
However, as indicated by the APB (1995: 126) most of these 
reforms relate to large and listed companies and this may 
explain why the APB's role in the SCFR has been 
criticised for being unduly influenced and populated by 
major firms (see, for example, "Small firms must unite to 
beat big six APB bias", Accountancy Age, 14 October 
1993): 
"The debate over whether the Auditing Practices Board 
represents the concerns of the big firms at the 
expense of others is just one indicator of unease 
among smaller practitioners and their small company 
clients. Generally there is a growing feeling that 
the agenda for reform in financial reporting and 
corporate governance is being set by large 
organisations, whether listed blue-chip companies or 
their big six auditors". 
Furthermore, quite recently, the APB has been criticised 
by Mitchell (1985) for being run by vested interests and 
also lacking accountability. 
3.3 Professional institutions 
The role played by each of the major professional 
institutions in the SCFR debate is determined to a large 
extent by the membership they, serve. 
Auditors 
The CA 1989 contains provisions designed to ensure that 
only persons who are' "properly supervised and 
appropriately qualified are appointed as company 
auditors, and that their duties are carried out properly, 
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with integrity and with a proper degree of independence. 
Only members of the ICAEW, ACCA, ICAS, ICAI and AAPA can 
practice as auditors in the UK. 
a) ICAEW (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales) has the highest number of members in 
public practice (accountancy/audit), and it is the 
most important institution contributing to SCFR 
debate. This is evident from the SCFR literature 
review (ICAEW 1985,1988,1989,1992a, 1992b). 
ICAEW had previously been criticised for being "pro- 
audit" in the SC debate because it has the highest 
number of members in audit practice. 
In their response to the DTI's discussion paper 
"Accounting and audit requirements for small firms", 
the ICAEW (1985) argued that audits are valuable 
because: 
"They ensure proper accounting in many small 
companies and represent an important form of investor protection. They also assist directors to comply with the accounting provisions of the Companies Act and have developed over time to become a vehicle for advice on accounting, 
control and financial matters to a company's 
management. We therefore believe that, as a 
general rule, the accounts of small companies 
should continue to be audited". (Para. 4). 
However, ICAEW (1985) argued that in SCs: 
"... the investor may be closely involved in the 
management of the company and may not need to 
delegate the review function to an auditor. 
Therefore, where all shareholders who are 
entitled to vote agree, we believe that such a 
company should have a choice as to whether it is 
to be audited or not. There should, however, 
always be adequate safeguards for minority 
investors and the wider public". (Para. 4). 
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Furthermore, in their latest report, the ICAEW (1992b) 
recommended the abolition of audit for Very SCs and 
the replacement of audit with a compilation report for 
companies with turnover up to VAT cash accounting 
threshold subject to unanimous annual resolution to 
dispense with the statutory audit (for more details 
see section 5.8). 
In September 1992, the London Society of Chartered 
Accountants (LSCA) published a report on the audit 
requirement for SCs. The LSCA (1992) suggested that 
Very SCs audit should be abolished and certain 
proprietary companies should have the option of 
dispensing with the audit if all shareholders agreed. 
b) ACCA (The Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants) is the second largest institution with 
members in public practice. ACCA has been 
historically "pro-audit" in the Sc audit debate, as 
its members in public practice are mainly small firms 
providing services to SCs (ACCA, 1993). 
c) ICAS (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland) is the third largest institution with 
members in public practice. 
In 1985, the ICAS proposed the replacement of 
statutory audit for small owner-managed companies with 
a report from an independent accountant. 
However, in their 
discussion paper the 
the replacement of 
compilation report, 
assurance that the 
records. 
response to the DTI (1988)'s 
ICAS (1988) in general supported 
SC's statutory audit with a 
together with an additional 
SC has kept proper accounting 
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d) ICAI (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ireland) supported the retention of SC audit in 1985. 
e) AAPA (The Association of Authorised Public 
Accountants), whose members are unqualified persons, 
previously authorised by the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry to act as company auditors under 
the provisions of the CA 1967 were able to apply for 
continued recognition but allowed to audit unquoted 
companies only. If application for audit registration 
had not been made by 30 September 1992, such persons 
lost their entitlement to audit. Most of the AAPA's 
members are sole practitioners. 
Other bodies 
f) CIMA (The Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants). Its members are not allowed by the CA 
to practice as auditors. In its paper "Small Company 
Audit: The Way Forward", CIMA (1985) proposed that the 
compulsory SC audit requirement to be rationalised and 
made optional. CIMA has long advocated a procedure 
under which SC accounts are certified rather than 
audited. 
Under the certification procedure the person primarily 
responsible for preparing the accounts, should be a 
professionally qualified accountant and would have to 
sign a certificate stating that the accounts have been 
properly prepared in accordance with the relevant UK 
generally accepted accounting principles. CIMA 
believes that certification would mean that annual 
accounts would be produced more speedily and more cost 
effectively. Furthermore, certification would add 
value to SCs and is more relevant to their needs 
(LIMA, 1985: 2). 
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g) CIPPA (The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy), whose members are not allowed to 
practice as auditors, has not participated in the SC 
audit debate. 
In summary, the role played by the professional 
institutions in the SC audit debate can be seen to have 
been influenced to some extent by their members' 
interests and pressures and for this reason, it would 
appear that the professional institutions have not been 
united on this debate. 
3.4 Accountancy firms 
Small accountancy practices benefit from growth in the 
small firms sector. Given that both are from the same 
sector, small practices with lower overheads are able to 
provide a more personal service to SCs at significantly 
lower charge rates. 
However, the maturity of the market for audits of major 
quoted companies has pushed larger accountancy practices 
into the small firms market. This has significantly 
increased the competitive pressure faced by smaller 
accountancy practices, and has influenced the nature and 
cost of services offered to SCs. 
Furthermore, medium sized accountancy practices, which 
hoped to benefit from the growth in small firms sector, 
have found themselves squeezed between the low overheads 
and more personal service provided by small local 
practices, and the expertise and extensive marketing of 
the larger accountancy practices. 
It appears that in general small accountancy practices 
have retained the advantage in their competition with 
medium sized and larger firms in acquiring and retaining 
108 
SC clients, but have tended to lose some of their clients 
with higher growth rates to the larger accountancy firms. 
In general, accountancy practices (small, medium sized or 
large) are interested in the small firms sector and for 
this reason they participate strongly in the SCFR debate. 
It is not surprising to note that 67% of responses to the 
APC (1979) Is discussion paper and 72% of responses to 
the ICAEW (1992b)'s discussion paper came from 
accountancy firms and sole practitioners. 
A detailed analysis of the responses to these discussion 
papers is presented in the table below. In total, 181 
comments were received in response to the APC (1979)'s 
discussion paper "Small Companies 
-the need for audit? " 
and 188 comments in response to the ICAEW (1992b)'s 
consultation paper "The statutory audit of small 
companies: the case for reform". They have been divided 
into the following categories: 
Response to Response to 
APC (1979) ICAEW (1992b) 
No. No. I 
a) Accounting firms and 
sole practitioners 121 67 135 72 
b) District societies 
and other groups of 
accountants 51 28 24 13 
c) Representative bodies, 
companies and 
individuals 95 29 15 
--- --- --- --- 
181 100 188 100 
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At the end of the APC (1979) discussion paper (Para. 64), 
readers were asked to consider four questions, which were 
identified as fundamental. The number of respondents 
replying to each question was as follows: 
For the first question, a total of 178 responses were 
received, of which 89 (50%) respondents agreed that audit 
in its present form should continue to be mandatory for 
all SCs. 
In response to the second question, 46 (69%) respondents 
out of a total of 67 considered that it was acceptable 
that a significant number of companies were likely to 
receive qualified audit reports. 
In considering the responses to the third question, a 
total of 90 responses were received, of which 55 (61%) 
respondents who had already answered "no" to the first or 
the second question considered that a Sc which chooses 
not to have an audit, should be required by law to have 
its accounts reviewed. 
In response to the last question, 23 (34%) respondents 
out of a total of 68 agreed that the right to choose a 
review should apply to all companies coming within the 
description "bottom tier" set out in the Green Paper (see 
Appendix 1 to APC, 1979). 
It should be noted that, the majority of responses to the 
above four questions came from members in practice which 
were respectively: 120 (out of 178 responses to the first 
question), 43 (out of 67 responses to the second 
question), 62 (out of 90 responses to the third question) 
and 42 (out of 68 responses to the fourth question). 
Referring to responses to ICAEW (1992b)'s consultation 
paper, it was reported that: 
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"Of the 188 respondents, 132 were in favour of 
relaxing the statutory audit requirement in some way. 
With 135 responses from firms and practitioners, the 
majority of these responses have by definition been 
from small firms. Five of the Big Six responded, all 
favouring relaxation. Of the next tier of larger 
firms (roughly, the next 20). 10 out of 15 favoured 
relaxation. Thus, 79 out of 115 small and very small 
firms favoured relaxation (69%)" (ICAEW, 1993a: 4). 
It is noteworthy that the majority of the responses (101 
out of 135) came from small accountancy firms with not 
more than five partners, highlighting the importance of 
the SCFR debate for their economic survival. 
3.5 Banks and other institutional creditors 
According to Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of 
England "the big banks are committed to the small 
business sector and necessarily so because it is an area 
where they have a competitive advantage" (Certified 
Accountant, February 1994: 19). 
This is because unlike larger companies, SCs cannot 
borrow directly in the money and capital markets. 
Therefore, as the big banks are the main sources of 
finance for SCs, they are in a position to ask for 
audited accounts as part of their lending requirements. 
However, Abdel-khalik (1983: 81) in his study of financial 
reporting by private companies, found that "bankers are 
not always as successful in obtaining information on 
request from private companies as outsiders are led to 
believe". Furthermore, in the follow-up to that study, 
the following comments were made by the ten Ohio bankers 
(Abdel-khalik, 1983: 100) in response to the question "why 
do not you insist on obtaining the information you 
requested? ": 
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Table 3.2: Comments made by ten Ohio bankers 
Comments Number of 
responses 
I always receive it 5 
Usually receive it, but exception is 
made based on judgement 3 
Competition may intervene 2 
10 
ýý 
The above findings are also supported by Berry, Faulkner, 
Hughes and Jarvis (1993: 136-137) who reported that: 
"A further problem that bankers face is that 
information is frequently out of date (Egginton, 1975; 
Berry et al, 1987). While, in theory, they have the 
power to demand more up-to-date information, there 
was a reluctance to exercise this power and run the 
risk of alienating an established customer. 
Therefore, except in the case of an existing customer 
wishing to expand or diversify, or a new customer with 
an existing business where up-to-date information is 
likely to be required, the banker may well be working 
with out-of-date as well as unreliable information. 
This may provide an explanation for their use of 
surrogate information... ". 
Banks use accounts for initial lending decisions as well 
as the subsequent monitoring of the ongoing security in 
respect of advances already made. 
In response to the APC (1979)'s discussion paper on SC 
audit, the Committee of London Clearing Banks, the 
Committee of Scottish Clearing Banks and the Finance 
Houses Association argued that without an audit the 
assessment of the credit worthiness of potential 
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borrowers would be more difficult and could result in a 
reduction of credit/loan granted (APC, 1980). 
However, the ICAEW's working party in their recent 
discussion paper on SC audit (ICAEW, 1992b: 2) concluded 
that "Banks and other financiers are generally in a 
position to make specific conditions for providing 
finance, and therefore have little need of a statutory 
audit". 
Furthermore, in response to the ICAEW (1992b)'s 
discussion paper, the British Bankers Association argued 
that the statutory audit is only one of the factors which 
a lending banker will take into account when assessing a 
SC's financial standing in order to determine the extent 
to which facilities should be made available. Other 
important considerations are: 
* the company's track record with the bank; 
* the quality of the company's management team; and 
* the timeliness and accuracy of management information 
and forecasts. 
The British Bankers Association concluded that none of 
these factors are necessarily affected by the existence 
or absence of a statutory audit requirement for SCs. 
3.6 Tax authorities 
The Inland Revenue is among the largest users of 
accounts, which uses the accounts as a basis for agreeing 
the computation of taxable profit. 
The Customs and Excise also uses the audited accounts for 
verifying the accuracy of turnover and expenses reported 
in VAT returns. 
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In response to the APC (1979) Is discussion paper on SC 
audit, the Board of the Inland Revenue confirmed that it 
did not insist on a mandatory audit, and that a review 
report would be sufficient (APC, 1980). 
According to ICAEW (1992b: 2): 
"The Inland Revenue's reliance on audited accounts is 
largely illusory, in that it does not appear more 
likely to accept them [the audited accounts] without 
further enquiry than unaudited accounts of similar 
unincorporated businesses". 
In a recent letter sent to all Inspectors of Taxes, the 
Inland Revenue said that: 
"... the lack of an audit report will not of itself be 
a reason for an investigation. However, the effect of 
the relaxation [of audit] is being monitored, and 
could lead to a change of view in the future, if in 
the opinion of the Inland Revenue it leads to 
'deterioration in voluntary compliance"'. (See 
"Taxation and the AUDIT EXEMPTION", Certified 
Accountant, May 1995: 28-29). 
L, Z_ small companies (SCs) and organisations representing the 
interests of small firms 
The analysis of responses to the APC (1979)'s discussion 
paper and recently to the ICAEW (1992b) Is discussion 
paper indicates that the least important and interested 
party in the SCFR debate are SCs themselves. Only one 
out of 6 responses to the recent ICAEW's discussion paper 
came from bodies representing SCs (ICAEW, 1993a). One 
possible explanation for this low response by SCs could 
be attributed to the perceived benefit of annual audit. 
In this respect, Keasey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988: 324) 
have pointed out that: 
"The major distinguishing internal control and 
ownership characteristic of small companies is that 
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the major shareholders are generally also working 
directors personally involved in the day-to-day 
control of the business. The traditional 
'stewardship' function of the audit would thus seem to 
be limited relevance for many small company 
shareholders. Benefits accruing to the 
director/ shareholders from an audit are, therefore, 
likely to be minimal since they will normally already 
have free access to this information. " 
Furthermore, Rutteman (1985: 12) argues that: 
"A statutory audit is of little value to shareholders 
of such companies [shareholder-managed]. They may 
well wish to employ outside accountants to advise them 
and prepare the accounts (and usually do) but the 
audit requirement is superfluous as far as its main 
purpose 
- 
shareholder protection - is concerned, 
because the shareholders are already in a position to 
know the true financial situation of their company". 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that a number of 
organisations representing the interests of small firms 
have contributed to the SC audit debate. For example, in 
their responses to the APC (1979) Is discussion paper, the 
Engineering Industries Association supported the 
retention of audit, particularly in the interests of 
shareholders, management and trade credit organisations, 
while the Association of Independent Businesses supported 
a limited review in place of statutory audit provided all 
shareholders agreed. 
The above responses indicate that these organisations 
appear not to have a clear and unique policy on this 
issue. 
In addition in 1985, such organisations contributed to a 
study by the DTI on how to reduce the administrative 
burden on companies arising from certain company law 
requirements (e. g. the burden of the statutory audit 
requirement on owner-managed SCs). (See Appendix 4 to 
"Burden on Business" report, DTI, 1985a). 
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Furthermore, in their response to ICAEW (1992b)'s 
discussion paper, the Federation of Small Businesses 
urged for a stronger representation to the government for 
the abolition of the SC audit requirement because they 
believed that the compliance costs imposed upon both 
small businesses and their professional advisers appeared 
to have been set out of all proportion to the perceived 
benefits of limited liability. 
3.8 Summary and conclusion 
Having recognised the administrative burdens on SCs 
resulting from the requirements of company law, the 
regulatory bodies appeared to have attempted to relieve 
SCs of the burdens of some of these statutory 
requirements (e. g. exempting Very SCs from the statutory 
audit requirement). Furthermore, they are considering to 
simplify the form and content of SC accounts. 
While, the professional institutions' role in the debate 
appeared to have been influenced to some extent by their 
members' interests, it would seem that this "self- 
interest" has led to the lack of consensus among the 
professional institutions involved in the debate. 
From responses to the SC audit discussion papers, it is 
evident that accountancy firms in general and small 
accountancy firms in particular, are interested in the SC 
audit debate. 
With reference to banks, it has been claimed that audit 
is one of the factors that bankers would take into 
account for lending decisions. However, they may also 
take into account the company's track record with the 
bank as well as the quality of its management. 
Furthermore, the research indicates that bankers have not 
always been successful in obtaining the required 
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information partly due to competition. 
With respect to tax authorities, it was observed that 
they are among the largest users of accounts but their 
reliance on audited accounts has been described as 
"largely illusory". 
Finally, as far as SCs and other organisations 
representing their interests are concerned, audit seemed 
to have a limited relevance to their shareholders. 
A number of major issues raised in this Chapter together 
with other issues affecting sCFR are considered in detail 
in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SCFR ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter considers some of the important issues in a SC 
environment which affect SCFR. It begins by considering the 
economic importance of small businesses and reviewing the 
various definitions of a SC, their characteristics and 
numbers. An attempt is also made to provide a comparative 
analysis of the financial structure and profitability of 
large and SCs. 
ownership and controls of SCs, their corporate status and 
the client-auditor relationship in a SC environment are also 
examined. Furthermore, the form and content of SC accounts 
as required by the CA 1989, application of accounting 
standards to SCs together with the burden of financial 
reporting on SCs are provided. The main users of SC 
accounts and their accounting information needs are also 
reviewed in this Chapter. This is followed by a discussion 
of audit problems and audit report with references to SCs 
and the possible conduct of an efficient and effective audit 
in a SC audit environment. 
Finally, an overview of the USA literature with respect to 
financial reporting for private companies and audit 
requirement in a number of overseas countries are provided. 
4.2 The economic importance of small businesses 
"The small business sector in the UK started to attract 
political attention during the 1970s, but it was not 
until the middle of the 1980s that the ideology of the 
Conservative party, with its sympathy towards competition 
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and the market mechanism, focused attention on the role 
that small firms were expected to play in the economy" ("Accounting for growth", Accountancy, March 1987: 160). 
The importance of the role played by small 
-businesses in the 
economy cannot be disputed. Small businesses increase 
consumer choice, challenge larger businesses to keep prices 
low and act as a defence against monopoly and state control. 
Small businesses provide vital supplies and services to 
large businesses and often grow into the medium and large 
businesses of the future. It is the growing small businesses 
which could offer the opportunity for employment (see Table 
4.4 in section 4.5) and the improvement in economic growth. 
They play a great role by creating and sustaining employment 
in situations where their medium-sized and large firms 
counterparts would fail to do so, in particular, in inner- 
city and rural areas (Cross, 1983). Furthermore, they have 
also played an important role in the introduction of 
innovations in the UK over the 1945-80 period. According to 
Cross (1983: 104): 
"Over the 1945-80 period small firms have provided 
between 11 and 17 per cent of all innovations across a 
variety of industrial sectors (30 in all) and it would 
appear that through time the small firm sector has 
managed to maintain its level of contribution whilst the 
very large firms (10,000 or more employees) have 
substantially increased their contribution". 
In social terms, it would appear that small firms play an 
important role in a number of ways. The setting-up of a 
small firm offers an outlet for those individuals who for 
whatever reasons, for example, class, ethnic, religious or 
political backgrounds have been unable to find work in or 
forced to withdraw from labour market (see for example 
Stanworth and Curran, 1973). Furthermore, small firms are 
the natural routes for the talents of all artists to find 
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their expression and give status and recognition toýtheir 
hard work. 
For the remaining part of this section, the birth, death and 
growth of firms, particularly, small firms are considered. 
The birth and death of firms occurs on a high scale. 
According to Storey (1994: 49) "In the United Kingdom each 
year nearly 14 per cent of all businesses have registered 
for VAT during the previous twelve months". In 1990, these 
new firms (births) constituted a gross addition to the stock 
of UK businesses of approximately 235,000. However, Storey 
(1994: 76) argues that: 
"Given that only two-thirds of businesses are registered 
for VAT, and that those which are unregistered are likely 
to be younger than those which are registered, it 
suggests that the 14 per cent figure is likely to be, if 
anything, a significant under-estimate of the importance 
of very young firms in the stock of businesses". 
It is interesting to note that the formation rates of new 
firms vary for different sectors, different time periods and 
regions. According to Daly (1991), registration-rates for 
VAT for new firms varied from 3.5% in agriculture to 12.9% 
for motor trades and it was as high as 20.2% for the 
miscellaneous service sector. Formation rates of new 
companies in the UK were very high during the 1980s and 
comparatively low during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Storey, 1994: 76). 
With reference to business failures, Storey (1994: 92) 
identifies eleven factors which influence the probability of 
failure of a business (for example, size, age, sector, 
etc. ). He notes that business failure rates, almost however 
they are defined, are inversely related to firm size. 
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In fact, Storey (1994) argues that the main characteristic 
which distinguishes small from large firms is their higher 
probability of ceasing trade. For example, firms with an 
annual turnover of less than £13,000 in 1980, according to 
Ganguly (1985), were six times more likely to deregister for 
VAT than firms with a turnover in excess of £2m. 
According to Daly (1987), deregistration for VAT relates to 
business age. His data shows that deregistration rates are 
at their peak in the second and third years of the life of 
a business, when the annual deregistration rate is about 20% 
compared to 7% once a business is ten years old. 
In considering the growth of firms, for some business 
owners, as Curran (1986) points out, growth of their 
business is not an objective. Hakim (1989) found that the 
typical no-growth firms were unincorporated businesses that 
were home-based, employing only one or two people (including 
the owner-manager) whereas limited companies were found more 
likely to be among the faster-growth firms. However, for 
small businesses to grow to maturity stage, Scott and Bruce 
(1987) argue that they should go through survival, growth 
and expansion stages which change the role their top 
management play, the management style and the organisation 
of structure. Furthermore, Storey (1994) argues that there 
are three main factors which influence the growth of firms - 
the background/resources of the entrepreneurs (for example 
motivation and education), the nature of the firm itself 
(for example smaller and younger firms grow quicker, as do 
limited companies) and the strategic decisions taken by the 
owner-manager in the firm (for example a willingness to 
share ownership, the ability to identify market niches and 
the introduction of new products). 
Various definitions of SCs, their characteristics, numbers 
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and financial structure and profitability are considered in 
the following sections respectively. 
4.3 Definition of a small company (SC) 
As a number of authors (e. g. Raiborn, 1982; Storey, 1994 and 
Freedman and Godwin, 1993) have pointed out there are 
various definitions of a SC for various purposes. These 
definitions may be grouped under two broad headings based 
on: 
i) quantitative limits (e. g. turnover, assets, number 
of employees, balance sheet total, profit or market 
share) and/or 
ii) qualitative characteristics (e. g. owner/manager 
dominance). 
The following review in this section will shed light on some 
of the definitions of a SC, based on quantitative limits, 
while, in the next section the definitions of a SC, based on 
qualitative characteristics will be considered. The 
definitions provided in these sections are not intended to 
be exhaustive. 
The Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (1971) (the Bolton 
Committee) gave a very wide definition of a small business 
which recognised that a small business has a relatively 
small market share, cannot affect the market and is managed 
in a personalised way by its owner(s). 
The Bolton Committee recommended different definitions for 
a small business in different industries. For example, for 
manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying 
industries, the criterion was employment. In retailing, 
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miscellaneous services, motor trades and wholesale trades, 
the criterion was sales turnover. However, in catering and 
road transport industries the criteria were based on 
ownership and the number of vehicles respectively. This 
made comparison and analysis between different industries 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Indeed, Storey (1994: 13) draws attention to the EC 
definition of "small and medium enterprise" (SME) which is 
disaggregated into three components: 
* micro-enterprises: those with between 0 and 9 employees; 
* small enterprises: those with 10 to 99 employees; 
* medium enterprises: those with 100 to 499 employees. 
Storey (1994) argues that the above definitions are more 
appropriate than those of the Bolton Committee because they 
are based upon employment rather than a multiplicity of 
criteria and also they recognise that the SME group is not 
homogeneous (i. e. distinctions are made between micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises). 
However, it should be pointed out that the definitions 
provided by the Bolton Committee had no direct significance 
for SCFR. 
The next definition of a SC is provided by the CA 1985 
(S247), which defines a company as "small" for a financial 
year for the purposes of filing abbreviated accounts with 
the Registrar of Companies, based on its turnover, total 
balance sheet assets and average number of employees (see 
List of definitions). In this regard, according to Freedman 
and Godwin (1993: 108): 
"It seems that at least 90 per cent. of all companies 
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would fall within the Companies Act "small companies" 
definition". 
Furthermore, they argue that: 
"If this is the case then this classification, although 
valuable for many purposes, is unlikely to be 
sufficiently targeted to be helpful in discussing the 
audit issue". 
This is because as they have noted: 
"Companies falling within this category will range from 
the one person entity operated from a back bedroom to a 
substantial organisation with minority shareholders, 
sizeable borrowing and a number of employees. Different 
considerations clearly apply to these very different 
entities". 
It is worthy of note that a similar definition was used by 
the APC (1979) in their discussion paper "Small Companies: 
the need for audit? ". 
Another definition of a SC, which is provided by the ASC 
(1988b), refers to specific circumstances for exempting SCs 
from certain provisions of accounting standards. SCs, for 
this purpose, are defined as those excluding: 
i) Public Limited Companies (PLC); 
ii) Companies that have a PLC as a subsidiary; and 
iii) Companies which exceed ten times the qualifying 
conditions for a company to be treated as a medium- 
sized company under Section 248 of the companies 
Act 1985. 
The effect of this definition for the purpose of accounting 
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standards is that a company is able to avail itself of 
relaxation specified in respect of all or part of 
accounting standards if it is not a PLC and does not have a 
PLC subsidiary and it meets two or more of the following 
conditions: 
* turnover does not exceed £112m (since 16 November 1992); 
* balance sheet assets do not exceed £56m (since 16 
November 1992); and 
* average number of persons employed in the year under 
review does not exceed 2500. 
Clearly, the effect of the above exemptions apply to 
companies other than very large ones. Therefore, it appears 
that the ASC has introduced an unnecessary definition by 
including the size criteria in the exemption. Perhaps, it 
would have been more beneficial if the ASC had distinguished 
between public and private companies for this exemption. 
Other definitions of a SC worth noting are those used for 
tax purposes, application of SSAP10 and FRS1 and also for 
sampling purposes. 
For tax purposes, a company is deemed to be "small" if its 
taxable profit is less than £250,000 for the year ended 31 
March 1994. 
For the application of SSAP10, a company with annual 
turnover of £25,000 or less was considered to be "small". 
However, SSAP10 was replaced with Cash Flow Statement 
FRS1 
, 
which exempts small companies (as defined by S247 CA 
1985) from the requirement to prepare a cash flow statement. 
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For sampling purposes, for example, in their research study, 
Carsberg et al (1985) defined a SC as one with less than 150 
employees, being exactly half of the limit (300 employees) 
used by Robertson (1986a) in an empirical survey of 100 
small Scottish manufacturing companies. Furthermore, the 
DTI (1985a)'s "Burden on Business" report effectively 
defined SCs as those in the manufacturing sector with 
employment of 50 or less and in the service sector with a 
turnover of £150,000 or less. 
It is worth mentioning that the current definitions of Very 
SCs and SCs used by ICAEW (1992b), LSCA (1992) and DTI 
(1993) are based on VAT registration and VAT cash accounting 
thresholds (see sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2). These thresholds 
are considered to have significant implications for the way 
a company conducts its business as they are reviewed and 
upgraded annually. 
Referring to the definition of a SC in other countries, it 
would appear that any international comparison would prove 
difficult. For example, in Canada, various provinces have 
different definitions for companies to be exempt from SC 
audit requirement (LSCA, 1992). Furthermore, the 
definitions used in different countries, such as in 
Australia, Canada and South Africa for exempting their SCs 
from audit requirement are different and therefore they are 
not comparable (LSCA, 1992). 
From the above consideration, it would appear that there are 
many definitions of a SC for different purposes and that 
most of the definitions cited in these studies overlap as 
they are generally based on one or a combination of the 
following factors: number of employees, turnover, balance 
sheet total, profit or market share. Furthermore, most of 
the definitions cover majority of companies in the UK. 
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It would appear, in the words of Storey (1994: 8) that: 
"There is no single, uniformly acceptable, definition of 
a small firm. This is because a 'small' firm in, say, 
the petrochemical industry is likely to have much higher 
levels of capitalisation, sales and possibly employment, 
than a 'small' firm in the car repair trades". 
Storey goes on to say that: 
"Definitions, therefore, which relate to "objective" 
measures of size such as number of employees, sales 
turnover, profitability, net worth, etc., when examined 
at a sectoral level, mean that in some sectors all firms 
may be regarded as small, while in other sectors there 
are possibly no firms which are small". 
In search of a possible definition of a SC, Page (1981: 21) 
has pointed out that: 
"... there are plain administrative advantages to choosing 
a relatively simple and uniform definition rather than a 
complex definition such as that used by the Bolton 
Committee". 
Furthermore, Cross (1983: 88) is also of the opinion that it 
is important to have "... an agreed definition which can be 
commonly and readily applied". 
Freedman et al (1993: 108) observed that "The problem of 
defining "small company" plagues the small company audit 
debate 
... 
" and that, "No one definition will be suitable 
for all purposes". 
In other studies SCs are defined based on their 
characteristics which are considered below. 
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4.4 Characteristics of a SC and their consequences 
The following studies have either identified the main 
characteristics of a SC or defined a SC based on its 
characteristics. 
- 
In a research project in the United States (Raiborn, 1982), 
reference was made to the AICPA's definition of a small 
business as one possessing some or all of the following 
characteristics: 
i) owner/manager dominance, allowing management to 
override internal accounting controls which are 
informally designed; 
ii) management personnel or employees have limited 
accounting knowledge and easy access to physical 
assets; 
iii) internal control deficiencies resulting from 
limited segregation of functions; and 
iv) the firm has an inactive or ineffective 
policy-making body such as a board of directors. 
It is worth pointing out that the UEC (1983) Auditing 
Statement Number 14 (para. 2) lists almost similar 
characteristics of a SC as the above. In addition, it 
states that a SC relies heavily on the services of outside 
advisors (e. g. accountants/auditors). 
A study by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA 1988) divides the main characteristics of SCs into two 
groups in order to identify the main characteristics of a 
SC, namely: 
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Primary characteristics: 
* concentration of ownership 
* operations are not complex 
* systems and authorisation procedures often lack formal 
documentation 
* segregation of incompatible functions is limited 
Secondary characteristics: 
* potential for management to override internal controls 
* management personnel have limited accounting knowledge 
* an inactive or ineffective policy-making body 
In general, similar SC characteristics as the above have 
been reported by the International Auditing Practices 
Committee (IAPC, 1988), Accountants Digest 245 (ICAEW, 1990) 
and the APC's draft auditing guideline (1991). 
The characteristics of SCs do not have an effect on the 
standard of the audit or on the duties and responsibilities 
of the auditor. 
However, in SCs, the approach to the audit needs to be 
responsive to SC characteristics (Anderson et al, 1982; 
Humphrey and Turley, 1986; and UEC, 1983). This is 
generally due to internal control deficiencies in SCs 
resulting from some of their characteristics such as limited 
segregation of functions and the potential for management to 
override internal controls. This would make it difficult 
for the auditor of a SC to test and rely on internal 
controls (UEC, 1983). The UEC (1983: Para. 4.3) has argued 
that: 
"... in approaching the audit of financial statements of 
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a small enterprise the auditor will normally place less 
emphasis on the study and evaluation of internal controls 
of the enterprise and more on the verification of 
transactions and balances through detailed audit tests 
and analytical review procedures". 
Furthermore, as shown earlier (see 2.6(i)), Humphrey and 
Turley (1986), who investigated the factors influencing the 
choice of audit procedures adopted in the audit of SCs (e. g. 
absence of an internal control system), concluded that: 
"... the audit of a small company will be different from 
that of a large company not only in matters of detailed 
procedures but also in fundamental approach... ". (Humphrey et al, 1986: 31). 
4.5 Number of small firms 
Given the problems identified above in defining a small 
firm, Storey (1994: 6) argues that: 
"... it is perhaps not surprising that, in the United 
Kingdom, there is no single definitive statement about the 
total number of firms in the economy, or the proportion of 
those which, however defined, could be regarded as small". 
This is partly due to lack of consensus about what 
constitutes "small" and also the absence of any single 
comprehensive data covering all firms in the UK economy. 
However, it is worth mentioning that data bases on the UK 
firms do exist. For example, statistics are available on 
the number of companies filing SCs' abbreviated accounts in 
Great Britain (DTI, 1994): 
Table 4.1: Companies filinqSCs' abbreviated accounts in 
Great Britain 
Number of % of total companies 
Cos. ('000) filing accounts 
1990/91 252 32.2 
1991/92 268 32.5 
1992/93 300 34.0 
1993/94 308 40.5 
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(Extracted from Appendix C, Table 1, DTI, 1994 
Source: Companies House, limited to "active" companies 
and compiled in December of each year). 
With reference to the effective number of companies in Great 
Britain on the register of Companies House, these were 
nearly 979,800 companies at the end of 1991/92 period (see 
DTI, 1991-92: Table A2) with the following legal structures: 
Table 4.2: Legal structures of companies in Great Britain, 
1991/92 
Public companies 
Private companies 
Number (1000) 1 
11.6 1.2 
968.2 98.8 
979.8 100.0 
With regards to other legal structures in 1991/92, the DTI 
(1994, Appendix C: Table 2) provides the following data: 
Partnerships 
Sole traders 
Number ('000) 
629 
2,840 
According to the DTI (1994: 7) "There are no government 
statistics on the number of entirely owner managed 
companies". It is worth mentioning that according to the 
DTI (1995: 7)'s estimates the numbers of small private 
companies (as defined by the CA 1985) were 870,000 out of 
957,000 companies on the register in 1993/94. 
With regards to turnover statistics, the DTI (1994) provides 
the following data which are only available in VAT 
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statistics in 1991: 
Table 4.3: Size by turnover according to VAT 
- 
1991 
Turnover % of % of % of sole 
(£'000) companies Partnership s traders 
22 
- 
50 18 25 46 
51 
- 
100 13 27 27 
101 
- 
250 21 31 19 
251 
- 
500 15 11 5 
501 
- 
1000 13 4 2 
1001 
- 
2000 8) ) 
2001 
- 
5000 6) 2 )1 
5001 
- 
10000 3) ) 
10000+ 3) ) 
100 100 100 
(Adapted from Appendix C: Tables 4,5 and 6, DTI, 1994). 
Note: the above table does not include 69,577 companies and 
140,596 sole traders with a turnover below £23,600 and 
45,000 partnerships with a turnover below £23,000 (see DTI, 
1994). 
From the above table, it is interesting to note that 88% of 
companies registered for VAT had a turnover up to £2m, 
satisfying turnover criteria of the CA 1985 definition of a 
"small company". 
Furthermore, the following table presents a comparative data 
on number of businesses and their share of employment 
according to employment size. 
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Table 4.4: Numbers of businesses and employment share by 
size band in the United Kinodom 
Share of 
total (%) 
Employment Numbers (1000) Employment 
size band 1979* 1986* 1991+ 79* 86* 91+ 
1-2 1,099 1,595 1,735 7 11 11 
3-5 319 535 565 6 10 10 
6-10 179 178 196 7 7 7 
11-19 109 84 97 8 6 6 
20-49 46 56 65 7 8 9 
50-99 16 16 20 5 6 7 
100-199 15 9 10 10 7 8 
200-499 5 5 6 8 10 9 
500-999 2 2 2 8 7 6 
1,000+ 2 1 1 35 29 
----- 
27 
---- 
---------- 
Total 
--------- 
1,791 
-------- 
2,481 
-------- 
2,697 
------ 
100 100 100 
(Extracted from Storey (1994: 21). 
Sources: *McCann (1993), +Daly and McCann (1992)). 
The key point of the above table is the fact that almost 
two-thirds of UK firms from 1979 to 1991 had two employees 
or less. In 1979, there were about 1.1 million firms having 
two employees or less, out of a total of 1.791 million 
firms, representing nearly 61% of all firms trading at that 
time. The numbers of firms having two employees or less 
were increased during the 1980s, so that, there were about 
1.595 million and 1.735 million of such firms by 1986 and 
1991 respectively, representing 64% of all UK businesses for 
those years. 
The above data emphasises the key numerical importance of 
tiny businesses in the UK. For example, taking the EC 
definition of the micro-enterprises (with ten, rather than 
nine employees or less), it can be seen that in 1991,92% of 
all UK businesses were micro enterprises. 
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However, the contribution of the "small" businesses to 
employment, is very much less than their contribution to the 
number of businesses. For example, although businesses with 
two employees or less accounted towards two-thirds of UK 
firms throughout the 1980s, but their contribution to UK 
employment was not more than 11% for the period. 
Similarly, the micro-enterprises (with 10 employees or less) 
accounted towards about 90% of UK firms throughout the 
1980s, but their contribution to UK employment was 
approximately 20% and 28% of employment in 1979 and 1991 
respectively. Storey (1994: 21) concludes that: 
"Even so, it is likely that there was an increase in the 
total number of firms in the UK economy in the 1980s, 
with the bulk of these being micro-enterprises with less 
than ten workers. Such enterprises dominate the UK stock 
of businesses, although they only provide just over a 
quarter of employment". 
International comparisons 
The UK and Europe 
The following table provides a comparative analysis of the 
number of enterprises in 1988 and their contribution to 
employment between UK and the rest of the European Community 
(EC) countries. 
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Table 4.5: EC enterprisebvmember states. 1988 
No. of enterprises 
per '000 Ave. Employment share 
(x1,000) inhabit. firm 0-9 0-499 
Country size %% 
Belgium 530 53 5 28 69 
Denmark 180 35 9 22 76 
France 2,040 36 7 28 67 
Germany* 2,160 35 9 17 62 
Greece 670 67 3 59 91 
Ireland 130 36 6 34 83 
Italy 3,170 55 4 48 81 
Luxembourg 20 43 9 23 74 
Netherlands 420 28 10 28 72 
Portugal 640 62 4 36 80 
Spain 2,020 52 4 36 83 
UK 
----------- 
2,630 
--------- 
46 
----- 
8 
---------- 
26 
---------- 
65 
------ 
Total EC 14,600 
---- 
45 6 30 70 
(Extracted from Storey (1994: 22) 
Source: ENSR (1993)) 
(Note: *Former FRG only) 
As can be seen from the table, Italy and Luxembourg with 
3.17 million and 20,000 businesses had the largest and the 
smallest number of enterprises in the EC respectively. 
However, by taking number of inhabitants in such countries 
into account, the average number of enterprises in the EC 
was 45 per 1000 inhabitants in 1988, which was almost the 
same as that for the UK. Countries such as Greece, Spain 
and Portugal had a higher number of enterprises per 1000 
inhabitants than the UK. Whilst, countries such as France, 
Netherlands and Denmark had a lower number of enterprises 
per 1000 inhabitants than the UK. 
The analysis of the third column (i. e. average firm size) in 
the table provides interesting results. According to Storey 
(1994: 22) who cited ENSR (1993) data and results (including 
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the above table statistics), the average firm size is 
broadly inversely related to the number, of enterprises per 
1000 inhabitants. For example, Netherlands and Greece with 
the lowest (28) and highest (67) number of enterprises per 
1000 inhabitants had respectively the highest (10) and 
lowest (3) average firms size in the EC. 
However, the UK average firm size (8) was higher than the EC 
average size (6) in 1988 but it was lower than those in 
Denmark, Germany (before unification), Luxembourg and 
Netherlands. According to Storey (1994: 22): 
"It is also the case that it is the less developed 
countries of Spain, Greece and Portugal which have the 
largest number of enterprises per 1000 inhabitants, so 
that number of small firms looks to be inversely related 
to level of economic development". 
For example, in more wealthy countries such as Netherlands 
and Denmark the average number of employees per firm was 
more than twice that of less wealthy countries such as 
Greece and Portugal in 1988. 
With reference to the employment share, the above table 
shows the percentage distribution of employment by size 
class for each Community country in 1988. This emphasises 
the importance of micro-enterprises in the economies of 
countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
From the above table, it is interesting to note that the 
size structure of enterprises having up to 500 employees in 
the UK was similar to that of Germany (before unification) 
and France in 1988 than any other EC countries. However, 
the only notable difference appears to be that, the UK had 
a higher proportion of its employment (26%) than Germany 
(17%) in enterprises with less than ten employees in 1988, 
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which is in line with the earlier finding that during the 
1980s, there was an increase in the total number of micro- 
companies in the UK. 
Europe and the United States 
A comparison between the UK and both the EC and the United 
States (US) of the size structure of enterprises in 1988 is 
presented in the following table. 
Table 4.6: Employment by enterprise classes. 1988 
All sectors 
USA 
UK 
EC-12 
Manufacturing 
<100 100-499 500+ 
-Total 
%ö 
37 14 49 100.0 
47 18 35 100.0 
55 16 29 100.0 
USA 20 15 65 100.0 
UK 24 15 61 100.0 
EC-12 42 20 38 100.0 
(Extracted from Storey, (1994: 24) 
Sources: EC data taken from ENSR (1993) 
US data from: The State of Small Business (1991)) 
As can be seen, the distribution of manufacturing employment 
according to enterprise size in the UK was closer to that of 
the US than to the EC. 
However, for all-sector employment a much higher proportion 
of employment in the US was in large enterprises than was 
the case for the UK or for the EC. For example, nearly half 
of all employment in the US was in enterprises having more 
than 500 employees, compared with 35% in the UK and 29% in 
the EC. As it can be seen from the table, the difference 
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between the EC and the US did not lie in the relative 
importance of middle-sized firms, but rather in small firms 
with less than 100 employees, which employed 55% of the EC 
workforce in 1988 as compared with 37% in the US. 
Similarly, for manufacturing employment a much higher 
proportion of employment in the EC (42%) was in small 
enterprises with less than 100 employees than in the case of 
the US (20%). Given that small business was viewed as the 
bed-rock of the US economy, the above finding could have 
been regarded by some as a surprising result. 
4.6 The comparative financial structure and profitability of 
large and small companies 
Financial structure 
This section draws heavily on the work by Cosh and Hughes 
(1994). In that work, they provided a summary analysis of 
the balance sheet structure, gearing and profitability of 
large and small UK non-financial companies in the period 
1987-9 based on their published accounts (Cosh and Hughes, 
1994: 35). In that context, "large" companies were those 
ranked in the top 2,000 in terms of capital employed in the 
UK non-financial corporate sector, whereas "small" companies 
were a one in 300 sample of the remainder of the sector, 
stratified by size of capital employed. 
Their work demonstrates that the financial structure and 
profitability of large and SCs differ significantly, even 
where account is taken of the distinction between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing. A number of 
interesting conclusions may be drawn from their work which 
are listed in the following subsections: 
Asset structure 
SCs have a lower ratio of fixed to total assets as compared 
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to large companies. However, SCs have a relatively high 
proportion of trade debt in their asset structure than large 
companies. 
Current liability 
Trade and other creditors are a higher proportion of total 
liabilities for small than for large companies. For 
example, in manufacturing, trade and other creditors were 
35.3% of total liabilities compared to 23.6% for large 
companies. The small manufacturing companies were net 
receivers of credit. 
one particular important result is that SCs are more reliant 
on short-term bank loans and overdrafts than large 
companies. In non-manufacturing, for instance, bank 
overdrafts and loans were 11% of total liabilities for SCs 
compared to 4.4% for large companies. 
Long-term liabilities 
SCs are less reliant on shareholders interests to finance 
their assets. In non-manufacturing, gearing (as measured by 
ratio of total loans to shareholders interest) is higher for 
SCs (78.7%) than for larger companies (44.5%). However, in 
manufacturing, SCs are slightly less highly geared than 
larger companies. 
In manufacturing, long term loans are only 20.5% of all 
loans for SCs compared to 61.7% of all loans for larger 
companies. Similarly, in non-manufacturing, long term loans 
are 29.4% of all loans for SCs compared to 72.9% of all 
loans for larger companies. 
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Cosh and Hughes (1994: 37) conclude that: 
"The high reliance on short term finance provided by 
banks, and the relatively low proportions of assets 
financed by shareholders interests are clearly long run 
persistent features of small business finance. The same 
is true of the relative importance of trade debt, and 
trade credit and the relative unimportance of fixed 
assets in their balance sheet structure. Thus our 
results match the results of previous investigations for 
the 1960s and 1970s for the UK and for other 
countries... ". 
Examples of the UK investigations in this area are those of 
Jones (1979) and Page (1984). In his survey of SCs' annual 
returns, Page (1984: 274) confirms some of Jones (1979)'s 
findings for the financial structure of SCs that: 
"... as compared with large companies: 
(1) shorter term assets and liabilities are more 
, 
prominent; 
(2) small companies are net receivers of trade credits; 
(3) small companies are more dependent on bank 
overdrafts and loans; 
(4) small companies are more dependent on equity (including directors' loans). " 
Profitability 
Table 4.7: The relative profitability performance of large 
and small UK companies in the manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing industries (excluding oil) in the period 1987- 
1989 (average %) 
Manufacturing 
companies 
Non-manufacturing 
companies 
Small Large 
RONA 15.9 19.6 
ROTA 12.4 14.3 
ROE 10.4 19.1 
Small Large 
19.1 14.4 
13.0 17.6 
18.8 13.3 
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Where: 
RONA = Pre-tax return on net assets 
ROTA = Pre-tax return on total assets 
ROE = Pre-tax return on equity 
(Extracted from Cosh and Hughes (1994: 35) 
Source: Business Monitor MA3 Company Finance, Various 
Issues) 
The above table shows that the average profitability of 
small manufacturing companies is below that of large 
manufacturing companies on each of the three measures used 
(RONA, ROTA and ROE) for the period 1987-9. 
However, for non-manufacturing companies, for two of the 
measures (RONA and ROE) SCs seem to be more profitable than 
large companies. 
Cosh and Hughes (1994: 42) show that the above results 
contrast with those obtained earlier, by both the Bolton 
Committee (1971) and the Wilson Committee (1979) which 
showed apparently that small firm profitability was between 
8% and 30% higher than larger firm profitability, depending 
on the measure and time period (1968 to 1975]. Jones (1979) 
also found that SCs were on average more profitable than 
large companies. 
However, it is apparent, according to Cosh and Hughes 
(1994: 42) that "over the years shown the gap was narrowing, 
and that, as we have seen, it was reversed by the late 
1980s". 
Storey (1994: 217) points to the limitations of the above 
official figures and argues that the concept of 
profitability in small firms is likely to differ sharply 
from that in a large firm. For example, as shown by Keasey 
and Watson (1993) the measures of profitability are after 
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directors' remuneration which constitutes 65% of gross 
profit margins. Storey (1994: 217-218) concludes that: 
"The lack of strict comparability occurs because in small 
firms profitability is more 'discretionary', and includes 
a larger element of 'return' on owners' equity than is 
the case for large firms. In short, there is likely to 
be greater variety in the accounting procedures employed 
by small firms than by large". 
4.7 Ownership and control of SCs 
Page (1984: 274) Is review of SCs' annual returns indicates 
that SCs are generally owned and controlled by their 
directors: 
"In 95.9% of cases 50% voting control is in the hands of 
the two shareholders owning most shares and in 77.5% of 
the cases these two shareholders have the almost complete 
control given by possession of 75% or more of the share 
capital. Similarly directors owned 50% or more of the 
shares in all but 8.8% of cases and in 64.6% of cases had 
total control. " 
A similar finding is also reported by Humphrey and Turley 
(1986). Page (1984) concludes that if the above pattern of 
ownership by directors continues, then in almost two-thirds 
of cases, directors report to themselves as shareholders. 
Humphrey and Turley (1986) report that the ownership of a 
large number of SCs include non-management interests, but 
the information needs of these interests were not regarded 
as significant by owner-managers. 
4.8 A new form of incorporation for SCs 
The limited liability company was devised based on the 
fundamental concept that management and shareholders are 
separate persons. For this reason, a relationship of 
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accountability developed between owners and managers. 
Therefore, company law is concerned with the regulation of 
the relationship between management and shareholders which 
is not relevant to those SCs where there is a complete 
identity of management and ownership. 
The DTI (1981) proposed that there was a need for a new 
small business vehicle distinct from private limited company 
because of the burden of legal and operating formalities. 
In response to the above proposal, the Councils of the CCAB 
(ICAEW, 1981) considered that: 
"... there is a strong case for exempting those small 
firms where there is a complete identity of management 
and ownership from all those provisions of company law 
which presume a separation of management and ownership. 
We propose the creation of a new class of limited 
liability company: the "proprietary company" in which the 
proprietors are also the managers... it may be desirable 
to remove proprietary companies from the ambit of company 
law and to enact separate legislation" (para. 4). 
According to Swinson (1985: 12): 
"It is now time to recognise that the traditional 
approach to the development of company law is mistaken 
and that the proprietary company is not simply a smaller, 
simpler version of the public company but a different 
form of business organisation". 
Furthermore, according to Page (1982: 92): 
"There has long been unease about the suitability of the 
limited company as a vehicle for small business, probably 
since the famous case of Salomon v Salomon 1897. The 
increasing complexity of companies legislation certainly 
makes it desirable that the law relating to small 
companies be simplified and clarified". 
Page (1982: 92) concludes that there is also a need: 
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"... to reduce all government form filling by the small 
businessman, and amendment to our tax system - in the 
widest possible sense - to recognise the difference 
between a multinational and the incorporated family 
business". 
In 1992, the LSCA (1992: 5), having considered the advantages 
and disadvantages of a form of corporate status with other 
form of business entity such as partnership, concluded that: 
"... a form of corporate status was preferable, mainly due 
to the advantages that incorporation infers. The 
principal ones being: 
* limited liability of members; 
* continuity of the entity; 
* ease of raising external finance; and 
* legal status of the entity. 
Consequently, we recommend the retention of corporate 
status for small business enterprises". 
The APC (1979) confirms that limited liability is a 
substantial benefit conferred on the shareholders of a 
limited company but it argues that in many SCs, the benefits 
of limited liability have been eroded as directors of SCs 
have to give personal guarantees to lending institutions, 
particularly banks. 
In a recent consultative document issued by the DTI 
(1994: 41) to consider a reform of the law applicable to 
private companies, the Law Commission expressed "... doubts 
as to whether a new incorporated limited liability structure 
would be of significant assistance to small businesses". 
Furthermore, they consider that: 
"... a reform of partnership law which addresses its main 
deficiencies, provides a statutory draft partnership 
agreement and possibly gives partnerships independent 
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legal personality may well be of benefit to small 
businesses". (DTI, 1994: 42). 
4.9 Client 
- 
auditor relationship in a SC environment 
The SC auditor often provides advice and assistance on a 
wide range of financial matters (e. g. accounting, taxation, 
management and business advice) in addition to providing an 
audit opinion on the client's accounts. The auditor's 
knowledge of a client's business is extended whenever 
additional services are provided. 
A research by the Study Group of the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA, 1988: 5) considers that: 
It 
.. 
an auditor who has developed a close working 
relationship with the client can obtain, relatively 
easily, the knowledge of the client's business necessary 
for the audit. Specifically, the auditor is in a better 
position to assess the: 
* reliability of the recordkeeping; 
* preparation of financial statements; 
* control environment of the business; 
* results of analytical review procedures; and 
* integrity of management". 
In providing advice and assistance to SC clients, the 
auditor must ensure that audit objectivity is retained. An 
objectivity problem arises when auditor is not independent 
by reason of fact or appearance. There are situations which 
may cause a lack of objectivity (CICA,. 1988: 7): 
* "provision of business advisory services to audit 
clients; and 
* business or personal relationship with the client 
other than with respect to audit itself". 
In practice, auditor independence may be threatened in a 
number of ways, principally because of the nature of the 
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economic relationship between the auditor and the client 
(Moizer, 1991). 
The main threats to audit objectivity (or independence) may 
arise where the size of the client is such as to constitute 
a major source of income for the audit firm. However, Lee 
(1986) demonstrates that there are potential threats to 
independence in all types of auditor and client 
relationships. 
To avoid a lack of audit objectivity in SC environment, the 
auditor should ensure that accounts comply with approved 
auditing standards, and that SC management accept 
responsibility for their preparation (although the auditor 
may have prepared them). Furthermore, in providing business 
advice, care must be taken to ensure that the auditor is not 
making decisions for the client. 
The CICA (1988) concludes that there are advantages to both 
parties in a close client-auditor relationship. The 
broadening of the auditor's knowledge of the business 
activities may be of significant assistance in the conduct 
of an efficient and effective audit. 
Humphrey and Turley (1986) find that the audit is not 
independent of other services provided by the auditor in 
SCs, nor is it perceived as a separate activity by SC owner- 
managers. They find that the reliance placed on the auditor 
by SC client increased by multiple services (as suggested by 
Goldman and Barleu, 1974) and this may increase the 
auditor's power in dealing with SC clients without conflict 
of interest with management. 
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4.10 Form and content of SC accounts 
The detailed requirements on the form and content of 
accounts are included in Part VII and Schedules 4 and 8 of 
the CA 1985. The CA 1985 requires that all companies 
prepare full statutory accounts for their members. SCs (as 
defined by sections 246 and 247 of the CA 1985) may file 
abbreviated accounts at the Registrar of Companies for the 
use by the public. The SC abbreviated accounts consist 
principally of an abbreviated balance sheet and related 
notes (without a profit and loss account or directors' 
report). 
In order to reduce regulatory burdens on small (and medium- 
sized) companies, the DTI introduced new regulations 
contained in SI 1992 No. 2452 (amending Schedule 8 to the CA 
1985) ("Accounts of small and medium-sized enterprises and 
publication of accounts in ECUs") Regulation 1992. These 
regulations reduced the detailed disclosure requirements in 
accounts for members of SCs for accounting periods ended on 
or after 16 November 1992. Due to their importance, the 
effects of SI 1992 No. 2452 are worth considering below, 
before returning to the debate on the form and content of SC 
accounts. 
SI 1992 No. 2452 determines the minimum disclosure required 
in a SC's annual accounts. A SC, however, does not have to 
take advantage of all the exemptions and modifications (see 
below) permitted if it does not wish to do so. Schedule 8 
to the CA 1985, which sets out the exemptions for small and 
medium-sized companies, has been amended by SI 1992 No. 
2452. 
Schedule 8 to the CA 1985 allows modifications to Schedule 
4 formats essentially by combining and re-numbering certain 
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items in the formats (to which an arabic number is assigned) 
in order to make a less detailed balance sheet. For 
example, there is no need for analysis of stocks (i. e. raw 
materials and consumables, work-in-progress, finished goods 
and goods for resale), other debtors and other creditors. 
Notes to the balance sheet formats apply to items in the 
amended format of balance sheet which have been re-numbered 
or combined into other items. 
Furthermore, a SC need not set out in the notes any of the 
information specified in Schedule 8 (CA 1985, Sch. 8, Paras. 
6-12). For example, according to CA 1985, Schedule 8, 
Paragraph 6a SC need not set out in the notes to its 
accounts any information required by. the following 
paragraphs of Schedule 4, inter alia: 
40 Contingent right to allotment of shares 
47 Provision for taxation 
48(2) Particular of debts 
48(4)(b) Nature of security given for debts 
51(2) Loans provided by way of financial 
assistance for purchase of own shares 
51(3) Dividend 
54 Particular of tax 
56 Particular of staff 
In addition, the CA 1985, Schedule 8, Paragraph 15 states 
that the directors' report of a SC need not give any of the 
following information, inter alia: 
* Fair review of business 
* Amount to be paid as dividend 
* Amount to be carried to reserves 
* Asset values 
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* Insurance effected for officers or auditors 
* Health, safety and welfare at work of company's employees 
* Employees involvement 
After the above exemptions, the directors' report of SCs, 
taking the exemptions provided by SI 1992 No. 2452, is only 
required to provide the following information: 
* names of directors 
* principal activities 
* directors' share interests 
* directors' share options 
* political and charitable gifts (exceeding £200). 
It should be pointed out that a SC company which takes 
advantage of the exemption with respect to the preparation 
of annual accounts for shareholders and directors' report 
must include the following directors' statements in its 
accounts: 
i) a statement that advantage has been taken, in the 
preparation of the report, of special exemptions 
applicable to SCs (in both directors' report and 
balance sheet); and 
ii) a statement of the grounds on which, in the 
directors' opinion, the company is entitled to 
those exemptions (in directors' report or balance 
sheet). 
The accounts of a SC which have taken any of the above 
exemptions continue to be deemed to give a "true and fair" 
view as required by the Act (Sch 8., Para. 14(2)) and the 
auditors in their report are only required to state whether 
in their opinion the annual accounts have been properly 
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prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act 
applicable to SCs (Sch. 8, Para. 14(3)). 
There is no longer a requirement to state explicitly that 
the accounts present a "true and fair" view. However, it is 
considered best practice that the auditors' report should 
continue to state whether the accounts give a "true and 
fair" view. 
Having considered the effects of SI 1992 No. 2452, it is 
worth considering the form and content of SC accounts, which 
have been a subject of a public debate. In 1985, the DTI 
(1985b) considered the arguments for and against the form 
and content of accounts for SCs. It argued that preparation 
of full accounts for shareholders in "shareholder-managed" 
SCs was expensive and unnecessary and also in order to 
protect their competitive position, SCs had to prepare two 
sets of accounts which were expensive. 
However, the DTI (1985b) argued that any further relaxation 
of the current form and content of accounts for SCs should 
be viewed with caution because if accounts were only 
available in abbreviated form, shareholders' interests would 
be adversely affected and that separate accounts might still 
need to be prepared for tax purposes or to meet the need of 
major creditors such as banks. Nevertheless, the DTI 
(1985b) proposed that only abbreviated accounts should be 
prepared by all "owner-managed" SCs and/or by other 
categories of SCs. 
The ICAEW (1985) supported the DTI (1985b)'s proposal that 
only abbreviated accounts should be prepared for all SCs but 
asked for the additional requirement of a summarised profit 
and loss account. 
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It has also been argued that the distinction between full 
and abbreviated accounts and the occasions when the latter 
may be used are not particularly well understood by SCs 
(LSCA, 1992). For this reason, the LSCA (1992: 8) believe 
that these requirements should be simplified and proposed 
that an "annual accounting return" should be developed for 
both filing at the Registrar of Companies and use by SCs' 
members. 
However, Robertson (1986a) finds that there is a fairly high 
degree of interest in the option to file abbreviated 
accounts despite extra preparation costs to SCs. Robertson 
(1986a: 21) also finds that: 
"... it appeared that the smaller the company and the 
smaller its firm of auditors the more likely it was that 
its financial statements contained evidence of 
unfamiliarity with the required contents of modified (abbreviated] financial statements; poor compliance with 
legislative requirements and formats; and lack of 
adherence to SSAP requirements". 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that very recently the DTI 
(1995) 's consultative document ("Accounting 
Simplifications") has proposed a further simplification of 
form and content of SC accounts. These are considered in 
section 8.7 together with the results of this Survey in 
respect of form and content of SC accounts. 
4.11 Application of accounting standards to SCs 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) should be 
complied with by all companies preparing statutory accounts 
in order to give a "true and fair" view. GAAP include the 
principles laid down in the CA 1985 and SSAPs/FRSs approved 
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by the ASB. 
The burden of complying with accounting standards is greater 
for SCs. Although the principles of accounting should apply 
equally to all companies, it has been recognised that the 
application of certain accounting standards is not cost 
effective and appropriate for SCs. For this reason, where 
appropriate, exemption has been granted to SCs in the 
application of some accounting standards. In particular, 
SCs are exempt from the requirement to prepare a cash flow 
statement under FRS1. 
Main arguments for and against universal application of 
standards 
In a research study carried out in the UK by Carsberg et al 
(1985: 1-2) on SCFR, the following arguments were considered: 
a) arguments for 
- 
standards are needed for the accounts of small and 
large companies to give a true and fair view; 
- 
standards promote comparability and are needed if 
large companies' accounts are to be comparable with 
the accounts of SCs; and 
-a distinction among companies according to their size 
is an arbitrary cut-off and difficult to defend. 
b) arguments against 
- 
compliance costs are relatively higher for SCs and the 
benefits are relatively lower; 
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- 
the users of SC accounts are different kinds of people 
with different kinds of needs from the users of large 
company accounts, therefore, there is no need for 
their accounts to be comparable; and 
- 
some standards will be ignored by SCs which will 
undermine the whole standard-setting process. 
With respect to the second argument above (i. e. different 
users of accounts), Chazen and Benson (1978) found that 
owner-managers and creditors are the main users of 
private companies' accounts, whereas public stockholders 
and financial analysts are the main users of public 
companies' accounts with different information needs. 
Furthermore, with reference to the first and second 
arguments above, Abdel-khalik (1983: 23) provided similar 
arguments against universal application of GAAP. 
Compliance with standards 
According to Carsberg et al (1985) SC directors (managers) 
have little awareness of what is involved in complying with 
standards because they leave this aspect of their accounting 
to their auditors. 
Carsberg et al (1985) found that some standards were well 
accepted by SC auditors as applicable to SCs (e. g. SSAP2, 
SSAP6, SSAP9 and SSAP12) and auditors were less concerned 
with compliance with accounting standards than the CA 
requirements. 
Furthermore, Carsberg et al (1985) found general opposition 
towards SSAP10, however, Robertson (1986a) found not only a 
low level of non-compliance but also instances of exempt 
companies producing the fund statement when not required to 
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do so. 
Robertson (1986a: 20) states that "In general, those 
companies most likely to disregard SSAP requirements appear 
to be those with small firm auditors and which are 
themselves relatively small in size". 
Carsberg et al (1985)'s study recommended that: 
* no case existed for exemption from all accounting 
standards; 
* the standards most suitable for universal application 
were those dealing with fundamental topics; and 
* the ASC should be prepared to give exemption to SCs if 
their compliance costs would exceed their benefits. 
The ASC views 
The application of accounting standards to SCs and the 
definition of "small company" for the purpose of applying 
accounting standards were considered by the ASC in 1988 and 
their conclusions were issued in Technical Release numbers 
690 (ASC, 1988a) and 706 (ASC, 1988b) respectively. 
The ASC (1988a) envisages that: 
"... there may be situations in the future where the 
strict application of the universality concept may 
prevent it from making progress in the regulation of 
publicly accountable enterprises. This may be because 
future standards would be inappropriate for small 
companies on purely conceptual grounds or, more likely, 
on grounds of practicability... " (para. 17). 
Accordingly, the ASC (1988b: para. 5.1) accepted that: 
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"... there is a case, in specific circumstances, for 
exempting small entities from certain provisions of 
accounting standards. Such exemptions are likely to 
relate more often to disclosure requirements, rather than 
to recognition or measurement rules. Exemptions will not 
be proposed where they are considered to impair a true 
and fair view or to entities perceived to have a special 
responsibility of public accountability". 
For the definition of a SC qualifying for exemption from 
certain provisions of accounting standards, see section 4.3. 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that recently, the 
CCAB working party on "Big GAAP/Little GAAP" has proposed 
that "... all entities that meet the Companies Act definition 
of a small company should be exempted from all but a handful 
of accounting standards... ". (See "A GAAP in 
understanding", Accountancy, February, 1995: 93). 
Companies Act exemption 
Section 246 of the CA 1985 exempts small (and medium-sized) 
private companies from the statutory requirement to disclose 
in their accounts whether the accounts have been prepared in 
accordance with applicable accounting standards and to give 
particulars of and reasons for any material departure from 
those standards. 
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Application 
Table 4.8: Application of particular FRSs and SSAPs to SCs 
Statement 
FRS1 
SSAP3 
SSAP13 
SSAP25 
Accounting standard 
Cash flow statements 
Earnings per share 
Accounting for research Applicable but with 
and development disclosure exemptions 
Segmental reporting Not generally 
applicable 
Application 
Not applicable to SCs 
Only applicable to 
listed companies 
The other FRSs and SSAPs are generally applicable where 
appropriate. It is worth bearing in mind that under S249(3) 
CA 1989 small and medium-sized groups are exempt from the 
requirement to prepare consolidated accounts under 
SSAP23/FRS2. 
4.12 Burden of financial reporting 
There has been much debate about the burden of financial 
reporting for SCs. The DTI (1985a)'s "Burden on Business" 
report suggested that SCs should be subject to less rigorous 
disclosure requirements in terms of their annual accounts. 
Carsberg et al (1985) investigated the burden of financial 
reporting for SCs by focusing on the costs and benefits of 
accounting disclosure and statutory audit. 
Carsberg et al (1985: 5-6) interviewed a sample of SC 
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managers (directors) to ascertain their views about the 
burden of financial reporting on SCs. They found that: 
* production of the annual accounts was considered to be 
one of the administration difficulty rather than one of 
the main problems facing SCs; 
* general accounting was considered less onerous than 
complying with VAT regulations and roughly level with 
PAYE and DHSS regulations; 
* preparation of the annual accounts was normally left to 
the auditors, and so the principal burden of preparing 
the annual accounts was within the fees paid to the 
auditors; 
* directors objected to the disclosure of personal 
information (e. g. directors' emoluments); 
* disclosure of commercial information (e. g. turnover and 
stock) was not seen as a burden. 
In a parallel survey, Carsberg et al (1985: 7-8) interviewed 
SC auditors to ascertain their views about the burden of 
financial reporting on SCs. Their findings are summarised 
below: 
* apart from accountants' fees, bookkeeping was seen as the 
main component of the financial reporting burden; 
* reductions in disclosure requirements and in the scope of 
the audit together with improved client bookkeeping were 
considered to be the ways of reducing the burden of 
reporting on SCs; 
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* 25% of respondents said that there were no feasible ways 
of reducing the burden of reporting or accountants" fees; 
* 56% of the auditors thought that the burden on small 
business of complying with SSAPs was too great; 
* 68% of the auditors thought that the burden of complying 
with company legislation was too great. 
Carsberg et el (1985) found that firms either ranked the 
burden of accounts relatively high or relatively low; a 
similar finding was also noted by Keasey and Short (1990). 
However, they extended the existing literature on the 
accounting burdens facing small firms by examining whether 
the perceived relative burden of accounts is general or 
contingent on a number of firm specific factors (Keasey & 
Short, 1990: 310): 
* ownership title 
* perceived benefits from preparation of annual accounts 
* size of accountancy firm 
* provision of all accounting needs by accountant 
* preparer of annual accounts 
* regularity of preparation of management 
* number of employees 
* growth in volume of turnover 
* use of computer for preparation of annual accounts 
* age of business 
* previous business experience 
* receipt of start-up advice 
Keasey and Short (1990) found that in general, the perceived 
relative burden of annual accounts is not influenced by the 
above specific factors investigated. 
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Comparing the Holmes and Nicholls (1989) study of the 
factors determining the information requirements of 
Australian small businesses with the above, it would appear 
that although the preparation or acquisition of additional 
accounting information (of non-statutory nature) is 
dependent on firm specific factors (such as business size, 
the number of years the business has been operating under 
existing management, industrial sector or the education of 
a business' owner/manager), the burden imposed by general 
accounting requirement is not dependent on firm specific 
factors (see above). 
In their conclusion, Keasey and Short (1990: 311): 
"... cautiously suggest that if the burdens associated 
with the production of annual accounts are to be reduced 
in the small firm sector, attention will have to be 
given, by both researchers and practising accountants, to 
the general costs and benefits of the accounting 
requirements imposed on small firms". 
Similarly, Carsberg et al (1985: 41) asserted that: 
"Any consideration of the "burden" involved in preparing 
financial reports must be set within the context of the 
uses and benefits derived from the reports. If accounts 
are little used, even a low level of cost may be hard to justify". 
In this regard, it is appropriate to consider the main users 
of SC's annual accounts and their needs, which are 
considered below. 
4.13 Main users of SC accounts and their needs 
The Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975) identifies the general 
user groups of accounts (equity investor, loan creditor, 
employee, analyst-adviser, business contact, government and 
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public) and the APC (1979) considers the main users of SC 
accounts. 
One of the main studies into the uses of SC accounts has 
been carried out by Page (1981). Page (1981) ascertained by 
postal questionnaires the views of SC directors and auditors 
about the main users of SC accounts. He found that both 
groups independently ranked the main users of SC accounts in 
the following order: 
i) management (use accounts for management decisions); 
ii) Inland Revenue (use accounts to agree tax 
computations); and 
iii) bank and loan creditors (use accounts for lending 
decisions). 
With reference to management as the main user of SC 
accounts, Page (1981: 90) said that "This is an unexpected 
finding". It is worth pointing out that generally, 
infrequency and delay in the production of annual accounts 
limit their usefulness for decision and control by 
management. Furthermore, Page (1981) reported that low 
priority had been given to the use of the accounts made by 
shareholders because in SCs they are usually part of 
management. 
Similar ranking of the main users of SC accounts were found 
by Carsberg et al (1985) when they interviewed SC auditors. 
However, in a parallel survey of directors, they found that 
SC directors ranked Inland Revenue and banks in reverse 
order to the above. According to Carsberg et al (1985) 
management uses the accounts for decisions on dividend, 
directors' pay and capital expenditure. The accounts have 
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little perceived influence on pricing decisions. 
With reference to banks which are among the main users of 
accounts, according to Berry, Crum and Waring (1991: 29): 
"Overall there is strong evidence that bank lending 
officers wish to look at: 
a) audited financial statements; 
b) pro forma financial statements; 
c) cash forecasts; 
d) management accounts; 
e) age analysis of debtors and creditors. " 
They further argue that: 
"Although there is fair agreement on the data collected 
there is conflicting evidence about the importance 
assigned to the various elements in the data set and the 
use actually made of them". (Berry et al, 1991: 29). 
With reference to use of the financial information, a report 
by the LIMA, prepared by Bob Berry of University of East 
Anglia and others, entitled "Corporate Performance 
Evaluation in Bank Lending Decisions" found that "Bankers 
are not making the best use of the financial information 
found in company accounts when making lending decisions". 
(Gleeson, 1993: 9). 
With reference to differences in information requirements by 
banks dealing with large and SCs, Berry, Citron and Jarvis 
(1987: 7) found that "the information, which is at present 
disclosed in the full Statutory Accounts, is used by bankers 
irrespective of the size of the company they are dealing 
with". However, they found "differences in the emphasis 
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placed on certain specific items of information due to the 
complexity of the business, and the availability of up-to- 
date information". They also found "Other differences arise 
due to the relative uncertainty of small businesses which 
result in a shorter term view being taken". (Berry et al, 
1987: 7). 
In particular, Berry et al (1987: 12) referred to the 
perceived importance of the management accounts and noted 
that: 
"Management Accounts, are perceived as 'very important' 
by the majority of bankers irrespective of the size of 
company they are dealing with. However,..., the 
frequency of use does not accord with the importance 
ratings. The reason for this is that bankers experience 
problems in obtaining this information". 
According to Berry et al (1987: 12)'s results: 
"... in general bankers dealing with Large companies 
attribute less importance to management accounts than 
those dealing with Small Companies. One of the main 
reasons for this is that bankers take the view that Large 
companies are more financially secure which reduces the 
importance of this source of information in the decision 
making process. On the other hand, banks dealing with 
Small Companies attribute greater importance than the 
norm to management accounts. This may well be due to the 
relative volatility of small businesses, together with 
the fact that the greater delays in publishing the 
Audited Accounts of Small Companies mean that the 
information is out of date and Management Accounts are 
needed as a surrogate". 
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They also found that for SCs, banks can and do exert 
pressure to obtain the management accounts and it would 
appear from the comments of some respondents that the 
situation is improving as a result of this pressure. 
However, Large Companies, generally due to confidentiality, 
they are reluctant to provide this information and "indeed 
30% of the respondents dealing with Large Companies 
indicated that this source of information was never 
available to them". This may be due to "the existence of a 
highly competitive large corporate lending sector as 
evidenced by the impact of foreign banks in recent years... " 
(Berry et al, 1987: 12). (See also section 3.5). 
Finally with regard to preference for audited accounts, 
Berry et al (1987: 20) found that "... there is evidence to 
support the view that bankers prefer audited accounts 
because they are perceived to be more reliable than the 
unaudited version". 
4.14 Significant SC audit problems 
The practical limitations encountered in auditing SCs can be 
summarised as follows (APC, 1979): 
* the need to rely on management assurances; 
* the frequent qualification of SC audit report; 
* the lack of sufficient reliable audit evidence; and 
* the difficulty of applying auditing standards and 
guidelines in SC audits. 
The above practical limitations have been put forward by the 
opponents of SC audit to argue that these may make a SC 
unauditable. However, as it will be shown in the next 
section, in many situations it may be possible to reach a 
conclusion that will support an unqualified opinion on the 
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accounts. 
Raiborn (1982: 46-47) identified the following significant SC 
audit problems: 
* compliance testing of accounting controls when a 
preliminary evaluation determined that reliance cannot be 
placed on the system; 
* assignment of more experienced personnel to the SC audit; 
* difficulty and uncertainty encountered in relying on 
internal accounting control; 
* insufficient documentation of owner/manager controls; 
* reliance on owner/manager controls to restrict the extent 
of substantive auditing procedures; 
* acceptance of management representations as audit 
evidence when completeness of recorded transactions 
cannot otherwise be verified; 
* difficulty in applying analytical review procedures; and 
* difficulty in communicating the contents of the 
representation letter. 
Furthermore, Raiborn (1982) established that there are 
"statistically significant" relationships between some SC 
characteristics and SC auditing problems. 
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4.15 The conduct of an efficient and effective audit in a SC 
environment 
The conduct of an efficient and effective audit in SC 
environment has been considered by various national and 
international auditing bodies (e. g. Raiborn et al, 1983; 
UEC, 1983; CICA, 1988; IAPC, 1988; ICAEW, 1990 and APC, 
1991). 
In SCs, the lack of segregation of duties and the possible 
override of internal controls by management make it 
difficult for the auditor to test and rely on internal 
controls (Bryan and Rouse, 1984). 
Therefore, the auditor will normally place less emphasis on 
the study and evaluation of internal controls of SCs and 
more emphasis on the verification of transactions and 
balances through detailed audit tests and analytical review 
procedures (UEC, 1983; Schaps et al, 1984). 
In all audits of companies (whether small or large), the 
auditor needs to obtain reasonable assurance as to the 
completeness and accuracy of the accounting records to 
support his audit opinion. 
IAPC (1988, para. 16) states that: 
"In many situations, however, it may be possible to reach 
a conclusion that will support an unqualified opinion on 
the financial statements by obtaining evidence from 
extensive substantive testing of transactions such as a 
careful review of costs and margins. However, in some 
businesses, such as those where most transactions are for 
cash and there is no regular pattern of costs and 
margins, the available evidence may be inadequate to 
support an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements". 
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This leads to the consideration of "Sc qualification" audit 
report, which is undertaken in the next section. 
4.16 ""SC qualification" audit report 
Where a SC auditor is unable to design or carry out 
procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence 
as to the completeness of a SC's accounting records, he 
should either qualify or disclaim his opinion. 
In situations where the auditor is of the view that 
incompleteness may be material but not fundamental to an 
understanding of the financial statements and he has not 
found any significant inaccuracies in the records, he should 
qualify his opinion accordingly. In these circumstances, 
the auditor generally used the old "Example 6" form of audit 
report. 
The content of the old "Example 611 form of audit report 
"subject to: acceptance of management assurances" was as 
follows: 
"We have audited the financial statements on pages 
... to 
... 
Our audit was conducted in accordance with 
approved Auditing Standards having regard to the matters 
referred to in the following paragraph. 
In common with many businesses of similar size and 
organisation the company's system of control is dependent 
upon the close involvement of the directors/managing 
director, (who are shareholders). Where independent 
confirmation of the completeness of the accounting 
records was therefore not available we have accepted 
assurances from the directors/managing director that all 
the company's transactions have been reflected in the 
records. Subject to the foregoing, in our opinion 
... (Auditing and Reporting, 1985/6, ICAEW). 
However, the "Example 6" audit report was withdrawn in 
September 1989, because it was suggested that the general 
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wording of the old "Example 6" led it to be regarded as a 
"standard" or "model" form of audit report for SCs. Indeed, 
it has been argued that a number of auditors used this form 
of report routinely as a suitable form of standard audit 
report for SCs (Accountancy Magazine, May 1989: 166). 
Furthermore, there was some internal inconsistency with the 
old report because although the auditor had "accepted 
assurances from the directors", he nevertheless qualified 
his audit report. 
In situations, where the auditor considers that 
incompleteness of accounting records is so fundamental to an 
understanding of the accounts, he is, however, required to 
disclaim his opinion. 
A leading investigation into SC qualification by Keasey, 
Watson and Wynarczyk (1988) found that the likelihood of 
receiving a SC qualified audit report was "significantly" 
greater if the company had: 
i) been audited by a large firm of accountants, 
ii) few directors, 
iii) few non-director shareholders, 
iv) a secured loan, 
v) a long lag between the accounting year end and the 
signing of the audited accounts. 
Their results also indicated that once a SC audit 
qualification had been received, a further qualification was 
more likely the following year. Keasey, Watson and 
Wynarczyk (1988: 332) concluded: 
"Overall, the results would seem to indicate that, unless 
they were aware of the influence of the above variables 
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upon the issuing of the audit qualification, small 
company account users would have great difficulty in 
interpreting its meaning". 
It is worthy of note that in order to reduce the number of 
qualified audit reports in SCs, the APC (1991)ßs draft 
auditing guideline "The Audit of Small Businesses" requires 
that the audit report should not be qualified because of 
uncertainty as to the completeness of any population, 
unless: 
* there are no controls on which reliance could be placed; 
and 
* sufficient substantive evidence (including analytical 
review) could not be obtained. 
The APC (1991) concludes that since sufficient assurance 
should usually be obtained in a SC environment, therefore, 
the need for audit qualification would not arise in most 
cases. 
In the next section, an attempt will be made to provide an 
overview of the financial reporting for private companies in 
the USA. 
4.17 An overview of the USA literature concerning financial 
reporting for private companies 
In the USA, the compulsory audit requirement normally 
applies only to those companies registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the number of 
which is estimated to be about ten thousand companies 
(Gwilliam, 1987). The audit requirement was introduced by 
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, however, there is 
168 
evidence that the majority of firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange voluntarily employed the services of external 
auditors even before the introduction of a compulsory audit 
requirement (Gwilliam, 1987: 41). 
The potential for creating differences in financial 
reporting requirements on the basis of either size (small 
versus large) or legal ownership (public versus private) was 
considered-by the AICPA's three special committees: 
i) the Committee on GAAP for Smaller and/or Closely 
Held Businesses (formed in 1974); 
ii) the Special Committee on Small and Medium Sized 
Firms (formed in 1978); and 
iii) the Special Committee on Accounting Standards 
Overload (formed in 1981). 
The 1976 report of the committee on GAAP for Smaller and/or 
Closely Held Businesses concluded that the same measurement 
principles should be applied in the general-purpose 
financial statements of all entities, but, the nature of 
information disclosed and the extent of detail necessary for 
any particular disclosure may well vary depending on the 
needs of users. 
The Committee recommended that the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) should develop criteria to 
distinguish disclosures that should be required by GAAP (see 
4.17.1) from additional or analytical disclosures in the 
financial statements of all entities. Furthermore, one of 
their main recommendations was that the AICPA auditing 
standards division ` should reconsider pronouncement 
concerning unaudited financial statements (see 4.17.2). The 
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reaction of the FASB and the AICPA in respect of the above 
recommendations, relevant to this study, are considered 
below. 
4.17.1 Big GAAP 
- 
Little GAAP 
In response to the above recommendation, the FASB reacted 
positively and paid particular attention to the problems of 
applying GAAP in reporting by small and closely held 
companies by issuing (see List of Standards for the full 
names of FASB statements): 
i) FASB Statement No. 21 (1978) 
- 
Suspending the 
earnings per share and segment disclosures- by 
private companies. 
ii) FASB Statement No. 33 (1979) 
- 
exempting private 
companies from the requirement of the statement on 
"Financial Reporting and Changing Prices". 
iii) FASB Statement No. 36 (1980) 
- 
providing 
flexibility for private companies in that 
disclosures about pension benefits and assets are 
required only when the information is readily 
available. 
iv) FASB Statement No. 69 (1982) 
- 
exempting certain 
private companies from some disclosure requirements 
relating to oil and gas producing activities. 
In 1980, in response to the pressure for more relief, a 
recommendation was made by the AICPA Special Committee on 
Small and Medium Sized Firms that a special committee be 
appointed to study ways of providing additional relief from 
accounting standards that were not considered cost effective 
170 
for small businesses and to study the development of another 
comprehensive basis of accounting (see Abdel-khalik, 1983). 
As a result, in 1982, a committee of the AICPA recommended 
changing or eliminating eleven accounting and disclosure 
requirements for private companies (see Abdel-khalik, 1983: 
22). 
The AICPA Special Committee on Accounting Standards overload 
considered those recommendations and in its own report 
asserted that a standards overload existed and recommended 
that the FASB should promptly reconsider and act on certain 
accounting standards that were widely perceived to be 
unnecessarily burdensome and costly, particularly for small 
nonpublic entities, by simplifying the standards and if this 
was not feasible, by considering: 
"... the information needs of the users of the financial 
statements of small nonpublic entities and the costs and 
benefits of developing the information with the objective 
of providing, within the framework of a unified set of 
generally accepted accounting principles, differential 
disclosure alternatives... as well as differential 
measurement alternatives for such entities". (See Abdel- 
khalik, 1983: 23). 
The FASB commissioned a research by Abdel-khalik (1983) for 
comparative analysis of practices and views of managers, 
bankers and accountants involved with the private companies 
to provide insights about the small business environment and 
also to assess existing financial reporting and the need for 
change. 
The research focused on the information needs of the 
intended users and on the costs and benefits of using GAAP 
for financial reporting by private companies. 
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Abdel-khalik (1983: 1-2) found that: 
"GAAP financial statements for private companies are 
perceived to benefit both managers and bankers. Managers 
find GAAP financial statements to be useful in making 
decisions and in facilitating borrowing. Bankers find 
that GAAP financial statements provide reliable and 
understandable data that are helpful in making lending 
decisions". 
The research found that departures from GAAP occur 
"moderately" frequently for certain accounting standards, 
particularly for SCs. The cost of compliance and perceived 
lack of relevance to owners were found to be rated as the 
primary reasons for those departures from GAAP. 
Furthermore, Abdel-khalik (1983) found that bankers, 
managers and accountants perceive cost-benefit 
considerations differently. The research concluded that the 
problem of cost-benefit considerations has elements of both 
practice (relating to the AICPA) and Standards Setting 
(relating to the FASB). Therefore, Abdel-khalik (1983: 2) 
observed that: 
"Both organizations, the AICPA and the FASB, share the 
responsibility of maintaining the credibility of 
financial statements, including providing a satisfactory 
resolution to the problem at hand". 
4.17.2 Unaudited financial statements 
As stated earlier, in its 1976 report, the AICPA Committee 
on GAAP for Smaller and/or Closely Held Businesses 
recommended that the AICPA auditing standards division 
should reconsider pronouncement concerning unaudited 
financial statements. 
In addition to the above, there was also a call by the 
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Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (Cohen Commission) 
for change in private company reporting: 
"The view that users will misunderstand different levels 
of assurance underestimates users' capabilities. 
According to this view, any time the auditor is 
associated with information, users will assume it has 
been audited. This conclusion is predetermined by 
present reporting requirements. If the only form of 
assurance given is an opinion on financial statements, 
then users have no opportunity to understand other types 
of assurance... The only way users will become informed 
is for auditors to change the traditional approach to 
reporting". (Arnold and Diamond, 1981: 4). 
In response to the above pressure, in December 1978, the 
Accounting and Review Services Committee of the AICPA issued 
Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Services 
(SSARS) 1- "Compilation and Review of Financial 
Statements". 
SSARS 1 came into effect in July 1979 and paved the way for 
compilation and review, two new levels of nonaudit reports 
for nonpublic companies and thus replaced the unaudited 
disclaimer. Until July 1979, CPAs were allowed either to 
audit a nonpublic company's financial statements and express 
an appropriate audit opinion or to disclaim an opinion if 
the accounts were not audited. Therefore, from July 1979, 
the services available to nonpublic companies have been: 
compilation, review and audit. 
In 1981, Arnold and Diamond (1981) investigated the 
experiences, reactions and attitudes of CPAs and bankers 
concerning the services available for nonpublic companies 
(i. e. compilation, review and audit). The main findings of 
the research were as follows: 
i) According to the CPAs the shifts from audits to 
reviews/compilations were approximately 2.5% while 
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according to the bankers the shifts were 
approximately 20% for their customers. The 
difference was explained by the experience of a 
minority of bankers, who had encountered 
substantial movement away from audit. However, 
the shifts from previous unaudited services to 
reviews/audits were 40% and 8% for customers of 
CPAs and bankers respectively. 
ii) The dominant factors influencing CPAs in their 
recommendations for a given level of service were 
the perceived needs of outside users, the client's 
systems of internal control and prior experience 
with the client. However, traditional lending 
factors, including loan size and the customer's 
capital structures had the greatest influence on 
the bankers' decision to require a given level of 
service. Relative costs of the services were least 
important. 
iii) CPAs and bankers tended to feel that the 
introduction of compilation and review services 
were a positive development by the accounting 
profession. 
iv) According to CPAs, for a new client, a compilation 
required 20% to 25% of the hours needed for an 
audit, whereas a review required 49%. However, for 
a continuing client, a review required 44% of the 
hours needed for an audit. 
v) A compilation with disclosures or a review, 
according to CPAs, was the minimum level of service 
appropriate for business clients. However, bankers 
felt that the required level of service increased 
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with the size and complexity of the loan. 
vi) CPAs and bankers felt that a compilation was 
acceptable for personal accounts. 
Having considered the audit requirement of companies in the 
USA, it would be beneficial to look briefly at the audit 
requirement in a number of overseas countries in the next 
section. 
4.18 overseas audit requirement for SCs 
As part of the move towards harmonisation, the EC Fourth 
Directive on Company Law allowed the member states to exempt 
all SCs from statutory audit. The UK Government did not 
take this option, which was adopted by many members states. 
Many European countries control the creation of limited 
liability companies more closely than in the UK by imposing 
a minimum capital requirement which would eliminate many 
owner-managed companies which are too small to have the 
accounting systems and records required by the CA 1985. "In 
view of this, it is all the more surprising that in Europe, 
the UK is very much the exception in insisting that all 
limited companies should be subject to a statutory audit" 
(Technical Advisory Committee of the ICAEW 
- 
response to the 
ICAEW (1992b)'s consultation paper). 
In other countries, such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, they all have different audit requirements for 
different categories of companies. In Australia, for 
example, "exempt "proprietary"" companies do not require an 
audit, if all members agree. 
In Canada, private or "closely held" companies do not 
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require an audit and in New Zealand, private companies do 
not require an audit if shareholders agree. 
It is interesting to note that Australia and New Zealand 
have dropped the SC audit requirements, despite the fact 
that their company law and business systems are similar to 
those in the UK. 
The definition of SCs in the above countries are not 
comparable. For example in Australia, an "exempt 
"proprietary"" company is a company whose shares are not 
held by a public company, a foreign company or another 
proprietary company, whereas, in Canada, the size 
requirements by the Canada Business Corporation Act (CBCA) 
which have not been changed for many years are turnover of 
$10m or assets of $5m. However, various provinces within 
Canada have legislation differing from that included within 
the CBCA (LSCA, 1992). 
4.19 Summary and conclusion 
The review of SC issues broadly indicates that: 
* there is no single, uniformly acceptable definition of a 
SC and that most definitions of a SC overlap greatly. 
Furthermore, the various definitions of a SC comprise the 
vast majority of all companies in the UK; 
* the majority of SCs are owned by their directors; 
* SCs have specific characteristics, for example, 
owner/manager dominance and internal control deficiencies 
resulting from limited segregation of functions; 
* the approach to SC audit needs to be responsive to SC 
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characteristics; 
* there are "statistically significant" relationships 
between some SC characteristics and SC auditing problems; 
* it appears that, in many situations, an efficient and 
effective audit of SCs can be carried out; 
* the burden of complying with accounting standards is 
greater for SCs; 
* management, Inland Revenue and banks are among the main 
users of SC accounts; 
* SCs' auditors often provide a wide range of financial 
services in addition to SC audit; and 
* the form and content of SC accounts need to be 
simplified. 
To conclude, the main SC issues have an important impact on 
SCFR and accordingly need to be investigated further in 
order to decide whether there is a need for change in the 
financial reporting requirements of SCs, and if necessary to 
establish a fair balance between the different needs of the 
diverse interests involved. 
There has been much debate in the UK about whether SCs 
should be audited or not which is considered in the next 
Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SCFR DEBATE 
5.1 Introduction 
The accounting and audit requirements of SCs have been 
subject to debate for a long time. 
Currently, all companies, with the exception of those 
companies identified in Chapter one of this work, are 
subject to statutory audit and SCs as defined by the CA 
1985 may file abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of 
Companies but they must prepare and circulate full 
accounts to their shareholders. However, the form and 
content of these accounts (already discussed in section 
4.10) and their needs for a statutory audit are still 
subject to debate. 
This Chapter begins by reviewing the history of the 
company audit by tracing the origins of auditing in the 
early corporation and the developments of auditing and 
the professional audit firms. Furthermore, it reviews 
the provisions of the main Companies Acts in respect of 
accounting and audit requirements since the Joint Stock 
CA 1844. 
An attempt is also made to provide some background to 
SCFR debate since 1979 by reviewing the main events (e. g. 
studies, research, discussion papers, statutory 
requirements, etc. ) which have contributed to public 
debate on SCFR. Furthermore, this Chapter examines the 
application, cost, effects and implication of audit 
regulation on SC audit debate. 
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The statutory audit requirement and cost of audit to SCs 
are further examined in this Chapter. This is followed 
by a discussion of the main arguments in favour of 
retaining and against Sc audit requirement by considering 
the needs of the users of audited accounts (e. g. banks, 
creditors) and other related issues (e. g. limited 
liability, fraud). 
Finally, alternatives to SC audit and sub-categories of 
SCs to which these alternatives may apply are considered 
with particular references to the recent audit exemptions 
to certain SCs and their possible consequences for 
shareholders, other users of accounts and auditors. 
5.2 The history of the company audit 
This section reviews the need for auditing in the early 
corporation, the development of auditing and audit firms 
and also the main accounting and audit requirements of 
the CAs. 
5.2.1 Auditing in the early corporation 
An attempt is made here to trace the origins of auditing 
in the early corporation and give a brief description of 
each type of business corporation, starting with English 
merchant guilds, merchant adventures/regulated companies 
and joint stock companies. Furthermore, some evidence of 
auditing for such corporation and incentives for their 
auditors to be independent from the days of English 
merchant guilds to the time audits were required by law 
will be provided. Most of the analysis would be based on 
the work of Watts and Zimmerman (1983). 
English merchant guilds 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983: 616) citing the work of Gross 
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(1890) noted that merchant guilds appeared in England 
shortly after the Norman Conquest in A. D. 1066 and 
merchant guilds arose to protect the prosperity of the 
merchants by forming cartels to monopolise trade (see 
Ekelund and Tollison, 1980). 
It would appear that from all historical accounts, the 
guilds were among the earliest examples of incorporation, 
which were chartered by the crown and had the monopoly to 
trade within their own particular towns. 
Gross (1890), whose work has been extensively referred to 
by Watts and Zimmerman (1983) claimed that guilds were 
expressly incorporated as early as in the reign of 
Richard II (1367-1400). 
One of the interesting evidence given by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983: 618) is that several craft guilds and 
companies of merchants were audited annually by committee 
of members. They also noted that the accounts of the 
Worshipful Company of Grocers of the City of London and 
the Worshipful Company of Pewterers of the City of London 
were audited annually as indicated by their records in 
1346 and 1546 respectively. 
The evidence suggests that the audits were not 
"superficial and were not merely counts of cash or assets 
on hand". As a matter of fact "Expenditures were 
examined in detail... ", and that: 
"The audit of the guild appears designed to monitor 
the managers' contracts. It came at the end of the 
managers' tenure and was designed to check for 
unauthorised expenditure... [and] for other breaches 
of contracts... " (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983: 618). 
Another interesting point noted by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983) was the use of an audit committee which usually 
consisted of four guild members and occasionally public 
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officials who encouraged auditor performance and 
independence by making collusion of the manager and 
auditor more difficult. 
Merchant adventures/regulated companies 
All available evidence suggest that before the latter 
half of the thirteenth century the English export trade 
was generally carried out by the German Hanse Merchants. 
However, from that period English export of raw products 
(mainly wool) was conducted entirely through English and 
foreign merchants who eventually formed companies of 
merchants. In such companies, each member provided his 
own capital (inventories and ships) and traded on 
personal account (or in partnership). 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1983) most of the 
regulated companies appeared to have been audited. 
Further, the similarities of audit arrangements (for 
example, use of bonding of the officers) and the 
commonality of membership with the guilds suggest the 
audit was adopted from the guilds with the same 
mechanisms to encourage auditors to be independent (for 
example, use of committees and penalties including loss 
of reputation). 
Joint stock companies 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983) have provided some evidence to 
suggest that in 1553 another form of corporate firm (the 
joint stock company) appeared in England. The Russia 
Company and the African Adventurers were the first joint 
stock companies formed for overseas trade. In the joint 
stock companies, the officers traded on behalf of 
shareholders, capital was raised to finance each separate 
voyage and the proceeds were distributed once the voyage 
was completed. This method of financing the trade was 
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different from that used in the regulated companies where 
each member supplied his own capital and traded on his 
own account or in partnership, using his own ships. The 
change in method of financing might be due to the 
magnitudes of the voyages and the greater risk of the 
voyages undertaken by the joint stock companies. 
They also noted that the accounts of the early joint 
stock companies were audited by a committee of 
shareholders (members) and/or directors. This practice, 
they claimed continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. They went on to assert that (1983: 625) "The 
survival of the committee of auditors for six hundred 
years strongly suggests it was an efficient monitoring 
device". However, they point out that some legal 
historians argued that the method used was inefficient 
because of the frauds which occurred in the seventeenth 
to nineteenth centuries and that government regulation 
was necessary for effective control. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983: 625) have attributed this to the fact that "They 
fail to consider the number of firms in which the 
contracting and monitoring system between managers and 
shareholders worked... " 
5.2.2 Observations on the development of auditing 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983: 626) have been able to conclude 
from their findings that the practice of having a 
committee of auditors was not imposed on the merchant 
guilds, regulated companies, or joint stock companies by 
law. Indeed, they asserted that: 
"The auditing was voluntary. Typically there were no 
references to auditing in the charters of the guilds, 
regulated companies, and joint-stock companies 
examined. The auditing was by order of the general 
court (meeting of members of shareholders) or the 
court of assistants (directors' meeting). Thus, when 
the U. K. Companies Act of 1844 required directors to 
keep accounts and required those accounts to be 
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audited by persons other than the directors (or their 
clerks), Parliament was merely incorporating into the 
law a version of a practice that had existed for six 
hundred years". 
Watts and Zimmerman` (1983: 626) in their observation on 
the development of auditing advanced the following 
hypothesis, namely that, committee of auditors survived 
because they were an efficient method of monitoring 
contracts between managers and those supplying capital. 
However, auditing practice was not constant overtime, it 
changed as the business corporation changed. Two 
dimensions in which auditing changed are the composition 
and relative size of audit-committee. 
It is worthy of note that the composition of audit 
committee of the early corporation, consisted of 
shareholders and some directors (assistants). The 
inclusion of directors in audit committee was a feature 
which was investigated by Watts and Zimmerman. The 
answer, according to Watts and Zimmerman, appeared to be 
that directors were not exactly equivalent to the 
directors of a modern corporation. Also, the ratio of 
directors to shareholders was very large by today's 
standards (e. g. one to five) which implied that the 
directors were likely to be representative of the 
members" interests, and the large number of directors 
would have made it more difficult to collude against the 
shareholders. Hence the directors were not audited by 
shareholders in general (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). 
However, the treasurer with direct personal control over 
resources, was audited by directors. 
As use of the joint stock form of organisations grew, the 
number of directors for each company and the ratio of 
directors to shareholders dropped substantially, 
particularly in the early eighteenth century. 
"This suggests that it would be less costly for the 
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directors to collude against the shareholders. 
Consequently, there was the increased tendency to use 
committee of shareholders, not directors, to audit the 
accounts". (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983: 627). 
5.2.3 The development of the professional audit firms 
The UK Companies Acts from 1844 to 1900 did not require 
outside independent auditors. However, the change from 
shareholder auditors to professional auditors occurred in 
the period when a professional auditor was not required 
by statute in the United Kingdom and the United States 
suggesting that the change was the result of market 
forces (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983: 630). 
"There were two major market developments in the 
period 1844-1900 in the United Kingdom that can 
explain the shift from shareholder to professional 
auditors: (1) an increase in the demand for audits and 
(2) the introduction of a low-cost mechanism for 
certifying auditor competence and independence". 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983: 630). 
The demand for audits in the UK in the latter half of the 
1800s increased because the complexity of the accounts 
(e. g. due to government regulation of railroads and 
utilities), the legal liability of directors and the size 
and number of corporations all increased. 
The increased complexity encouraged specialisation in 
auditing and the growth of professional firms. The 
growth in the scale of the capital markets increased the 
fixed cost of an auditor's establishing a reputation, 
which led to the development of large professional audit 
firms. 
Furthermore, the professional societies (e. g. ICAS and 
ICAEW formed in 1854 and 1870 respectively) were formed 
to provide information on the accountant's reputation, 
not in auditing, but rather in bankruptcies, which led to 
the introduction' of a low-cost mechanism for certifying 
0 
184 
auditor's competence and independence because the start- 
up costs for accrediting accountants were already 
incurred in certifying accountants for bankruptcy work. 
The development of professional audit firms being later 
in the United States than in the United Kingdom mainly 
because the absolute increase in the scale of the capital 
market and in the demand for auditing in the period 1844- 
1900 was smaller in the United States and also the United 
States did not experience the same reduction in start-up 
costs for accrediting professional accountants. 
"The start-up costs of the American societies were 
borne largely by British accountants who came to 
America to audit firms raising capital in London and 
stayed to start their own firms". (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983: 632). 
5.2.4 Companies Acts requirements 
CA 1844 The Joint Stock CA 1844 was the first CA to require 
all companies to have their accounts audited. The Act 
required a "full and fair" balance sheet to be 
presented by the company to its shareholders and filed 
for public inspection. The Act did not require that 
the auditor be independent or qualified. The primary 
obiective of audit was detection of fraud and error 
because of the growing number of dishonest managerial 
and company employee frauds. 
LLA 1855 The Limited Liability Act 1855 allowed registration 
with limited liability. 
CA 1856 The Joint Stock CA 1856 abandoned the audit provisions 
and gave the Board of Trade the right to audit a 
company if at least one-fifth of the shareholders (in 
number and value) asked for it. 
During the period 1856 to 1900, due to increased 
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number of frauds and errors by company management and 
employees, some companies continued to have audit on 
a voluntary basis. Furthermore, as a result of two 
famous court cases during this period (re: London and 
General Bank (No. 2) (1895) 2 Ch. 673 and re: Kingston 
Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2) (1896) 2 Ch. 279), it was 
recognised that the auditor should not be responsible 
to find every fraud or error and management should be 
responsible in this regard (Lee, 1982). 
CA 1900 The CA 1900 required a compulsory audit of every 
company's accounting records and gave auditors 
statutory rights of access to company books and 
records. Auditors were required to report whether in 
their opinion balance sheets were "true and correct". 
The Act also required the directors of the companies 
to supply their auditors with the required information 
and explanations (Hopkins, 1984). 
CA 1907 The CA 1907 distinguished between public and private 
companies and gave shareholders the right to receive 
accounts if presented and required the company's 
balance sheet to be filed by public companies (Page, 
1981). 
CA 1929 The CA 1929 required a company's profit and loss 
account and balance sheet to be circulated to members 
and public disclosure of profit and loss account by 
public companies (see Page, 1981: 12 and Hopkins, 
1984: 20). 
CA 1948 The CA 1948 required that all groups to prepare 
consolidated accounts. All except the smallest 
companies (i. e. "exempt private companies") were to be 
audited by professional auditors (see Hopkins, 
1984: 21). Exempt private companies could be audited 
by non-professional auditors (this requirement was 
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abolished by the CA 1967). The Act also introduced 
many disclosure and accounting requirements including 
those dealing with reserves and required auditors to 
report whether in their opinion the accounts gave a 
"true and fair" view. Furthermore, the Act required 
the auditors to be either members of one of the 
recognised UK accountancy bodies or individually 
authorised by the Board of Trade. 
As a result of acceptance by the company management of 
its responsibility for prevention and detection of 
fraud and error, the primary objective of the audit 
was seen that of verification of financial accounting 
records' accuracy. Detection of fraud and error 
became the secondary objective of the audit because of 
their possible effect on the reliability of the 
accounting information. 
In 1961, the Company Law Committee (1961) (the Jenkins 
Committee) made the following recommendations: 
- 
there should be no distinction in the CA in the 
treatment of public and private companies; and 
- 
the distinction between the exempt and the non- 
exempt private company should be ended. 
CA 1967 The CA 1967 abolished exempt private company status, 
therefore, extending the requirement for independent 
professional audit to all companies. The Act put an 
end to the granting of individual authorisation to 
audit firms (Hopkins, 1984). Furthermore, the Act 
allowed the formation of larger accountancy firms with 
more than twenty partners. 
CA 1976 The CA 1976 contained a number of provisions dealing 
with the company auditor's appointment, removal, 
resignation, remuneration and qualification. 
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In 1971, the Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms 
(1971) (the Bolton Committee) made the following 
recommendations: 
- 
the category of exempt private company as defined in 
the 1948 Act should be restored; and 
- 
the legal concepts of public and private companies 
should be replaced by new categories to be known as 
"stewardship" and "proprietary" companies. 
The Bolton Committee recommended that the 
"proprietary" companies by virtue of their small size 
and lesser importance to the public should be exempted 
from the more disclosure requirements and should be 
relieved of some of the burden of the present 
accounting procedures, such as the statutory audit 
requirement. 
CA 1980 The CA 1980 introduced the provisions governing 
capital maintenance, directors' transactions and 
insider dealings. The Act included provisions 
concerning the status of public and private companies. 
It also introduced a definition of distributable 
profit. Among other provisions, the Act placed 
restrictions upon certain transactions by a company in 
which either its directors or persons with whom they 
were connected had interest. 
CA 1981 The CA 1981 regulated, for the first time, the 
structure of accounts and their related accounting 
practices. The Act exempted small and medium-sized 
companies from delivering their fully detailed annual 
accounts to the Registrar of-Companies. Instead they 
can deliver abbreviated accounts. 
The provision enabling SCs to file abbreviated 
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accounts and the detailed requirements on the form and 
content of accounts derived in the main from the EC 
Fourth Directive on Company Law. The EC Fourth 
Directive included the options of exempting SCs from 
audit and allowing SCs to circulate abbreviated 
accounts to their members, which were not taken in the 
UK. ' 
The CA 1981 exempted a "dormant company" from 
compulsory audit. A company qualifies as dormant for 
this purpose if it is a "small" company as defined by 
the Act and it is not a holding company and has had no 
"significant accounting transactions" since the end of 
the previous financial year. The company has to pass 
a special resolution that auditors are not to be 
appointed. However, the company is still required to 
lodge accounts with the Registrar, but instead of an 
auditors' report, a statement from the directors that 
the company was dormant must be filed. 
CA 1985 In 1986, the provisions of the CA 1985 came into 
effect. The detailed requirements on the form and 
content of accounts were included in Part VII and 
Schedule 4 and 8 of the Act. 
CA 1989 The CA 1989 received Royal Assent on 16 November 1989. 
The main purpose of the Act was to implement the EEC 
Seventh and Eighth Company Law Directives. The Act 
contains provisions designed to ensure that only 
persons who are "properly supervised and appropriately 
qualified" are appointed as company auditors. The 
regulation of auditors is considered in more detail in 
section 5.4. The CA 1989 also exempted small and 
medium-sized groups from the requirement to prepare 
consolidated accounts. 
It is worthy of note that the provisions of SI 1992 
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No. 2452 and those relating to exemptions of SCs from 
audit (in August 1994) have been subsequently 
incorporated in the above Companies Acts. 
5.3 Background 
A summary of the main events, affecting the accounting 
and audit requirements of SCs, has been presented 
below in a chronological order since the publication 
of a green paper by the government in September 1979 
to the recent date. It is worth pointing out that the 
details of some of these events have already been 
provided in the earlier Chapters. 
Sept '79 The Government published a Green Paper (DoT, 1979) on 
"Company Accounting and Disclosure", inviting comments 
and views as to whether or not the UK should take 
advantage of those provisions of the EC Fourth 
Directive which allowed certain SCs not to have a 
statutory audit and to prepare and file abbreviated 
accounts only. 
Oct '79 The APC (1979) issued a discussion paper "Small 
Companies: the need for audit? ", setting out the 
arguments for and against statutory audit for SCs. 
Mar '80 The analysis of public comments (APC, 1980) on the APC 
(1979)'s discussion paper was published which clearly 
indicated that the accountancy profession was divided 
on this very important issue. 
June `81 The results, of research (Page, 1981) sponsored by the 
ICAEW to investigate the extent to which there was 
scope for the simplification of the accounting and 
audit requirements for SCs concluded that savings 
could arise if, given appropriate safeguards, less 
information was made available to shareholders and 
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accounts were prepared with the use by management in 
mind rather than minimal compliance with statutory 
disclosure requirements. 
Dec '81 The introduction of compilation and review services in 
July 1979 was a dramatic move by the American 
accounting profession to expand services available to 
nonpublic companies. In 1981, Arnold and Diamond 
(1981) investigated the attitudes of CPAs and bankers 
about the services available for nonpublic companies 
(i. e. compilation, review and audit). 
They found that CPAs and bankers tended to feel that 
introduction of compilation and review services were 
a positive development by the accounting profession. 
June 182 The provisions of the CA 1981 came into force which 
required that all SCs should continue to be audited 
and they must prepare full accounts for their 
shareholders. However, SCs were allowed to file 
abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of Companies. 
These requirements reflected the outcome of 
consultation and comments received on the Green Paper 
(DoT, 1979) and the APC (1979)'s discussion paper. 
Sept 182 A research project in the United States (Raiborn, 
1982) provided evidence that auditors had difficulty 
in implementing certain auditing standards in SCs 
audit engagements. 
July '83 In Europe, the problems of SC audit were investigated 
by the UEC (1983) Auditing Statements Board. 
Aug '83 A comparative analysis of practices and views of 
managers, bankers and public accountants about 
financial reporting by private companies was carried 
out by Abdel-khalik (1983). He found that GAAP 
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financial statements for private companies were 
perceived to benefit both managers and bankers. The 
departures from GAAP occurred "moderately" frequently 
for certain accounting standards, particularly for SCs 
where the cost of compliance and perceived lack of 
relevance to owners were rated as the primary reasons 
for those departures. Furthermore, bankers, managers 
and accountants perceived cost-benefit considerations 
differently. 
Mar '85 The DTI (1985a) published the "Burden on Business" 
report which set out proposals for reducing the 
administrative burden on companies arising from the 
requirements of company law. Among the most important 
of these proposals relating to SCs was the proposal 
that the Government should eliminate the statutory 
audit of accounts for "shareholder-managed" companies. 
X85 The result of research (Carsberg, Page, Sindall and 
Waring, 1985) requested by the ASC and commissioned by 
the Research Board of the ICAEW was published. The 
research considered the universal application of 
accounting standards in order to determine among other 
things, the burden imposed on SCs by accounting 
standards. Among the recommendations was that SCs 
should be exempt from certain provisions of accounting 
standards. 
June '85 The DTI (1985b) published its response to the above 
report in the consultative document "Accounting and 
Audit Requirements for Small Firms", outlining the 
arguments for and against statutory audit for SCs, 
the contents of their accounts, options for change, 
and invited comments on all the proposals. 
Oct '85 The Council of the ICAEW (1985) submitted their 
response to the DTI's consultative document. They 
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recommended that as a general rule, the accounts of 
SCs should continue to be audited. However, where all 
shareholders who were entitled to vote agreed, then 
such a SC should be able to choose as to whether its 
accounts should be audited or not, with adequate 
safeguards for minority investors and the wider 
public. They also recommended that only one set of 
accounts should be prepared for both shareholders and 
public filing in order to reduce the accounting burden 
on SCs. 
Similar views were expressed by the Council of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland, 
Scotland and the Chartered Association of Certified 
Accountants. 
Mar 86 The result of a survey by Robertson (1986a) to 
consider the extent to which SCs were making use of 
the option to file abbreviated accounts was published. 
He concluded that there was a high degree of interest 
in this option, but with poor compliance with 
statutory accounts formats. 
'86 The result of a research carried out by Humphrey and 
Turley (1986) to examine five propositions relating to 
the nature of the audit in SCs was published. They 
found that owner-managers placed a wide variety of 
interpretations on the role of the audit, many of 
which did not match its theoretical role. 
Winter Given the increasing emphasis on SCs in the UK and the 
'86 importance of trade credit for their performance, a 
study by Keasey and Watson (1986b) investigated 
whether trade-credit specialists and a statistical 
model could use post 1981 Companies Act financial 
ratios to predict SC failure with a reasonable degree 
of success. They found that the ratios selected for 
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their study did not allow the same level of accuracy 
to be achieved as that obtained in the majority of the 
large company studies. However, they found that 
whilst increased information did not on average lead 
to more accurate or more confident predictions, it led 
to a greater variability in the accuracy, confidence 
and consensus of predictions. 
'86 The provisions of the Companies Act 1985 came into 
effect without any change in respect of statutory 
audit requirement for SCs. 
Autumn A study by Keasey and Watson (1987) found that for 
'87 small UK companies, past reporting lags were important 
predictors of failure. Furthermore, SC failure 
prediction models based upon annual accounts generally 
produce less accurate predictions than similar models 
for large companies. 
'87 Research by Berry, Citron and Jarvis (1987) found that 
there were differences in information requirements of 
bankers dealing with large and SCs. They also found 
that a move towards a reduction in disclosure 
requirements was unlikely to reduce the burden on SCs 
unless an alternative approach to lending was taken by 
bankers. 
Feb '88 Internationally, the SCFR also received great 
attention. The International Auditing Practices 
Committee (IAPC, 1988) of the International Federation 
of Accountants considered the main characteristics of 
SCs and their consequences. They argued that SCs had 
a combination of characteristics which made it 
necessary for the auditor to adapt his audit. 
Furthermore, the result of a study (CICA, 1988) 
carried out in Canada to provide guidance to 
practitioners engaged in SCs audit on the conduct of 
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an efficient and effective audit concluded that 
generally, the accounting records of SCs were 
auditable. 
Mar '88 The DTI (1988) published a consultative note on 
possible alternatives to audit for SCs. It offered 
five options for consideration. The ICAEW (1988) 
favoured the option allowing the SC audit to be 
replaced by a statement by the directors that the 
accounts meet the CA requirements. However, the ICAEW 
(1988)expressed reservations that the alternative 
forms of report to the audit report might well confuse 
and mislead readers as to the degree of assurance 
being given. 
The ICAS (1988) favoured a compilation report with an 
additional assurance that proper accounting records 
are kept. 
July 88 Having considered the findings of "Small Company 
Financial Reporting" (Carsberg et al, 1985) and 
realised the extent of the burden imposed on SCs by 
accounting standards (ASC, 1988a), the ASC (1988b) 
accepted that there was a case, in specific 
circumstances, for exempting SCs from certain 
provisions of accounting standards. 
Autumn A research by Keasey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988) 
'88 investigated empirically whether organisational, 
financial, size and auditor variables possess any 
explanatory power in respect of the receipt of a SC 
audit qualification. They found that companies 
audited by large audit practices, companies which had 
a prior year qualification, a secured loan, declining 
earnings, large audit lags and few non-director 
shareholders were more likely to receive an audit 
qualification than other companies. 
195 
Winter A study by Keasey and Watson (1988) provides evidence 
'88 that Whittred and Zimmer (1984)'s results cannot be 
applied to the SC sector in the UK where the 
population of failed and non-failed companies have 
"significantly" differing propensities to submit 
accounts. Furthermore, they conclude that given SCs 
have a high failure rate and a far higher propensity 
to delay/not submit their accounts, then the adoption 
of even a simple decision rule seems likely to improve 
materially the predictive accuracy of a failure 
prediction model. Therefore, by combining lag and 
financial information, it should be possible to 
develop cost-effective monitoring procedures for SCs. 
With reference to Whittred and Zimmer (1984)'s study 
which was concerned with the reporting behaviour of a 
sample of companies listed on the Sydney Stock 
Exchange, it is 'worth pointing out that they found 
those companies experiencing financial distress take 
significantly longer than financially healthy 
companies to publish their annual accounts. They also 
found that the inclusion of finite reporting lags in 
a discrimination model does not increase the ability 
to predict financial distress. 
Feb '89 The DTI (1989) published a consultative document in 
respect of the draft Directive, which was proposed by 
the European Commission in response to pressure from 
several Members States (including the UK) in favour of 
lifting burdens on small (and medium-sized) companies. 
It included some proposals for mandatory exemption for 
all SCs from compulsory audit requirement and 
simplification of their accounts. 
Spring Holmes and Nicholls (1989) investigated the factors 
189 determining the information requirements of Australian 
small businesses. They reported that a 
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"significantly" greater proportion of small business 
owner/managers sought statutory and budgeted 
information from an external accountant rather than 
preparing the information within the business, whilst 
the reverse situation existed for additional 
information (of a non-statutory nature). Furthermore, 
small firms were found, in general, to be more likely 
to prepare to acquire additional information if they 
were relatively large (in term of number of employees 
and turnover), if they were less than 10 years old, if 
they were in the manufacturing, wholesale, 
business/finance sector and if the owner/manager 
stayed at high school for 5-6 years and/or attended 
university or college. 
Their results led to the development of a model which 
could be used as a means of estimating the level of 
accounting information that a business with specific 
characteristics is likely to prepare or acquire. 
June '89 The Council of ICAEW (1989) responded to the draft 
Directive by reconfirming its earlier position. 
Sept '89 The APC withdrew the old "Example 6" form of audit 
report for SCs because it had been used routinely as 
a "standard" form of audit report for SCs. 
Nov 89 The CA 1989 received Royal Assent. The Act made some 
minor changes to the rules allowing SCs to file 
abbreviated accounts. There was no change in 
statutory audit requirement for SCs. The Act contains 
provisions in respect of audit regulation, causing 
major changes to auditing firms and influencing the SC 
audit debate (see section 5.4). 
Summer Accountant Digest 245 "The audit of small businesses" 
'90 (ICAEW, 1990) suggested some ways of achieving an 
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effective and efficient audit of SCs. 
Autumn Keasey and Short (1990) examined whether the relative 
'90 burden of annual accounting requirements was general 
to small firms or specific to certain types of small 
firms. The main empirical finding was that the 
relative-burden of accounts as perceived by small 
firms was not contingent on the factors investigated 
(such as the size of the firm, the use of computers in 
the preparation of annual accounts, the age of the 
firm, ownership type, perceived benefits from 
preparation of annual accounts, size of accountancy 
firm, provision of all accounting needs by accountant, 
preparer of annual accounts, etc. ). 
Mar 91 The APC (1991) issued a draft Auditing Guideline "The 
Audit of Small Businesses". It considered the various 
aspects of SC audit issues, and confirmed that to the 
"owner-manager" the cost of an audit was invariably 
considered to outweigh its benefits. In particular, 
there might be no perceived benefits if the audit 
report was qualified. 
'91 A research by Keasey and Watson (1991) used an agency 
theory perspective to develop an understanding of the 
determinants of auditor change for small firms in the 
UK, by extending the existing literature (see for 
example Williams, 1988) from a consideration of 
auditor change for large firms in the US to small 
firms in the UK. Their results indicated that the 
small UK firms had a greater propensity to change 
their auditors if they experienced relatively large 
changes in their use of external loan capital, if they 
had relatively high levels of loan capital and if none 
of these loans were secured. Furthermore, their 
results contrasted with those of Williams (1988) in 
that the significance of the receipt of a first-time 
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audit qualification variable suggested that some small 
firms might change auditors partly to secure more 
accommodating monitors. 
Jan '92 The DTI (1992) published a consultative document 
regarding the amending Directive to the fourth and 
seventh company law directives in order to reduce the 
burden on small (and medium-sized) companies imposed 
by the existing legal requirements. 
Mar 92 The Council of the ICAEW (1992a) responded to the 
above consultative document by suggesting that "what 
would, we believe, be of greater practical assistance 
to small companies would be the removal of the 
requirement to have their accounts audited". 
Aug 92 The Council of the ICAEW (1992b) published a 
consultation paper, recommending the complete 
abolition of statutory audit for Very SCs, and 
replacement of the audit with a compilation report for 
other SCs. 
Sept '92 The LSCA (1992) suggested that the audit of Very SCs 
should be abolished in line with the ICAEW. However, 
they suggested that the audit of certain "proprietary 
companies" should be replaced by an independent review 
carried out by a qualified accountant. 
Nov '92 SI 1992 No. 2452 came into force with the effect of 
reducing the detailed disclosure in accounts for 
shareholders of SCs (see 4.10). 
Jan 93 The results of a survey by Fearnley and Page (1993) in 
respect of costs and effects of audit regulation 
indicated that all audit firms had to make significant 
changes to all aspects of their work and they were 
bearing a significant amount of audit regulation 
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costs. They further observed that opinions against 
retaining the SC audit had been hardened. 
Mar '93 The response to the ICAEW's consultation paper was 
published. There was overall support for relaxation 
of the statutory audit requirement for all SCs (ICAEW, 
1993a). 
`93 In an article entitled "The Statutory Audit and the 
Micro Company 
- 
An Empirical Investigation", Freedman 
and Godwin (1993) explored the statutory audit issues 
relating to "micro" companies (i. e. very small 
independent companies, with no more than two or three 
shareholders, complete identity between managers and 
shareholders, a very low turnover and five or fewer 
employees) 
They concluded that the removal of the statutory audit 
requirement from "micro" companies would remove a 
substantial cost and time burden from "these companies 
without significantly prejudicing creditors". They 
went on to say that "The onus should be on supporters 
of the statutory audit to show that the burden is 
justified". (Freedman and Godwin, 1993: 130). 
Apr 93 The DTI (1993) which was under pressure from 
professional bodies and SCs, proposed to relieve Very 
SCs of the burden of the audit requirement and offered 
two options for consideration, (1) abolition of the 
audit requirement and (2) replacement of the audit 
with a compilation report. 
July '93 The result of this research was presented to the DTI 
which generally supported the relaxation of SCFR 
requirements. 
Nov '93 The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget 
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confirmed the abolition of the audit for Very SCs and 
replacement of audit by a simple compilation report 
for certain SCs. 
Mar '94 A research by Fearnley and Page (1994) indicated that 
audit regulation benefits no one except the regulatory 
bodies and the "free riders" (i. e. banks, creditors 
and Inland Revenue). 
Apr '94 The details of the regulations to be implemented for 
companies taking advantage of audit exemption were 
published by the DTI (press notice, 7/4/94). 
June '94 The proposed format of the Compilation Report and 
professional guidance for SC practitioners were 
published by the APB (1994). 
July '94 The regulations to implement audit exemption for SCs 
were laid before Parliament and came into force on 11 
August 1994 (DTI, press notice, 21/7/94). 
Nov '94 The DTI (1994)'s consultative document indicated that 
a reform of Partnership law may benefit small 
businesses. 
Feb '95 The APB (1995) proposed that the scope of audit for 
listed companies and major economic entities must be 
differentiated from that for unlisted, owner-managed 
businesses and in this regard it suggested that the 
APB should develop guidance on the application of 
auditing standards to the audit of owner-managed 
businesses. 
May 195 The DTI (1995)ßs consultative document "Accounting 
Simplifications" proposed a further simplification of 
form and content of SC accounts in addition to fifty 
proposals to simplify specific CA accounting 
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disclosure requirements which mainly relate to 
accounts of large companies but considered to be of 
interest to SCs as well. 
5.4 Audit regulation 
Until very recently the continuation of self-regulation 
in the accountancy profession in the UK never appeared to 
be in doubt. Of course, there have been some concerns 
from government departments about the profession's need 
to "get its house in order" over the seeming disparity, 
in the public perception, between the profession's 
performance and the expectations laid upon it. These, in 
fact, can be traced back to the late 1960s when the 
Department of Trade inspectors' reports first began to 
raise serious criticisms of the performance of auditors 
for corporate fraud, mismanagement, and deception 
resulting in losses to investors and creditors. The 
public perception (as expressed by the media, the courts 
and DTI's inspectors) has often linked these corporate 
scandals and collapse with audit failures (for example, 
De Lorean in 1981, Johnson Matthey Bankers in 1987, Polly 
Peck in 1990, British & Commonwealth in 1990, BCCI Bank 
in 1991 and Maxwell Communications Corporation also in 
1991). Perhaps, mindful of these scandals, the 
government: 
"... seized the opportunity presented 
Directive to enforce a completely 
regime on the profession, and its now 
as formal practice inspections, 
understandable anxiety amongst 
(Woolf, 1994: 432). 
by the EC Eight 
new regulatory 
:1 features, such 
have created 
practitioners". 
It has been suggested by Woodley (1991) that two forces 
compelled the government to intervene in regulating 
auditors' practice, namely, the need to protect the 
public and the need to conform with the European 
Community harmonisation directive. 
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The CA 1989 contains provisions relating to the 
qualification, training and conduct of auditors designed 
to ensure that only persons who are properly supervised 
and appropriately qualified (with the exception of the 
members of the AAPA as noted in section 3.3 (e)) are 
appointed as auditors and that audits are carried out 
properly and with integrity and also with proper degree 
of independence. This is achieved by the DTI's 
recognition of supervisory bodies (competent to establish 
audit regulations to which registered auditors are 
subject) and professional qualifications. 
Application 
Audit regulation started on 1 October 1991. It applies 
to all. registered auditors whether they are sole 
practitioners or large firms. Every audit practice will 
be liable to a monitoring visit, which will review all 
aspects of compliance with audit regulation. 
According to Fearnley and Page (1992: 21): 
"Audit regulation has brought with it major changes to 
auditing firms in the form of a heavy rule book 
requiring new formalised and documented procedures for 
practice management, independence, professional 
conduct, training, technical competence and conduct of 
audits. Monitoring visits to selected firms will 
check compliance". 
There are two monitoring units currently run separately 
by the three chartered institutes: ICAEW, ICAS and ICAI 
(which have a joint monitoring unit) and the certified 
association (ACCA). These units are responsible for 
monitoring all 10,559 firms registered with the three 
chartered institutes and 2866 firms registered with the 
ACCA respectively. These figures are not static, for 
example, new firms may register or old firms may 
deregister. (See "Independent oversight? " 
- 
Accountancy, 
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March'1994: 13). 
The scope of monitoring has been designed to relate to 
public interest (Woodley, 1991). A practice that audits 
a listed company will be visited at least once every five 
years by the joint monitoring unit. It is estimated that 
about°less than 200 firms (most of which are registered 
with the three chartered institutes) audit all listed 
companies. (See Beattie and Fearnley, 1993: 71 and 
Fearnley and Page, 1992: 21). The remaining practices 
which include a large number of sole practitioners will 
be monitored by the joint monitoring unit on a sample 
basis. The sample size has initially been set at 150 
firms a year, but this will be kept under review. There 
will also be special visits where specific problems have 
been reported or identified. 
Costs and effects of regulation 
All audit firms had to make`significant changes to all 
aspects of their work. The most extensive changes, 
according to Fearnley and Page (1993: 59)'s survey, were 
in respect of procedures for recording audit work. They 
also noted that changes in quality control procedures and 
audit methods had been necessary and less extensive 
changes had been in practice management and staff 
training. 
However, their results indicated that "training staff in 
new documentation and audit procedures" has been the 
largest single item of cost for a number of respondents 
to their survey. 
The costs of these changes have been significant. 
Fearnley and Page (1993: 59) identified these costs as 
follows: 
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i) The average set-up costs per practice (not 
attributable to individual clients) for firms with 
three or few partners were estimated at £4,900, 
comprising expenses of £1,220 and lost chargeable 
time of £3,680. Furthermore, the subsequent annual 
recurring fixed costs were estimated at £3,400 
(£1,000 expenses and £2,400 lost time). 
ii) The estimates 
attributable to 
uncharged fixed 
variable cost 
turnover. 
of costs of audit regulation 
individual clients comprised an 
cost per audit of £200 and a 
f £100 per £100,000 of company 
Audit firms are bearing a significant amount of these 
costs themselves. According to Fearnley and Page 
(1993: 59): 
"They had been able to recover only 10% of their set- 
up costs and 28% of their recurring costs in chargeout 
rates. Furthermore, they were getting back only 62% (1991 
- 
52%) of the additional costs of individual jobs. " 
Furthermore, a research by Fearnley and Page (1994) found 
that audit regulation benefits no one except the 
regulatory bodies themselves and the "free riders" 
- 
the 
banks, the creditors and the Inland Revenue 
- 
who do not 
have to pay for it. They also found that the regulation 
has had no impact on the large firms' approach and that 
it had raised audit standards and costs for smaller 
firms. As a result, it has created barriers to entry to 
the small company market which were not there before, in 
particular for small chartered accountancy firms. 
They have also suggested that one of the ways the self- 
regulatory bodies have benefitted from the audit 
regulation is that: 
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"... they now have considerably more power over their 
members and the quality of their work than previously 
and are therefore able to defend themselves against 
criticisms of market failure". (See "A waste of 
time? ", Accountancy, March 1994: 15). 
Implication for Sc audit 
The introduction of regulation has affected the SC audit 
debate because of its considerable and unwelcome burden 
to the SCs and the small practitioners. 
Fearnley and Page (1993: 59) report that opinion against 
retaining the SC audit has been hardened since their 
previous year's survey (1992: 21). They found that 81% of 
their sample practitioners in 1992 Survey favoured the 
abolition of SC audit as against 72% in 1991 Survey. 
Furthermore, in seeking practitioners' views on which SCs 
should be exempted from audit, they offered the three 
alternative thresholds taken from the Institute's 
consultative document and they found that: 
"... only 18% opted for the VAT registration limit 
(turnover £36,600); 47% were in favour of the VAT cash 
accounting limit, and 35% opted for the EC small 
companies definition". 
Fearnley and Page (1993: 59) found that the most 
respondents supported abolition of the audit requirement 
for companies with turnover below the VAT cash accounting 
limit, subject to 'safeguards for the protection of 
minority shareholders. 
In August 1994, the DTI, which was' concerned about the 
impact of audit regulation on SCs, exempted certain SCs 
from statutory audit requirement (see 5.8). This 
resulted in the exemption of a significant number of 
companies from audit'requirement, thus saving them audit 
fee costs. However, it is arguable whether this had 
reduced the overall cost of regulation for small audit 
firms, because few practices would be able to deregister 
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and eliminate their regulatory overheads. According to 
a research by the University of Central Lancashire, 
conducted prior to the November 1993 Budget announcement 
of the relaxation of the SC audit, found that "One in ten 
accountancy firms entitled to audit companies could be 
set to deregister from the regulated audit regime" (see 
"1,000 audit firms 'may deregister "11, Accountancy Age, 
13/1/1994: 3). However, a survey of small and medium- 
sized firms by professional publishers Tolleys, which was 
conducted after the November Budget, found that 16% of 
small audit firms (i. e. one in six) are undecided about 
whether they would retain their audit registration ("One 
in six practices may drop out of registration", 
Accountancy Age, 3/3/1994: 3). 
Fearnley and Page (1994: 82) argue that: 
"The proposed changes to this (SC audit) requirement 
will still leave many small companies in the net. If 
they are to remain there, then ways must be found of 
cutting the compliance costs for this sector of the 
market". 
The future of audit regulation 
The review of the monitoring regime for registered 
auditors is claimed "to anger the supervisory bodies if 
proposals, currently in draft form, are included in the 
finalised version" ("Independent oversight? ", 
Accountancy, March 1994: 13). The draft review report 
which was commissioned by the DTI and carried out by 
Professor Peter Moizer of Leeds University is understood 
to suggest that the two monitoring units should be merged 
and made wholly independent of the supervisory bodies. 
The report apparently wants all firms currently on the 
three institutes' audit register to be visited at least 
once every five years. Furthermore, it is understood to 
criticise the cost of Joint Monitoring Unit of £2.848m in 
1993 as compared to the ACCA's total expenditure of 
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£418,000. 
It is worthy of note that Fearnley and Page (1994: 81) 
refer to debate about who should be doing the regulating 
and note that: 
"Some have suggested that professional bodies cannot 
act as regulators and at the same time serve their 
members' interests - the 'dual role' argument. The 
barrage from the left claims that the profession 
should not be allowed to regulate itself because it 
protects its members rather than the public - the 
'self-regulation must go' argument". 
However, Fearnley and Page (1994: 81) refer to the fact 
that "all the accounting bodies are operating two forms 
of regulation, one delegated by the state and the other 
internally generated... " and observe that "There are 
obvious economies of scale that should be achievable 
combining these functions within the same 
organisation... ". 
5.5 The statutory audit requirement and cost of audit to 
SCs 
Many businesses start as small family private companies 
in order to benefit from "limited liability" and other 
perceived advantages 
. 
of. incorporation. Others start as 
small family concerns and as they grow they may be 
converted to corporate entity or a partnership. 
The owner-managers, in these SCs, normally participate in 
the day-to-day activity of the company and have a good 
knowledge of their company's performance. The financial 
information contained in accounts tends to substantiate 
rather than increase their existing knowledge of the 
company affairs. 
However, they have a relatively small group of external 
208 
business contacts (e. g. suppliers, banks and Inland 
Revenue) who have some obvious need for formal financial 
information about the company. 
As companies expand, their owners cannot maintain a 
physical presence to all the activities and may have to 
employ qualified and experienced individuals to manage 
the companies. They find themselves becoming less and 
less involved in the company's operations and they have 
to rely more and more on the services of professional 
managers/directors. 
The larger the company becomes, the greater will be the 
tendency for its shareholders to become divorced from its 
affairs and therefore, the greater will become their 
needs for financial information about the company's 
activity, performance and progress (Lee, 1982). 
For the financial information to be of any use, it must 
be reliable. For this reason, in the UK, the Companies 
Acts require that the financial statements of all 
companies (with the exception of those companies 
identified in Chapter one of this work) should be 
audited. 
However, problems invariably arise in the application of 
normal auditing principles and procedures to many audits 
of SCs due to SC characteristics such as owner/manager 
dominance which allows the management to override 
informally designed accounting controls or internal 
control deficiencies resulting from limited segregation 
of functions. Thus, it will be difficult for SC auditor 
to obtain relevant and reliable audit evidence and to 
ensure all the transactions have been recorded. This is 
likely to lead to 
-the need to rely on management 
assurances that all transactions have been properly 
recorded and also the frequent qualification of SC audit 
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report. 
The above problems even become very frequent for very 
small proprietary businesses whose accounting records 
falls within the category known as "incomplete records". 
According to Woolf (1994: 319): 
"In such a case any reference to an independent audit 
of the records is farcical. The 'auditor' will in 
fact attempt to glean enough verbal and documentary 
information from the proprietor ('managing director') 
to enable him to prepare a set of accounts, apparently 
sufficiently respectable to satisfy (1) the registrar 
of companies, (2) the Inland Revenue, and (3) the bank 
manager, if overdraft facilities have been granted. 
In many such cases the information supplied to the 
accountant will be woefully deficient and often 
unsupported by documentary evidence. Such situations 
will invariably demand a qualified audit report, if 
only on the grounds of failure to maintain proper 
accounting records". 
Woolf (1994: 319) concludes that: 
"It is clearly debatable whether such a business 
should have been granted the privileges of incorporation in the first place... It is equally debatable whether such a company can and should be 
subjected to a normal audit". 
It is worth noting that some of these companies have 
since been exempted from audit (see 5.8). 
In addition to the above, the statutory audit requirement 
imposes a real cost on SCs. In this regard, a 
consultative document which was issued by the DTI in 
April 1993 to offer Very SCs some measure of relief from 
statutory requirements (for more details see section 
5.8.1), referred to three specific surveys about cost of 
statutory audit which are considered below. 
The first survey which was published in November 1991 and 
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carried out by the Manchester Business School estimated 
that the audit fee may represent 2% 
- 
4.5% of turnover 
for companies with a turnover in the range of £20,000 to 
£50,000 (DTI, 1993: para. 4.3). It is worthy of note that 
these results do not include the effects of audit 
regulation (see 5.4). 
The second survey, a study by the former Business 
Statistics office, based on a sample of some 2000 company 
accounts for 1987, illustrated that "the burden of cost 
becomes proportionately heavier as turnover decreases" 
(DTI, 1993: para. 4.3). It is instructive to note that 
according to Central Statistical Office (CSO) this study 
is based on the annual Company Finance survey, published 
as Business Monitor MA3 (See CSO, MA3, twenty-first 
issue, 1990) and analyses the financial returns of two 
thousand UK companies. Correspondence (12/9/1995) with 
the CSO reveals that "the statement in the DTI 
[1993: para. 4.3] refers to costs in general, rather than 
audit costs". 
Finally, a survey by the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies has suggested that company dissatisfaction with 
the cost of, and need for, audit increases as company 
size decreases. (DTI, 
-1993: para. 4.3). 
It is also worthy of note that according to Freedman and 
Godwin (1993: 123), the audit fee for their sample 
companies was between £500 to £1,500, a sum which was 
considered to be "sizeable to businesses with profits of 
£50,000 or below... ". 
- 
Furthermore, there are two additional costs associated 
with the audit, which cannot be strictly quantified: 
i) the opportunity cost- of diverting management time 
to deal with the audit, which is likely to be 
211 
proportionately higher for smaller companies than 
larger companies; and 
ii) the extra cost of the new audit regulation, which 
was introduced in October 1991. It seems likely 
that many auditors will face additional costs, 
depending on the complexity of the accounts and 
their audit, in providing sufficient evidence of 
compliance with auditing standards. This will 
lead to rise in audit fees and additional 
financial burdens on their SC clients. (For more 
details see 5.4). 
Whether the benefits of the compulsory audit of the 
accounts of SCs justify the above costs has been the 
subject of public debate for many years. 
5.6 SC audit debate 
- 
To audit or not? 
The APC (1979) argues that the case for retaining SC 
audit rests on the value of the audit to those who have 
an interest in SC affairs, namely: 
- 
shareholders 
- 
banks and other institutional creditors 
- 
trade creditors 
- 
tax and other authorities 
- 
employees 
- 
management 
The decision of the House of Lords in the case of Caparo 
Industries plc v Dickman and others (1990) established 
that the purpose of the annual accounts is to report to 
shareholders on management's stewardship of the company 
and auditors are not liable to third parties in respect 
of statutory accounts. Effectively this decision ignores 
the other users of the accounts. 
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However, it has been recognised that in considering 
whether to relax statutory audit requirement for SCs the 
needs of all users of audited accounts should be taken 
into account (ICAEW, 1992b). 
Many arguments have been put forward in favour and 
against SC audit (for example, Mottershead, 1978; APC, 
1979; Davison, 1980; Pratt, 1981; Jones, 1985; 
Accountancy, July 1985: 12-13; Adams, 1988; ICAEW, 1992b; 
Freedman and Godwin, 1993). 
It is the intention of the author to start discussing the 
SC debate by first of all considering the main arguments 
put forward by those in favour of retaining SC audit. 
This would be followed by a discussion of the main 
arguments against retention of SC audit. 
5.6.1 Arguments in favour of retaining SC audit 
Those supporting the retention of compulsory audit 
requirement for SCs have put forward the following 
arguments by considering the needs of the users of 
audited accounts and other related issues. 
USERS OF ACCOUNTS 
Shareholders 
An audit provides some assurance to shareholders and in 
particular to those who are not connected with management 
of the company as to whether the accounts give a true and 
fair view of the company's state of affairs and it may 
protect the interest of minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the accounts are 
often of particular importance to shareholders of SCs 
because: 
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"... they provide virtually the only information 
available to determine the value of their shares... 
It is accordingly particularly important that these 
statements should be fair and an audit provides 
valuable assurance of this fact". (APC, 1979: para. 
14). 
Hanks and other institutional creditors 
Audited accounts are valuable for lending decision by the 
banks as well as monitoring the continuing security of 
advances already made. 
Qualification of an audit report reduces but does not 
eliminate its value to the banks and other institutional 
creditors, indeed, it draws their attention to 
deficiencies in a company's affairs. 
Trade creditors 
Trade suppliers assess the creditworthiness of their 
potential or existing customers by using their accounts 
or by relying on the reports from their credit agencies 
for whom the Registrar of Companies files are a valuable 
source of information. However, the value of this 
information is reduced if it is not independently 
audited. 
Tax authorities 
Accounts are used by the Inland Revenue as the basis for 
computing corporation tax liability. Accounts are also 
used by the Customs and Excise for verifying the accuracy 
of figures (turnover and expenses) contained in VAT 
returns. The value of the accounts is clearly enhanced 
by the addition of an independent audit opinion. 
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Employees 
Audited accounts may be used by Trade Unions in 
conducting collective bargaining and individual employees 
may also use the audited accounts with a view to 
assessing the prospective viability of their employer's 
business. 
Management 
Supporters of SC audit would also argue that an audit 
provides an independent check on whether the business is 
performing as management believes and it provides the 
management with valuable benefits such as recommendations 
for improvements to accounting and internal control 
systems and the detection of fraud and error. 
Furthermore, they point out that audit provides an 
independent check on the accuracy and adequacy of 
accounting procedures performed by the company's own 
staff. 
OTHERS 
Limited liability 
Limited liability is an important benefit provided to the 
shareholders of a limited company by the Companies Acts. 
The statutory audit is argued to be a valid price to ask 
for the benefits of limited liability. 
Going concern 
Audited accounts provide some assurance as to whether a 
business continues as a going concern. This is 
particularly important to suppliers, lenders and other 
users of accounts. 
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When forming his opinion, the auditor needs to consider 
whether there are reasonable grounds for accepting that 
accounts should have been prepared on a going concern 
basis. Of course, the auditor does not guarantee that a 
company will or will not fail. 
Accounting records 
Audit creates a discipline for the company leading to 
better accounting records and accounts. 
Fraud 
An audit may be a major factor in deterring and detecting 
fraud. The APC (1990)'s auditing guideline on fraud, 
other irregularities and errors states that: 
"Audit procedures should be designed to give the 
auditor a reasonable expectation of detecting any 
material misstatements, whether intentional or 
unintentional, in an entity's financial statements. 
He cannot, however, prevent a fraud or other irregularity from occurring; but the recurring annual 
audit may act as a deterrent" (APC, 1990: para. 7). 
5.6.2 Arguments against SC audit 
The main arguments 
provided below. 
against retention of SC audit are 
USERS OF ACCOUNTS 
Shareholders 
The independent audit is of little value to shareholders, 
who are all directors and actively involved in the 
management of the company and also shareholders who 
although not involved in the management'of the company, 
but have complete confidence in the integrity of the 
directors. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
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statutory audit is of little value to shareholders where 
the audit report has been heavily qualified (due to the 
SC's characteristics). 
Banks and other institutional creditors 
It is doubtful if banks place more reliance on the 
audited accounts of small limited companies than on the 
unaudited accounts of unincorporated businesses of 
similar size which are nearly always prepared by a 
qualified accountant. Even if a bank considers that it 
requires audited accounts it would be able to make an 
audit a condition of granting a loan, therefore, it is 
difficult to justify the retention of audit requirement 
for all SCs on this ground. 
In practice, banks generally place greater reliance on 
the manner in which bank accounts have been conducted, 
cash flow projections and management accounts. 
Trade creditors 
In SCs, the value of the audited accounts for assessing 
the creditworthiness is extremely limited, because SCs 
are exempted from filing their full accounts. 
Furthermore, SCs' accounts- are generally filed with the 
Registrar of Companies, too Iate (up to 10 months after 
the year end) to be of relevance for short terms credit 
decisions. Trade creditors are more likely to rely on 
trade references and--personal-contacts than filed 
accounts. 
In the case of smaller companies, creditworthiness is 
rarely reviewed on a continuous 
-basis, it is only 
investigated when an account is first opened, or the 
level of credit' is significantly increased or a trade 
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debtor is considered to be in financial difficulty. 
Tax authorities 
It is doubtful if the Inland Revenue places greater 
reliance on audited accounts of SCs than unaudited 
accounts of unincorporated businesses. 
In their response to the APC (1979)'s discussion paper, 
the Board of Inland Revenue did not insist on a mandatory 
audit for SCs as long as there was an accountant's report 
with the accounts. Furthermore, the Chairman of the 
Board of HM Customs and Excise stated that the abolition 
of SC audit should not reduce the accountant's 
involvement with the SCs (APC, 1980). 
The Inland Revenue now accepts "three-line" accounts from 
very small unincorporated businesses with turnover below 
£15,000 p. a. It would seem unlikely that the Inland 
Revenue has a particular need for audited accounts in the 
case of Very SCs, where their accounts provide more than 
"three-line" information. 
Furthermore, it has been observed that tax authorities in 
most other countries do not require a statutory audit for 
very SCs. "Comfort should not be provided for the Inland 
Revenue at the expense of the small company sector". 
(Freedman and Godwin, 1993: 111). 
Therefore, it appears that, 
-Inspectors of Taxes are more 
likely to be influenced byý the reputation of the 
accountants who prepare the accounts than with the 
expression of a particular form of opinion. 
Furthermore, the detailed trading account of a company 
which is of great importance to the Inland Revenue and 
the Customs and Excise is not explicitly part of an 
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annual audit. 
Employees 
In SCs, the audited accounts are unlikely to be used as 
a tool for salary negotiation and employees cannot assess 
the prospective viability of their employer's business 
because the accounts are either heavily qualified or the 
level of profit is heavily influenced by the amount of 
directors' remuneration and by the extent of low interest 
loans from the directors (APC, 1979: para. 28). 
Management 
In SCs, an audit opinion is unlikely to add anything to 
management's knowledge of the results if the information 
supplied to the auditor has not been given honestly and 
accurately by the management. The audited accounts serve 
only a compliance function and they are unlikely to be 
used for managing a company's financial resources. 
Indeed, the removal of audit might enable the accountant 
to make a much greater contribution to a SC management by 
concentrating on his management advisory role. 
OTHERS 
Limited liability 
In many SCs, the benefits of limited liability have been 
eroded because directors have to-give personal guarantees 
for their companies' borrowings and, in any event, it is 
disclosure of accounting 
-information rather than the 
statutory audit which is the appropriate price to pay. 
It is interesting to observe that unlimited companies are 
also required by the CA 1985 to undergo an audit, 
although their accounts. are not filed with the Registrar 
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of Companies. This suggests that the audit is not so 
much the price of "limited liability" as a protection for 
shareholders in line with Caparo (1990) case judgement. 
Going concern 
SCs are particularly vulnerable to changes in trading 
conditions and the actions of their owners which can pose 
special problems for SC auditors when assessing whether 
going concern concept applies to their SC audit clients. 
This will lead to semi-automatic qualifications in many 
SCs. 
Accounting records 
The additional burden of an audit does not, specifically 
in the case of SCs, lead to a better set of accounting 
records. In fact, the need to have a better set of 
accounting records derives principally from the need to 
prepare accounts in accordance with the CA 1985 
requirements for filing with the Registrar of companies 
and presenting to the tax authorities, which generally, 
leads in practice to the involvement of a qualified 
accountant, who would ensure a satisfactory standard of 
accounting records and accounts. 
Fraud 
The primary responsibility for the prevention and 
detection of fraud, and errors rests with management and 
not the auditor. An 
. 
audit cannot be relied upon 
necessarily to detect fraud perpetrated by sole manager 
or collusive fraud amongst a SC management group. 
Audit evidence 
Due to the characteristics of SCs (e. g. the personal 
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involvement of the proprietor) independent audit evidence 
is either not available or, where available, the cost of 
collecting and evaluating it may well be disproportionate 
to the benefits arising, leading to a widespread increase 
in the number of audit qualifications in SCs, which could 
harm the standing of the audited accounts of the SCs. 
Auditing standards 
It has been argued that the retention of the audit for 
SCs will lead to compromises and delays in developing 
standards of auditing for larger companies which are 
publicly accountable. 
Audit regulation 
As explained in detail in section 5.4, audit regulation 
has caused a considerable burden on SCs and their 
auditors and the research by Fearnley and Page (1993) 
indicates that opinion against retaining the SC audit has 
been hardened (see also Freedman and Godwin, 1993). 
5.6.3 Conclusion 
The arguments set out above show that the substantive 
benefit is in the provision of the accounts and the audit 
provides additional assurance as to the truth and 
fairness of the information. 
However, in most cases, 
-. 
the audit of SCs is an 
unnecessary burden when viewed on a cost-benefit basis, 
both to the company and to the wider economy. (ICAEW, 
1992b). 
This has been recognised- by the DTI's "Burden on 
Business" report in 1985 which made proposals for 
reducing the administrative burden on companies arising 
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from the requirements of company law. 
Furthermore, in March 1993, a report (ICAEW, 1993a) 
summarising the responses to the ICAEW (1992b)'s 
consultation paper "The statutory audit of small 
companies: the case for reform" confirmed that the 
majority of respondents were in favour of relaxing SC 
audit requirement in some way. 
In relaxing the statutory audit requirement, there is a 
need for statutory safeguards for minority shareholders 
or debentureholders not involved in management. The 
users with legitimate needs (e. g. banks or Inland 
Revenue) will generally be able to request or require an 
audit if necessary. 
It will be helpful to consider the alternatives to SC 
audit and the sub-categories of SCs to which these 
alternatives may apply. '- 
5.7 Alternatives to SC audit 
On 4 March 1988, the DTI (1988) published a Consultative 
Note on possible alternatives to audit for SCs. It 
offered five options: 
- 
i) a statement by the directors that the accounts meet 
the CA requirements., 
ii) an assurance by a competent person that the accounts 
meet the CA requirements. 
iii) a statement by a`competent person that the accounts 
have been properly =- prepared from information 
supplied by, -, management' and' conform as regards 
content and layout with. the, requirements of the CA. 
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iv) as (iii) above, but with an additional assurance 
that the company has kept proper accounting records. 
v) a limited assurance on the validity of the accounts. 
The report under option (ii) is essentially an audit 
report except that the person making it need be neither 
qualified nor independent. The report under option (iii) 
is the same as compilation report and the option (iv) is 
similar to the option (iii). The report under option (v) 
is the same as Review. 
The above options and their consequences are considered 
below: 
Option (i) 
-a statement by the directors that the 
accounts meet the CA requirements (DTI, 1988: para. 7). 
On 30 March 1988, in their response, the ICAEW (1988) 
recommended that the accounts of SCs which had decided to 
dispense with an audit should contain a statement made by 
all the directors acknowledging their responsibilities 
for the accounts, stating in particular that they are 
entitled to the audit exemption and that the accounts are 
prepared to give a true and fair view and to comply with 
the CA. 
The ICAEW (1988) believed that this option was preferable 
to the other alternatives because a statement of this 
type by the directors would focus their minds on their 
responsibilities. 
On 29 March 1988, the ICAS (1988) replied to the DTI's 
Consultative Note, by confirming that although this 
option could in theory result in the maximum potential 
savings to SCs (ICAS, 1988: para. 3) because they would 
not have to pay an audit, fee but it has some very serious 
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disadvantages: 
"It would mean that effectively there were no 
additional obligations in relation to financial 
reporting in return for the benefit of limited 
liability. The quality of accounts produced would 
inevitably vary widely and the onus would fall to the 
Registrar of Companies to check compliance with the 
Companies Act requirements. 
Furthermore, sight must not be lost of the fact that 
the purpose of all accounting activities is to 
communicate useful and credible information to the 
readers of the accounts. The lack of an independent 
view being added to a company's financial statements 
would undoubtedly be to the detriment of users such as 
shareholders not involved in the day-to-day running of 
the company, the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise 
and bankers and creditors" (ICAS, 1988-, para. 4). 
option (ii) 
- 
an assurance by a competent person that the 
accounts meet the CA requirements (DTI, 1988: para. 8). 
Under this option, a report is provided by possibly an 
unqualified, presumably unregulated and not necessarily 
independent person as to whether the accounts give a true 
and fair view. This approach would be contrary to the 
regulation of auditors contained in the CA 1989. 
Both the ICAEW (1988) and the ICAS (1988) did not support 
this option on the grounds that there is a lack of 
independent opinion and also the reliance that could be 
placed on such report would vary and be very difficult 
for the users of the financial statements to. determine. 
Option (iii) 
-a statement by a competent person that the 
accounts have been properly prepared from information 
supplied by management and conform as regards content and 
layout with the requirements. of the CA (DTI, 1988: para. 
9). 
The above option (i. e.! "preparation and compliance") is 
an equivalent to Compilation Report. 
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Compilation approach is similar to that currently carried 
out by practitioners in relation to the accounts of 
unincorporated businesses. The ICAEW's guideline on 
"Reports on accounts of sole traders and partnerships" 
(ICAEW, Members Handbook, Statement 3.907) states that 
members should not allow their names to be associated 
with accounts, even though unaudited, which they believe 
give a misleading view and they also should ensure that 
the accounts which they prepare conform to accepted 
accounting principles. 
Under this option, the ICAS (1988) suggested that the 
reduction in the costs incurred on the present audit 
could be in the order of 20-25% of the present fee paid 
to external auditors/accountants. However, there could 
be two drawbacks for the users of the financial 
statements: 
* uncertainty about the acceptability of this type of 
report 
*a compilation-style report results in the reporting 
accountants giving no assurance on the financial 
information and whether proper accounting records is 
kept by the company or whether the accounts give a 
true and fair view. 
The only comfort to the users of the financial statements 
is the fact that accounts have been prepared with due 
professional skill and care. 
With reference to other definitions of a compilation, it 
is worth noting that Abdel-khalik (1983: 113) refers to 
the following: 
"A compilation: is an engagement wherein a CPA presents 
in the form of financial statements information that is 
the representation of management (owners) "Without the 
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CPA undertaking to express any assurance on the 
statements. " 
Furthermore, the APB (1994: Introduction, para. 4) 
provides the following definition of a "compilation 
report": 
"The 'compilation report' is a report made pursuant to 
section 249A(2) Companies Act 1985, stating whether in 
the opinion of the reporting accountant making it: 
a) The accounts of the company for the financial year 
in question are in agreement with those accounting 
records kept by the company under section 221, and 
b) Having regard only to, and on the basis of, the 
information contained in those accounting records, 
those accounts have been drawn up in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of the Act (i. e. 
accounting requirements) specified in section 
249C(4), so far as they are applicable to the 
company... ". 
The APB(1994) and the ICAEW(1993a: 24) provide some 
examples of compilationreports. - 
Option (iv) 
- 
this is the same as the above option, but 
with an additional assurance that the company has kept 
proper accounting records. (DTI, 1988: para. 10). 
The ICAS (1988) preferred this option to other 
alternatives to replace SC audit because: 
"It would allow the reporting accountant to establish 
that the client has employed procedures to provide 
reasonable accuracy of the 
. 
underlying accounting 
records. We confirm, that''a' consistent standard in 
reporting would be achievable". (ICAS,: 1988: para. 13). 
Option (v) 
-a limited assurance on the validity of the 
accounts (DTI, 1988: para. 11). 
The above option (i. e. a "limited. assurance") is same as 
Review. Review is very, common" in the USA` and there is 
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existing guidance from the AICPA and IFAC. The 
International Auditing Practices Committee of IFAC issued 
in February 1988, Related Statement No. 1 "Basic 
Principles Governing Review Engagements". 
In practice, according to ICAS (1988), this option would 
be of little difference from the present SC audit, hence 
the, review fees would be of a very similar level to those 
presently incurred in an audit. 
In their studies, Arnold and Diamond (1981: 7) referred to 
the following description of a review: 
"A review encompasses performance of inquiry and 
analytical procedures to provide the accountant with 
a reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance 
that there are no material changes that should be made 
to the financial statements for them to be in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles". 
Comparing the above with the definition provided by the 
APC (1979: para. 43 
- 
see List of definitions), it appears 
that they both provide a limited assurance on the 
validity of the accounts and they are of little 
difference from the present audit. I A similar definition 
was also provided by Abdel-khalik (1983: 113). 
It is worth emphasising that the ICAS (1988: para. 8) has 
pointed out that: 
"This option [Review] ~would". of course not be to the 
detriment to users, of the financial statements in that 
there would be very little. change from the present 
audit situation. '. The important feature of the 
independent view on: 
-the financial statements would 
still be there". 
It should be pointed out, that the concept. of the review 
has generated some criticism in the US, where the 
following question has been raised "Limited assurance is 
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a term that could cause problems of interpretation. When 
or how does the practitioner determine that this point of 
comfort has been reached? " (See Arnold and Diamond, 
1987: 13). 
In this regard, in the UK, Flint (1988: 174) refers to the 
debate in respect of the proposal to replace SC audit 
with a review following the adoption by the Council of 
The European Communities of the EEC Fourth Directive on 
Company Law in 1978 and observes that: 
"Some of the problems in the proposal which were 
highlighted in discussion related to the difficulty of 
conveying to the user of accounts what a 'review' is 
and what benefit or assurance it produces for the 
user". 
Furthermore, according to Flint (1988: 174): 
"While the presupposition about the understanding of 
the meaning of audit may not be well founded and it is 
unclear what a review is, it appears that it was 
believed that, at least, review could be distinguished 
as being different from an audit". 
In general, the ICAEW (1988) expressed concern at how the 
various alternative forms of report (under the above 
options) that might be introduced in place of an audit 
report would be interpreted by the reader of the 
accounts. 
"In performing his work, the reporting professional 
will have to take account of any confusion that may 
exist in the reader's mind. This may lead him to 
perform what is in substance 
- 
an audit, even if his 
report is nominally in 
., 
a different form, so eroding 
whatever cost-savings might have been expected from 
the alternative form=of report"'(ICAEW, 1988: 3). 
Examples of review reports 
(1994: 322) and LSCA (1992: 22). 
are provided by Woolf 
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Finally, the results of the following studies provide 
some comparisons between some of the above alternatives 
and an audit. 
In a study by Johnson, Pany and White (1983), the impact 
of auditor association with accounts on the decisions of 
bank loan officers was investigated. In particular, they 
examined differences in reactions to auditor association 
in the form of compilation, review or a full audit. They 
found that the decision to grant the loan or the 
interest-rate premium was not "significantly" affected by 
the form of auditor association. However, perceptions of 
confidence were affected and expectation of conformity 
with GAAP was "significantly" higher with full auditor 
association. 
In another study in 1981, Arnold and Diamond (1981) 
investigated the reactions and attitudes of CPAs and 
bankers concerning the services available for nonpublic 
companies. They found that CPAs and bankers felt that 
the introduction of compilation and review services were 
a positive development by the accounting profession (see 
4.17.2). Furthermore, Arnold and Diamond (1981: 6-7) have 
cited Dirkes and Deming's study, - point out that an audit 
provides positive assurance "as to whether the accounts 
are presented fairly, whereas, a review provides a 
limited assurance and no assurance is provided by a 
compilation because there is'no examination or review of 
accounts. 
With reference to review, ` Hylas-and Ashton (1982) found 
that review procedures were effective and 'low cost method 
of detecting material error. 
-', 
Furthermore, according to 
Woolf (1994: 320): 
"There have been a number of advocates of the view that 
the accountant should limit his work in this context to 
performing a review as distinguished from audit 
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procedures, on the grounds that if the financial 
statements are improper, false or misleading, the 
accountant is less exposed if he had done no auditing 
than if he has performed some audit procedures and 
failed to find the deficiencies". 
However, Gwilliam (1987: 76) claims that the need for 
review (rather than full audit) arises from the 
increasing call for a form of auditor association with 
interim data, forecast data, etc., that do not 
necessarily lend themselves easily to traditional audit 
techniques and also from the recognition that for many 
SCs, while there is a need for some sort of independent 
check, the costs of full audit are likely to exceed the 
benefits. 
5.8 Sub-categories of SCs to be exempted from audit 
There are a number of ways of defining a SC to be 
exempted from audit. These could be based on 
characteristics, legal and other measurement criteria 
(see also section 4.3). 
Defining a SC based on its characteristics is very useful 
but it is not a suitable basis for statutory rule because 
SC characteristics are too vague, and open to avoidance. 
Defining a SC based on legal characteristics (e. g. 
private or public, limited or unlimited) is useful but 
requires some additional measurement criteria. 
A 
., ýa ý.. Currently, there are a. number of useful and attractive 
measurement criteria, which already have significant 
implications for the-way a company conducts its business 
and they are reviewed and upgraded annually. These are: 
* the threshold for VAT registration 
£45,000); 
(currently 
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* the threshold for VAT cash accounting (currently 
£350,000); and 
* the threshold for turnover for a SC to file 
abbreviated accounts (currently £2.8m). 
The application of the above thresholds to companies" 
annual turnover could provide the basis for creation of 
three categories of companies (within the CA 1985 
definition of a SC) to which the alternatives to audit 
may apply. These are considered below. 
5.8.1 Companies with annual turnover up to VAT registration 
threshold (Very Small Companies) 
There are possibly some 250,000 to 300,000 companies, 
whose turnover is below the VAT registration threshold 
(DTI, 1993: para. 5.2 and ICAEW, 1992b: para. 64). 
They include non-trading companies, such as clubs and 
flat management companies, whose -1 accounts ': 'are' only of 
interest to their shareholders who are- mainly also 
directors of their companies. ' 
In its response to the DTI (1988) Is consultative note, 
the ICAEW (1988) emphasized that it should be opposed to 
any statutory distinction between "Small"ý and "Very 
Small" companies. However, in'its consultation paper in 
August 1992, the ICAEW (1992b) changed 
-its attitudes 
towards the above and recommended that Very SCs should be 
exempted from the statutory audit requirement. 
In September 1992, the Technical Committee of the London 
Society of Chartered Accountants (LSCA, 1992) suggested, 
in line with the ICAEW, " thattVery SCs should-be exempted 
from statutory audits. ' 
-- . 
-. 
.` 
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A significant number of respondents (but not the 
majority) to the ICAEW's consultation paper supported 
complete audit exemption for Very SCs (ICAEW, 1993a). 
In April 1993, as a result of an initial review by the 
DTI, the Inland Revenue and the HM Treasury, the 
Government proposed in a consultative document to relieve 
Very SCs of the burden of the audit requirement and 
offered two options for consideration (DTI, 1993): 
a) abolition of the audit requirement which would provide 
maximum deregulatory benefit to the companies 
themselves; 
b) replacement of the audit with a compilation report 
produced by a suitably qualified independent 
accountant which would offer eligible companies a more 
limited measure of relief- in order to address the 
concern of the users ofýthe accounts. 
The consultation exercise generated- enormous public 
interest. The overwhelming majority of respondents 
supported relaxation, but thought that the proposed 
exemption thresholds were 
. 
too low to be genuinely helpful 
to business. 
In the November 1993 Budget, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer confirmed the abolition of the audit for Very 
SCs with turnover up to £90,000=per annum (i. e. "-twice the 
current limit for VAT-registration)` and balance sheet 
total not exceeding £1.4m. 
There would however be no change in the statutory duty of 
directors to prepare annual accounts giving a true and 
fair view and for accounts to be sent to shareholders and 
filed at the Registrar, of Companies.,: The directors of 
companies taking advantage of audit., exemption=will need 
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to state in the accounts which are filed at the Registrar 
of Companies that: 
- 
the company is eligible to take advantage of audit 
exemption; and 
- 
they are aware of their obligation to keep proper 
records and to prepare accounts which give a true and 
fair view of the company's position. 
An individual shareholder (or shareholders)-who holds 10 
per cent or more of the issued share capital can, demand 
an audit for the current financial year by depositing a 
notice in writing at the registered office of the company 
not later than one month before the end of that financial 
year. 
5.8.2 Companies with annual turnover between VAT registration 
and VAT cash accounting thresholds 
There are possibly some 200,000 companies, whose turnover 
falls between the above thresholds. This estimate is 
based on the difference between total number of companies 
estimated to be exempt from auditý, '(i. e. some 500,000 
companies, see DTI, 1995: 9)-ýand those- with 'annual 
turnover below the VAT registration threshold (i. e. some 
250,000 to 300,000 companies, -see'`DTI,: 1993: Para. 5.2). 
In its response to the. DTI 
. 
(1988) Is consultative note, 
the ICAEW (1988) came out in'favour., of-. a'statement by, the 
directors of their responsibilities. -. in relation to the 
accounts but against other -alternativeforms of-report 
including a compilation report.. w :... , 
However, in its consultation paper (ICAEW, 1992b), the 
ICAEW proposed that companies with annual turnover 
between VAT registration 
. 
and "., VAT 
. 
cash- ; %accounting 
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thresholds should be allowed to make a unanimous annual 
resolution to replace the statutory audit with a 
compilation report prepared by a qualified (not 
necessarily independent) accountant together with a 
statement made by all the directors acknowledging their 
responsibilities for the accounts. 
A significant number of respondents to the above 
consultation paper believed that the VAT cash accounting 
threshold and the SC limits were equally popular 
relaxation criteria and the compilation report prepared 
by an independent qualified accountant was a popular 
alternative to the auditor's report (ICAEW, 1993a). 
Although, this category of SCs was not considered by the 
DTI (1993)'s consultative document, but it is possible 
for the following reasons,,, the Government decided to 
consider this option: 
i) public concern about.. the rising cost of audit for 
SCs following the introduction of the new regulatory 
regime for company auditors; 
ii) the majority of respondents to the DTI (1993)'s 
consultative document thought the proposed exemption 
thresholds were too low to be helpful to business 
(DTI, Press notice, 7 April 1994); 
iii) since the publication of ! 'Burden, on Business" report 
(DTI, 1985a) and the consultative document 
"Accounting and Audit Requirements for Small Firms" 
(DTI, 1985b), the Government policy has-been to-ease 
administrative burdens on SCs whenever possible. 
Relaxing the statutory audit requirement would be 
consistent with this policy;. 
iv) in the European Community, the UK is very much the 
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exception in insisting that all limited companies 
should be subject to a statutory audit. 
There are considerations of harmonisation and 
competitiveness in the EEC which suggest that the UK 
should take full advantage of the Fourth EC 
Directive on Company Law, which allows member states 
to exempt SCs from audit; and 
- 
v) there are audit exemptions for SCs in Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and 
_USA, 
where some of these 
countries (e. g. Australia and New Zealand) have 
similar company law and business systems to those in 
the UK. 
In the November 1993 Budget, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that for companies with a turnover 
between £90,000 (being twice VAT registration threshold) 
and £350,000 per annum (being VAT cash accounting 
threshold) and balance sheet total not exceeding £1.4m, 
the audit requirement would be replaced by a compilation 
eo produced by a suitably, qualified accountant (being 
a practising member of one of the recognised accountancy 
bodies). 
Companies taking advantage of audit exemption must still 
keep and maintain adequate accounting records in 
accordance with the CA 1985 and to prepare annual 
accounts giving a true and fair view. 
There are similar provisions for protecting the interest 
of minority shareholder(s) and preparing the accounts as 
those for Very SCs. 
In June 1994, the APB (1994) published, 
_, 
the "proposed 
statement of standards for reporting, accountants: 
compilation reports under company legislation" setting 
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out the detailed format of the compilation report and 
professional guidance for practitioners who are eligible 
to act as reporting accountants. 
The proposed statement states that: 
"... the reporting accountant is not required, and the 
procedures will not be sufficient, to give any opinion 
on whether the accounts have been properly prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act 
and whether they give a 'true and fair view'. Apart 
from those opinions expressed by the reporting 
accountant, a compilation report cannot and does not 
provide any assurance that the accounting records and 
the accounts are free from material misstatements" (APB 1994: preface section). 
The proposed statement also states that practising 
accountants have a professional responsibility not to 
allow their names to be associated with accounts which 
they believe may be misleading. 
In practice, this may force the reportin 
perform such procedures which are needed 
necessary for compilation report which 
question the extent of savings to be 
substituting a compilation report for 
audit. 
accountant to 
for audit than 
will bring to 
obtained from 
the statutory 
5.8.3 Companies with annual turnover between VAT cash 
accounting threshold and the CA 1985 threshold for filing 
SC abbreviated accounts 
The companies in this category continue to be subject to 
statutory audit. 
In June 1985, when the DTI (1985b) proposed to exempt all 
SCs (as defined by the CA 1985 for filing purposes) from 
the statutory audit, it faced strong opposition from all 
accountancy bodies. Similarly, in 1989, in response to 
the draft Directive, which was proposed by the European 
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Commission in favour of the deregulation measures 
including mandatory exemption for all SCs from compulsory 
audit requirement, the Council of the ICAEW (1989) 
responded by arguing that the deregulation measures were 
radical and, if adopted, would have the effect of 
considerably reducing accountability to shareholders of 
SCs. 
The ICAEW (1992b) Is consultation paper recognised that to 
exempt companies in this category from statutory audit 
may be regarded as too significant a change to be made 
immediately. 
The Government has also indicated that once the existing 
proposals in respect of Very SCs and compilation report 
are implemented, "we will see how the measures work in 
practice and consider, in due course, whether any further 
changes might be appropriate" (DTI, Press notice, 7 April 
1994). 
5.8.4 Other SC category 
The concept of owner-management is important, because 
annual accounts are intended to allow the owners to 
assess management's stewardship. It seems, therefore, 
illogical to require an audit of accounts where the 
directors are also the shareholders in a private company. 
The DTI (1985a) and (1985b) proposed to eliminate the 
statutory audit of accounts for "shareholder-managed" 
companies. 
In March 1991, the APC (1991)'s draft auditing guideline 
"The Audit of Small Businesses" argued that to an owner- 
manager, the cost of an audit was invariably considered 
to outweigh its benefits. 
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In September 1992, the LSCA (1992) proposed that the 
statutory audit of accounts of "proprietary" companies 
(essentially owner-managed companies with some other 
criteria) should be replaced with an independent review 
carried out by a qualified accountant. 
Despite the above proposals, this category of SCs has not 
received its own status and exemption from audit (apart 
from those owner-managed companies which are already 
covered by other sub-categories, depending on their 
annual turnover). 
Possible consequences of the recent changes 
a) For shareholders: 
* In Very SCs, the shareholders are mainly the 
directors who benefit from audit exemption by either 
saving the audit cost or spending it instead to 
obtain more needed business and management advice. 
The opportunity cost of diverting management time to 
deal with audit matters will be saved. 
* The extent of the saving would be less if 
compilation report is prepared. 
* Minority shareholders who are not involved in 
management may no longer have the comfort of an 
auditor's opinion that the accounts fairly reflect 
the directors' stewardship of the company's assets. 
However, if they hold at least 10% of issued share 
capital they can ask for an audit. 
* Lack of audit and lack of involvement of a suitably 
qualified accountant in Very SCs may lead to 
inadequate financial management and discipline which 
is among the principal factors contributing towards 
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small business failure. 
b) For other users: 
* Companies taking advantage of audit exemption must 
still keep and maintain adequate accounting records 
in accordance with the CA 1985 and to prepare annual 
accounts giving a true and fair view and would 
continue to file their accounts with the Registrar 
of Companies with a directors' statement of their 
obligation and eligibility for audit exemption. 
All persons who have dealings with companies benefit 
from having access to annual accounts. 
* Where a compilation report is provided, then 
additional comfort would be provided to users of 
accounts because the reporting accountant would not 
allow his name to be associated with the accounts 
that he considered to be misleading. 
However, the reporting accountant is not required to 
give any opinion on whether the accounts give a 
"true and fair" view. 
* The quality of filed accounts are expected to 
deteriorate especially in case of Very SCs, which do 
not employ suitably qualified accountants. 
* The risk of fraud and error would probably increase. 
* It is claimed that banks would continue to demand 
audited accounts in some cases. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that a survey by the CharterGroup of 
150 bank managers revealed that: 
"... only 9% of branch managers had any great 
understanding of the legislation on audit 
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exemption and that 64% are likely to reduce the 
amount they are prepared to lend to businesses 
which dispense with the audit. 41% of the 
regional managers said they may still insist on 
audited accounts whilst others stated that they 
will seek additional security and guarantees 
where accounts are not audited". (The Small 
Practitioner, November 1994: 2). 
Furthermore, according to a research of bank 
managers by medium-sized firm Hacker Young's 
Manchester office, 84% of bank managers questioned 
felt that "audited accounts would remain a 
requirement for the majority of lending", despite 
the deregulation of the SC audit. Furthermore, 95% 
of the respondents also stated that "they would feel 
far less confident about receiving non-audited 
financial statements, even if they were from 
existing clients" (see Accountancy Age, 19 January 
1995: 3). 
However, as argued in section 5.6.2, it is difficult 
for banks to justify the need for audited accounts 
from all SCs. 
c) For auditors: 
* Small accountancy firms are expected to face 
increased competition from each other and from 
unqualified accountants for Very SC clients which 
may cause some firms to consider a merger in order 
to offer a better range of services. 
* Large accountancy firms are also expected to come 
under pressure from small firms in providing a 
compilation report, because their clients may employ 
the cheaper services of the smaller practitioner who 
has decided to dispense with audit registration. 
* As appeared from the surveys which have investigated 
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the effects of audit regulation on auditors' 
deregistration (see section 5.4), not many auditors 
are expected to deregister. 
5.9 Summary and conclusion 
All available evidence suggest that some early 
corporation had auditing which was voluntary. In their 
observation on the development of auditing, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983) argued that the committee of auditors 
survived because they were an efficient method of 
monitoring contracts between managers and those supplying 
capital. Furthermore, the shift from shareholder to 
professional auditor has been attributed mainly to an 
increase in the demand for audits in the period when 
audit was not required by statute in the UK and in the 
USA. 
Over the years since 1844, the main objective of audit 
has changed from detection of fraud and error to 
attesting to the credibility of financial statements 
(i. e. verification of financial accounting records' 
accuracy). This change has resulted from the gradual 
awareness and acceptance by company management of its 
responsibility for fraud and error detection and 
prevention, improvements in company law, financial 
reporting, accounting and auditing practices, and 
increasing use being made of reliable accounting 
information. However, detection of fraud and error 
remains the secondary objective of company audit because 
of their possible effect on the reliability of the 
accounting information. 
Generally, the structure of the company, with ownership 
often divorced from management, appears to justify the 
audit requirement. However, in SCs where owners and 
managers are the same and also due to SC characteristics 
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(e. g. internal control deficiencies), it is debateable 
whether such companies should be subjected to a normal 
audit. Furthermore, the introduction of audit regulation 
by the CA 1989 is claimed to have had a considerable 
burden on SCs and their auditors which has resulted in 
hardening the opinion against the retention of SC audit 
requirement. 
Having considered the cost of audit and the arguments for 
and against SC audit requirement and evaluated the 
alternatives to SC audit and possible cost savings and 
consequences of the current options, it appears that the 
government's drive to free SCs from unnecessary burdens 
is in the right direction. In this direction, the 
government should also consider exempting all owner- 
managed private SCs from statutory audit requirement. 
It is now up to SCs to show that they are able to satisfy 
the financial needs of their users and to maintain the 
quality of their accounts and financial discipline. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter considers the methods of data collection and 
analysis used for this research. 
6.2 The methods of data collection 
The following methods of data collection were used for 
this research: 
i) Literature review 
The SCFR issues were identified by reviewing the 
academic, professional and the Companies Acts literature 
(for example, text books and academic and professional 
journals on auditing and accounting with reference to 
SCs, the Companies Acts, auditing and accounting 
standards, technical releases, discussion papers and 
responses to discussion papers). 
ii) Personal interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with practising 
accountants/ auditors and directors/ shareholders of SCs 
were undertaken to pilot test the questionnaires and to 
discuss SCFR issues and also to clarify some unclear 
responses to the questionnaires. Post-review meetings 
were undertaken with some auditors who had already 
allowed the author to review a sample of their SC 
clients' accounts. 
Meetings and discussions were undertaken with appropriate 
officers of the DTI and the ICAEW to obtain materials 
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needed for the research. Meetings and discussions were 
also held with Mr. Wright, Head of Auditing of the ICAEW, 
to review the responses to the ICAEW's discussion paper 
on SC audit, as well as with Mr. Bowen, Secretary of the 
London Practitioner Board, to seek the LSCA's support for 
this research. 
In addition, extensive correspondence was undertaken with 
professional bodies in France, Holland, Belgium and 
Germany to obtain relevant information for international 
comparison. There were few available published papers on 
SCFR in those countries. 
iii) Survey of SC accounts (review of accounts) 
After considering a number of options (see Chapter 7), it 
was decided to undertake a telephone sample of 40 
professional colleagues and their contacts in "small" 
audit practice in London, of which 21 practitioners 
agreed to allow the author to carry out a review of their 
SC clients' accounts. Each practitioner was requested to 
select randomly a sample of five small non-dormant 
companies (as defined by the companies Act 1985 for 
filing abbreviated accounts) from their SC clients for 
accounts review. 
In total a sample of one hundred and five SC accounts was 
reviewed to check whether certain disclosures in the 
companies' accounts were consistent with financial 
reporting requirements. 
The details of sample selection and the main findings of 
the survey of accounts are provided in chapter 7. The 
rest of this Chapter considers postal questionnaire 
surveys, their sample selection, size and analysis. 
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iv) Postal questionnaires (surveys of directors and 
auditors of SCs) 
Postal questionnaires were used to ascertain the views of 
the directors/ shareholders and auditors /accountants of 
SCs about SCFR issues. 
The review of the main research in SCFR (Page, 1981; 
Carsberg et al, 1985 and Humphrey and Turley, 1986) 
indicates that the surveys of SC directors (as one of the 
main users of SC accounts) and SC auditors (who also, 
generally speaking, prepare accounts of SCs) are crucial 
in understanding SCFR. For this reason, and also the 
reasons given below, it was decided to ascertain the 
views of SC directors and auditors. 
a) Survey of directors 
Directors can play three roles as follows: 
- 
as management of a SC, they need the accounts for 
business decisions; 
- 
as main shareholders of a SC, they need the 
accounts for investment decisions; and 
- 
as trade creditors to other companies, they need 
the accounts for making credit decisions. 
Therefore, the survey of directors was very important 
for the results of this research as the three main 
uses were covered in this way. 
b) Survey of auditors 
The survey of auditors (and in particular small firms 
of auditors) was very important because: 
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- 
auditors normally have some small clients and 
therefore they have a good knowledge of SCs and 
their needs; 
- 
auditors are providers of services which are needed 
by SCs; and 
- 
auditors are interested in participating in 
professional developments and debates which impact 
not only on their own future and survival but also 
on their clients,. This has been evidenced in 
their responses to the discussion papers on SC 
audit debate (see 3.4) of the APC (1979) and the 
ICAEW (1992b). 
Postal surveys of directors and auditors were used 
instead of interviews because postal surveys: 
- 
were cheaper; 
- 
covered greater sample sizes spread over a larger 
geographical area (i. e. it was more representative); 
- 
had relatively easier administration and control; and 
- 
suited simple and closed (i. e. forced choice, pre- 
coded) questions (for advantages of this type of 
question see 6.4). 
Apart from the vital question of non-response (see 6.6), 
there are some disadvantages to the mail questionnaire 
method (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 260-261). For further 
details see 6.4. These were considered in advance in 
order to minimise their effects. 
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Comparison of the above methods of data collection with 
other major research 
Table 6.1: Comparison of the methods of data coliec 
with other maior research 
Authors/Research Survey of: Survey Methods of 
sample data 
size collection 
i) Page, 1981 Directors 413 Postal survey 
(for ICAEW) Auditors 413 Postal survey 
Accounts 1000 Review 
ii) Carsberg et al, Directors 50 Interview 
1985 (for ASC) Auditors 50 Interview 
Accounts 50 Review 
iii) Robertson, 1986a Accounts 100 Review 
iv) Humphrey & Turley Directors 40 Interview 
1986, (for ICAS) Auditors 148 Postal survey 
The methods of data collection and the target groups 
selected for this research (i. e. review of accounts and 
postal surveys of directors and auditors), are generally 
consistent with the methods and the target groups 
selected in the previous major research in this field 
(see the above table). 
6.3 Sample selections and sizes 
Surveys of auditors 
The surveys were designed to ascertain and compare the 
views of directors and auditors about SCFR issues. In 
order to be able to cross-reference their views, it was 
necessary either to contact auditors via their clients 
(i. e. directors) or vice-versa. 
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For the following reasons, it was decided to contact 
clients (i. e directors) via their auditors: 
i) the support of the LSCA could allow selection of 
auditors to ensure adequate representation of the 
different size categories of accountancy firms; 
ii) with the support of the LSCA, a higher response 
rate seemed likely, given that clients would 
receive questionnaires from their auditors, often 
with a covering letter; and 
iii) it was thought to be an efficient way of selecting 
the right clients, who were considered by their 
auditors to be of an appropriate size and 
interested in the SCFR debate. 
Three hundred and seventy five auditors were randomly 
selected from the LSCA's known Practitioner Members List. 
Based on the analysis of membership by district society 
and type, as at 30 September 1992, the LSCA had a total 
of 22,616 Members of which 7,635 were known practitioners 
(see ICAEW, 1992c: Quarterly Circular, Statistical 
Circular on Members, Students and Offices as at 30 
September, 1992). 
It is worth noting that the LSCA is the largest district 
society of the ICAEW. The ICAEW had 87,567 members in 
the UK as at 30 September 1992, of which 30,190 were 
known practitioners (see ICAEW, 1992c: Quarterly 
Circular). Thus, almost 25% of the UK membership or the 
UK known practitioners were based in London (LSCA). The 
auditors' sample size of 375 represents 4.9% of the total 
number of known practitioners of the LSCA or 1.2% of the 
total number of known practitioners of the ICAEW. 
In arriving at the above sample size, due consideration 
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was paid to the sample sizes of a number of previous 
major studies in this field (see 6.2). Furthermore, it 
was necessary to ensure that it would be sufficient to 
enable unbiased generalisation of the results and to meet 
the assumptions of the statistical tests that were used 
(i. e. in the one-degree-of-freedom situation, a minimum 
expected cell frequency of five is required for the chi- 
square analysis (Haber & Runyon, 1977: 325)). In order to 
ensure a reasonable distribution across different size 
and professional staff categories, the following 
comparative analysis was carried out, looking at "general 
population" and similar studies to this research. 
It is worth noting that, with regard to the regional 
nature of the data (London based), it is difficult to see 
why the auditing situation would be any different from 
London compared with other areas (see for example, Keasey 
and Watson, 1991). 
i) Distribution of auditors in the sample 
The majority of auditors (81%) in the sample were from 
firms with up to 5 partners. A further breakdown of the 
distribution of auditors in the sample and the "general 
population" is provided below: 
Table 6.2: Comoarison of distribution of auditors_betwee 
sample and "general population" 
general 
Size of Audit practice 
- 
Respondents Population 
No. of partners No. I 
1 (sole practitioner) 70 46 ) 71* 
2-5 53 35 
6- 10 12 8 15 
11 
- 
20 8 5 5 
21 
- 
50 2 1 3 
Over 50 8 5 6 
153 100 100 
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(Source for "general population" data: ICAEW, 1992c: 
Quarterly Circular, Statistical Circular on Members, 
Students and offices as at 30.9.1992). 
Although a strict comparison with "general population" 
data is not possible because the figure of 71%* relates 
to firms with up to 4 rather than 5 partners, and also 
the "general population" data assumes that all 
respondents were partners, nevertheless, a trend is 
discernible and it appears that the sample has a slightly 
higher number of "smaller" firms (up to 10 partners). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
distribution of auditors in the sample of this research 
mirrors that of Humphrey and Turley (1986), where a 
higher proportion of their sample (76.8%) came from firms 
with up to 5 partners. A similar trend was also observed 
when the sample was compared with that of Page (1981: 73), 
where again a higher proportion of his sample (62%) came 
from firms with up to 4 partners. As observed by Page 
(1981: 73) this trend is "... indicative of the fact that 
accounting work for small companies is usually done by 
small firms rather than the giants of the profession". 
This comparative analysis indicates that this research 
sample may have a slightly higher number of "smaller" 
firms (up to 5 partners) than that of Humphrey and Turley 
(1986) and probably that of Page (1981). (It should be 
pointed out that a strict comparison with Page (1981) is 
not possible as the figure of 62% relates to firms with 
up to 4 rather than 5 partners). 
ii) Distribution of professional staff 
A comparison of the number of professional staff 
(excluding partners) of the auditors' sample of this 
research with that of Humphrey and Turley (1986) is 
provided below: 
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Table 6.3: Comparison of distribution of professional 
staff between sample and Humphrey and Turley (1986)'S 
sample 
Number of professional 
staff 
o- 10 
11 
- 
25 
26 
- 
50 
51 
- 
100 
Over 100 
% of respondents 
This Survey Humphrey and 
Turley (1986) 
76 51.7 
10 24.5 
3 12.2 
3 6.5 
8 5.1 
100 100 
The above table indicates that a higher proportion of the 
respondents to this research compared with that of 
Humphrey and Turley (1986), came from audit practices 
with up to ten professional staff. Accordingly, this may 
support an earlier finding that the auditors' sample of 
this research has slightly higher number of "smaller" 
firms than that of Humphrey and Turley (1986). 
Other aspects of the sample of auditors are provided in 
Chapter 9. 
Survey of directors 
Three hundred and seventy five clients were selected 
through their auditors. This represents 0.23% and 0.08% 
of the estimated (see below) number of "active and 
independent" companies on the register at 31 March 1992, 
which had registered offices in Greater London and in 
Great Britain respectively. The estimated number of 
"active and independent" companies has been calculated on 
the basis of 40% (see Page, 1981: 33) of the number of 
companies on the register at 31 March 1992 by region of 
registered office (see Table A3, DTI, 1991/92: 28), which 
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was calculated to be 161,320 (40% * 403,300) and 472,080 
(40% * 1,180,200) companies with the registered offices 
in Greater London and Great Britain respectively. It 
should be pointed out that Freedman and Godwin (1993: 108) 
have included "non-active" companies in their 
calculations on the grounds that if these are not 
dormant, they are all subject to a statutory audit 
requirement. The inclusion of "non-active" companies 
would have further reduced the above reported percentages 
of 0.23% and 0.08%. 
Considering that this method of selecting clients (i. e. 
directors) through their auditors might result in a 
biased sample of unusually compliant clients, a follow-up 
to the survey was carried out to ascertain how the 
clients were selected by their auditors. A random sample 
of 25 auditors was contacted for a follow-up survey. 
They were among those who had already expressed 
willingness in the questionnaire to take part in the 
follow-up survey (i. e. respondents who had supplied their 
names and telephone numbers in response to questions 7.2 
and 7.3 of the questionnaire). A total of 23 auditors 
eventually agreed to take part in the follow-up survey. 
The original sample size of 25 was chosen, bearing in 
mind the cost and time involved. 
In the follow-up survey the following questions were put 
to the auditors: 
i) how did you select the client to whom you sent the 
directors' questionnaire? 
ii) did you send a covering letter with the 
questionnaire? 
In response to the first question, it was deduced from 11 
auditors that they selected those clients they felt, 
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based on past experience, were "reliable" to complete the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, 5 auditors claimed they 
selected clients they thought might be "interested" in 
the SC audit debate. Finally, 7 auditors claimed they 
selected SC clients on a random basis. 
In response to the second question, 16 auditors disclosed 
that they sent a covering letter or note in addition to 
the LSCA's covering letter. 7 auditors said that they 
did not send a covering letter but handed the 
questionnaire personally to their clients. Some auditors 
claimed they had contacted their clients by phone prior 
to mailing the questionnaire to them. 
In addition to the above follow-up survey, in order to 
ensure a reasonable distribution of the directors sample 
across different turnover (sales) and employment 
categories, the following comparative analysis was 
carried out. 
i) Distribution of turnover 
Table 6.4: Comparison of distribution of annual turnover 
between sample and "general population" 
Annual turnover 
£1 
- 
£O. 25m 
£O. 25m 
- 
£O. 5m 
£O. 5m 
- 
Elm 
Elm 
- 
£2m 
£2m 
- 
£5m 
Over 5m 
Sample "general population" 
34 55 
12 14 
24 12 
10 8 
12 6 
8 5 
100 100 
(Source for "general population" data: "Company size by 
turnover according to VAT (including building 
societies)", see Appendix C, Table 4 of DTI, 1994: 8). 
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It is worth noting that the sample appears to have less 
than the average number of SCs with an annual turnover 
below £O. 5m. According to the table, therefore, the 
sample of directors appears to come from relatively 
"larger" SCs (in terms of annual turnover) than average 
in the "general population". 
ii) Distribution of employment 
Table 6.5: Comparison of distribution of employment 
between sample and "general population" 
Number of employees Sample "general population" 
in company %% 
0-9 63 91 
10 
- 
19 25 4 
20 
- 
49 82 
50 
- 
99 31 
Over 99 12 
100 100 
(Source for "general population" data: Adapted from 
"Employment" statistics, see Appendix C, Table 7 of DTI, 
1994: 11). 
(Notes: The original ranges of employees in the sample 
were: 0- 10,11 
- 
20, etc. ). 
The above published employment statistics in respect of 
the "general population" do not distinguish companies 
from other legal structures (DTI, 1994: 7), therefore, 
precise comparison with the sample is difficult. 
However, the above data may further support the earlier 
finding that the sample of directors appears to come from 
relatively "larger" SCs (here in terms of employment) 
than average in the "general population". For example, 
up to 63% of the sample companies compared to 91% of the 
"general population" had up to 9 employees, whereas up to 
25% of the sample companies compared to 4% of the 
"general population" had between 10 and 19 employees. It 
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is worth pointing out that 96% of the sample companies 
(compared to 97% of the "general population") had up to 
50 employees, which is one of the criteria used by the CA 
1985 to define a SC. 
iii) ownership and control 
Table 6.6: Comparison of distribution of shareholdings by 
the board between sample and a sample of UK SMEs 1991 
(SBRC, 19921 
% of shares held by Sample SBRC (1992) 
the board All 
0% 1 4.8 
1- 25% 4 2.9 
26 
- 
50% 4 5.8 
51 
- 
75% 4 11.3 
76 
- 
99% 18 15.6 
100% 69 59.6 
100 100.0 
(Source: Extracted from SBRC (1992), see Cosh and Hughes, 
1994: 24). 
(Notes: percentages of shares held by the board in the 
sample included those held by their families as well). 
The SBRC (1992) data relates to the share ownership 
characteristics of UK businesses employing fewer than 500 
people, who responded to the Cambridge University 
National Small and Medium Sized Firms Survey in 1991. 
From the above table, it appears that the percentages of 
shareholdings by the boards of the sample companies are 
higher than those of SBRC (1992) survey. For example, 
87% of directors of the sample companies as compared to 
75% of "All" boards in the SBRC (1992) survey held over 
75% of the shareholdings in their companies. This 
difference might be due to the fact that the 
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shareholdings reported for the sample included those held 
by the board's families as well. 
From the above comparisons, it is possible to conclude, 
with some caution, that the sample companies appear to be 
"bigger" than "average" in terms of turnover and 
employment distribution. In terms of shareholdings (and 
control), the board of the sample companies appears to 
have a greater ownership and control than "average". 
6.4 Questionnaire design 
In order to ascertain the views of SC directors and 
auditors about SCFR issues, it was decided to use two 
separate sets of questionnaires. 
The starting point in the design of the questionnaire was 
to refer to the main objective of the research and the 
hypotheses, and to determine what questions should be 
included in order to gather relevant information to meet 
the above aims. 
There were four 
questionnaires: 
stages in the design of the 
Initial preparation 
It was decided to 
following sections, 
specific objectives: 
divide each questionnaire 
each section covering one 
into the 
or more 
* personal information 
- 
to gather personal information 
about the respondents; 
* organisation information 
- 
to gather information about 
the respondents' organisation; 
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* SC accounts 
- 
to ascertain the respondents' views on SC 
accounts issues; 
* SC audit 
- 
to ascertain the respondents, views on SC 
audit issues; and 
* others 
- 
to ascertain whether the respondents were 
interested in discussing the issues raised in the 
questionnaires. 
In addition to the above sections, the auditors' 
questionnaire included the following sections: 
* SC clients 
- 
to gather information about directors' 
shareholdings; and 
* services to SC clients 
- 
to collect information about 
accountants' services to SCs. 
The above sections helped to develop the more detailed 
aspects of the design in a logical order and were also 
considered helpful to the respondents in their 
comprehension of the questionnaire as a whole, thereby 
influencing the response rate (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 
346). 
References were made to similar research (see 6.2) and 
questionnaires to ensure the research objective could be 
satisfied. In particular, the valuable support of Prof. 
Page was obtained at this stage to modify and use some of 
his questions, which he had used in a similar research 
nearly a decade ago (Page, 1981). This was necessary to 
compare his findings with those of this research in order 
to evaluate the extent of changes over the last decade. 
In total, nearly one-third of the questions in both 
questionnaires used in this study were based on Page 
(1981)'s questionnaires. In particular, the author's 
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questionnaires benefited from questions relating to the 
following key areas: 
* the main advantages and disadvantages of incorporation; 
* the main users of SC accounts; 
* the importance to their users of certain information 
contained in the published accounts of SCs; 
* the principal benefit of audit and the main 
difficulties in auditing SCs; 
* the effects of the abolition of the audit requirement; 
and 
* the importance of services provided by auditors to SCs. 
In order to evaluate critically the developments in SCFR 
since Page (1981)'s surveys, it was considered necessary 
to raise a number of new questions, particularly those 
relating to the following areas: 
* the extent of audit qualifications in SCs and their 
reasons; 
* the effects of the withdrawal of the old "example 6" 
audit report; 
* the importance and usefulness of abbreviated accounts 
and the extent of their use; 
* the need for "one set of accounts" to replace both full 
and abbreviated accounts of SCs and their possible 
effects and contents; 
* the most important function of the audit in SCs; 
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* the statutory audit requirement in respect of three 
categories of SCs, namely: Very SCs, Owner-managed SCs 
and Other SCs; 
* the effect of replacing the statutory audit by a 
statutory review; 
* auditors'/directors' opinions about the information 
needs of some users of the accounts (e. g. Inland 
Revenue); 
* views about the CA 1985's thresholds used to define a 
SC; and 
* general views on specific SC issues (e. g. audit 
regulation, introduction of separate accounting and 
auditing standards for Scs and possible 
disincorporation). 
Use of closed type of questions 
The closed (i. e. forced choice, pre-coded) type of 
questions was used in the questionnaires because it had 
the following advantages (Moser & Kalton, 1971 and 
Oppenheim, 1966): 
* answers were standard and could easily be compared 
between respondents; 
* easier to code and analyse the questionnaires; 
* respondents were often clearer about the meaning of the 
questions; 
* easier to answer; 
* easier to deal with sensitive issues; and 
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* the number of irrelevant answers was minimised. 
However, from the outset, it was recognised that the 
closed type of questions had the following disadvantages: 
* if an appropriate answer was not offered, it might 
frustrate respondents; 
* differences in interpretation might go undetected; 
* respondents might simply guess an answer; and 
* too many choices might produce errors by respondents or 
clerical errors in analysis. 
In order to overcome the above problems, the respondents 
were invited to make additional comments if they thought 
an answer needed expansion. 
Adequate definitions and choices were provided and the 
use of technical terms was minimised as much as possible. 
At the analysis stage all choices were clearly coded to 
minimise any clerical error. 
Pilot study 
It was necessary to conduct a pilot study of the 
questionnaires in order to identify ambiguities in 
wording, difficulties in responding to the questions and 
incompleteness of a question. 
At this stage the problem of brevity as against 
completeness was considered and although it was 
recognised that a long questionnaire could lead to a 
lower response rate, it was decided that the advantages 
outweighed the disadvantages. Nevertheless, as these 
surveys were sponsored by the CUBS and supported by the 
260 
LSCA, high response rates were achieved. 
The pilot study was carried out using mailed 
questionnaire or semi-structured interviews. The pilot 
study groups, which consisted of the following (Table 
6.7) were randomly selected from the author's previous 
audit practice firm and its clients, with the exception 
of 3 accountants, who were approached from medium-sized 
and large firms in order to obtain different points of 
view. 
Table 6.7: Details of pilot study groups 
Organisation size Accountants Directors 
by no. of employees 
* "small" (up to 10) 74 
* "medium" (11 
- 
50) 22 
* "large" (more than 50) 11 
10 7 
Each pilot study reviewer was requested to submit a 
written list of suggestions for improving and revising 
the questionnaires. The pilot study responses have not 
been included in the final analysis of the results, 
because the questionnaires were evolving continuously 
during this stage and it was difficult to standardise 
responses. 
The results of the pilot study revealed that there was a 
marked difference in the knowledge of the directors 
compared to the auditors with regard to SCFR. For 
example, auditors in general had no problem in 
distinguishing between different form and content of the 
accounts (e. g. full and abbreviated accounts) and 
alternatives to SC audit. 
However, a number of directors appeared to lack full 
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understanding of these concepts. For this reason, it was 
decided not to include some specific questions in the 
directors' questionnaires, such as the application of 
SSAPs to SCs or audit requirement of different categories 
of SCs. It was observed that some of directors in the 
pilot study could differentiate between full and 
abbreviated accounts. However, they appeared to lack 
full understanding of the contents of different sets of 
accounts. These results should be treated with caution 
as the pilot group surveyed was rather small. 
Revision 
Some adjustments were made to the questionnaires as a 
result of the findings of the pilot study. 
Definitions were also added for certain technical terms 
used within a question. 
A final review of the questionnaires was made to ensure 
their clarity, lack of bias, sensitivity, level of 
knowledge demanded of the respondents (in particular 
directors) and their applicability to the research 
objectives and hypotheses. 
6.5 survey responses 
In November 1992, the questionnaires were mailed to a 
sample of 375 auditors with a covering letter from the 
LSCA (see Appendix 1) which requested their participation 
in this survey and also urged their co-operation in 
forwarding an enclosed questionnaire to their clients' 
directors. Two questionnaires were sent to each auditor. 
These were completely different from each other. One for 
the auditor and one for him to post to one of his 
clients. 
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The second requests were made in January 1993. At the 
cut-off date of 28 February 1993,106 analysable 
responses were received from directors of private 
companies (a response rate of 28.3%) and 153 analysable 
responses were received from auditors of private 
companies (a response rate of 40.8%). 
The response rates were considered to be satisfactory for 
this type of survey, taking into account the timing of 
postal surveys and length of questionnaires; the postal 
surveys of this research were carried out during the 
recession of 1992/93 when many SCs were adversely 
affected and relatively lower response rates were 
expected from the long questionnaires, which were used. 
For comparison, the response rates for similar postal 
questionnaire surveys were: 
- 
Page (1981): directors (41%) and auditors (69%); and 
- 
Humphrey & Turley (1986): auditors/accountants (nearly 
50%). 
Sponsorship by the CUBS, support of the LSCA and the 
topicality of the SCFR debate assisted in achieving the 
satisfactory response rates. 
Details of the respondents (directors and auditors) are 
given in sections 8.2 and 9.2 respectively. 
6.6 Tests of non-response bias 
The limitations of postal surveys must also be considered 
when forming the final conclusions (Moser & Kalton, 
1971). 
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The main problem with a questionnaire survey, is non- 
response (Moser & Kalton, 1971: 262) (i. e. the inference 
about how representative the answers of respondents are 
likely to be of the characteristics and opinions of non- 
respondents). 
Moser & Kalton (1971: 267) offer a number of solutions to 
deal with the non-response problem, one possibility 
being: 
"to make the, assumption that the respondents to a 
second mailing are a random sample of all the non- 
respondents to the first mailing and weight them up 
accordingly; this obviates the need for further 
mailing but its validity rests on the basic 
assumption. It is likely that the non-respondents are 
closer in their characteristics to those who respond 
to the follow-up effort than to those who do so to the 
initial mailing, but the assumption that they are the 
same is dubious". 
Therefore, in order to investigate the above, it has been 
assumed that the answers of the late respondents to the 
questionnaire were more similar to characteristics of 
non-respondents than were the answers of respondents who 
replied promptly. 
For both surveys, the cross-tabulation of answers to the 
following key issues failed to reject the hypothesis of 
similar responses from prompt and late respondents at a 
significant level: 
* the main users of SC accounts and delay in response to 
questionnaire; 
* the main disadvantage of incorporation and the delay in 
responding to the questionnaire; and 
* the main advantage of incorporation and the delay in 
responding to the questionnaire 
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Therefore, there is a little evidence that the responses 
to the questionnaires are unrepresentative of the 
opinions and characteristics of directors and auditors of 
SCs as a whole. 
6.7 Analysis of results 
The results of the questionnaires were analysed using the 
Minitab statistical package at the CUBS computer centre. 
It was necessary to construct master tables for the 
results of each questionnaire, which could be sub-divided 
into a range of different criteria, to facilitate 
statistical analysis and cross-referencing of the 
results. 
It should be pointed out that where the respondents were 
requested to rank items in order of importance, their 
responses were reported in Chapters 8 and 9 on the basis 
of the number of first ranks accorded by the respondents 
and not by a weighted score. It has not been possible to 
carry out rating on a weighted score basis because not 
all the respondents ranked all the items in order of 
importance. If rating on a weighted score basis had been 
carried out, it could have provided a fairer assessment 
of the relative importance of the items in the questions. 
Furthermore, the estimated "average" in this research 
refers to the weighted average of the mid-points of a 
five or six 
- 
category scale (e. g. 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 
61-80%, 81-100%). 
6.8 Statistical tests 
Chi-square test of independence 
The objective of the statistical tests was to carry out 
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cross-analysis of the results with the aim of confirming 
consistency of answers and identifying interesting 
correlations. 
As most of the data collected through the questionnaires 
were in terms of frequencies in discrete categories and 
their distributions did not exhibit the characteristics 
of normal distributions, it was necessary to use non- 
parametric tests which do not rely on the assumption of 
normal distributions (Haber & Runyon, 1977). 
These tests, such as chi-square, are robust and are 
applicable to a wide range of distributions but they tend 
to result in a conservative treatment of the data (e. g. 
it may not be possible to state that a statistically 
significant difference exists between the clients of 
small and large practices in relation to some attribute, 
despite what appear to be large differences between the 
means of their distributions). 
However, it was considered that the chi-square test of 
independence was the appropriate statistical test because 
the groups were independent and the data were in terms of 
frequencies in discrete categories (Siegel, 1956) (i. e. 
contingency table), where: 
Null hypothesis (H 0): There is no relationship between 
groups of people in their opinion about a given issue. 
Alternative hypothesis (H 1): There is a relationship 
between groups of people in their opinion about a given 
issue. 
Therefore, the significant non-random association between 
results were identified by chi-square tests giving a 
significance (chance of random association) of less than 
5%. 
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Limitations in the use of the chi-square test 
According to Haber & Runyon (1977), the limitations of 
chi-square tests are: 
- 
the frequency counts must be independent of one 
another. 
-a rule which has been generally adopted, in the one- 
degree-of-freedom situation, is that the expected 
frequency in all cells should be equal to or greater 
than 5. When the degree of freedom is greater than 
one, the expected frequency should be equal to or 
greater than 5 in at least 80% of the cells. 
There are several procedures which can be followed with 
tables having too many small expected frequencies: 
* reduce the number of rows and/or columns; or 
* remove one or more levels of a classification. 
The above procedures result in testing a different null 
hypothesis. 
Correction for continuity 
In the one-degree-of-freedom situation, a correction for 
continuity is required to obtain a closer approximation 
of the obtained chi-square values to the theoretical 
distribution, because the empirical distributions of 
categorical variables are discrete, whereas the 
theoretical distributions of chi-square are continuous 
(Haber & Runyon, 1977: 323). 
This correction is also referred to as F. Yates' 
adiustment (Fisher, 1970: 94), where each observed 
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frequency is reduced by half a unit. 
Gamma statistic to measure the degree of association 
Where associations between variables were indicated by 
significant chi-square tests and the variables were 
either dichotomies or naturally ordered, the degree of 
association had been measured by the use of the Gamma 
statistic. 
Where both variables are dichotomies, Gamma is known as 
"Yule's Q'I and the following conventions are used for 
describing the association (Davis, 1971): 
Table 6.8: Conventions to describe association (Gammal 
Absolute value of Gamma 
0.00 
- 
0.09 
0.10 
- 
0.29 
0.30 
- 
0.49 
Convention 
negligible 
association 
low association 
moderate 
association 
0.50 
- 
0.69 
0.70 or higher (up to 1) 
substantial 
association 
very strong 
association 
"Yule's Q" is one of the best known measures of 
association in the social sciences. It lies between 
-1 and +1 with zero implying statistical independence 
(Reynolds, 1977). It is a very simple measure of 
association for a2x2 contingency table. 
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6.9 summary and conclusion 
In collecting the data for this research, due 
consideration was paid to different methods of data 
collection, in particular, surveys of SC accounts, 
directors and auditors. 
The pilot study helped to clarify a number of ambiguities 
in the wording of the questionnaires and identified the 
marked difference in the knowledge of the directors and 
auditors, which subsequently enhanced the final draft of 
the questionnaires. 
Postal questionnaires were used to ascertain the views of 
directors and auditors of SCs about certain SCFR issues. 
Owing to the topicality of the debate, with sponsorship 
by CUBS and the support of the LSCA, satisfactory 
response rates were achieved for both surveys, the 
findings of which are reported in Chapters 8 and 9 
respectively. 
The next Chapter considers the main findings of the 
survey of accounts. 
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